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EDUCATION, DEMOCRACY AND REPRESENTATION IN JOHN STUART 
MILL’S POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 
Corrado Morricone 
Abstract 
This thesis is concerned with John Stuart Mill’s democratic theory.   
In chapter I, I examine the relations between political philosophy and political theory 
and science before providing a detailed outline of the aims of the dissertation.  
In chapter II, I argue that in order to reconcile the concepts of progress and equality 
within a utilitarian theory, a Millian political system needs to devise institutions that 
promote general happiness, protect individual autonomy, safeguard society from 
mediocrity. 
Chapter III discusses what different authors have said about Mill and liberty, then 
explores James Mill’s theory of education and Coleridge’s influence on John Stuart Mill’s 
thought. I conclude by criticising Richard Arneson’s interpretation according to which 
the Considerations and On Liberty are inconsistent, and some of Gregory Claeys’ 
conclusions on Mill and paternalism. 
Chapter IV explores the methodology of the social sciences and the philosophy of history 
as found in Mill’s writings; then it considers Mill’s thought in regard to his father’s 
Radical proposals. I also discuss at some length the idea of the tyranny of the majority. 
Chapter V begins with a discussion of Hanna Pitkin’s theory of representation. I then 
provide a critical account of Richard Krouse and Nadia Urbinati’s interpretations of Mill. 
I conclude by arguing that, in a Millian democracy, the higher is the degree of complexity 
or the need for expertise in dealing with affairs, the greater is the bearing of the 
principle of competence in assessing whether a representative should act as a trustee 
or a delegate. I also introduce the idea of rational debate as a sort of ‘influence 
multiplier’, arguing that this would help to make a democracy rational and effective 
along Millian lines. 
In the last two chapters, I stress the relevance of Mill’s political philosophy as for some 
contemporary issues (nationalism, European federalism, current social and economic 
changes) while suggesting some potential further investigations, and summarise my 
conclusions. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The main philosophical text on which this thesis is based is John Stuart Mill’s 
Considerations on Representative Government1. It is a book which brings together many 
views and ideas that Mill had already expressed during his life2. At the same time, it is 
not just a summary of a lifelong reflection on political philosophical issues; it is also used 
by Mill to argue in favour of representative democracy and of a free society.  
In general, this thesis touches many aspects of Mill’s political philosophy, not focusing 
just on CRG, but using it as a starting point for a more general investigation. Some 
preliminary issues are clarified in this introduction. 
Firstly, a number of pages deal with procedural issues, formation of laws, composition 
of legislative bodies. This prompts the question of whether CRG are a purely political-
philosophical book, or whether it rather belongs to more practically-oriented fields such 
political theory or political science. 
Secondly, a general overview of main critical literature is given, in order to inform the 
reader of the different interpretative frameworks in which Mill’s political, social and 
moral philosophy can be understood. 
Finally, I describe the aims of this thesis and the reasons for its structure. 
 
 
1 From now on, mentioned as CRG. It is worth to point out now that, as regards John Stuart 
Mill’s texts, as a reference I will use his Collected Works published by the University of 
Toronto Press (see the bibliography at the end of this thesis). E.g.: a reference to Mill’s 
Utilitarianism, chapter I, will be expressed in the following form: Utilitarianism, CW X, pp. 
205-208. 
2 As Mill states in the Preface of the work (CRG, CW XIX, p. 373), ”the principles are those to 
which I have been working up during the greater part of my life, and most of the practical 
suggestions have been anticipated by others or by myself”. 
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I.I. BETWEEN POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY AND POLITICAL SCIENCE 
While reading CRG, one might wonder – maybe naïvely –which category of writing it 
falls into. Drawing a sharp line between different subjects such as political philosophy 
or political theory, or political philosophy and political science, or, in some cases, 
between any of these and the history of political thought, is obviously not easy, and it is 
not going to be discussed here. It can even be questioned whether any real distinction 
among these areas of study actually exists and whether it is not just a form of 
nominalism, or what are the differences regarding objects of study, approach, 
relationship with conceptual content, historical development of certain ideas or certain 
political systems. However, if one had to decide into which category CRG should be 
placed, the answer would not be immediate. These uncertainties may possibly be 
summarised in one single question: what is the philosophical value of a book whose a 
number of chapters deal with electoral systems, composition of the parliament, 
legislative procedures, colonies and so on? 
Initially, it can be stated that CRG are at the intersection of political philosophy, political 
theory, and the development of institutional mechanisms and legislation. It is not, 
therefore, merely a philosophical text. First of all, then, it is necessary to emphasise that 
the issues Mill discusses are a cross-over of political philosophy and political science, 
and that therefore these two domains provide, together, a reasonable basis from which 
to approach his political writings. On the one hand, the description of the way the 
political institutional process ought to be remains at the heart of Mill’s political proposal; 
he accepts typical liberal features such as the separation of powers and the 
representative democracy framework, of which he describes characteristics, 
composition, modalities of operation. On the other hand, however, Mill retains his 
interest in fundamental questions about the form of government, the way rulers are 
chosen, how to define their appropriate qualities, the role of intellectuals, philosophers, 
skilled and educated people in politics. So, to what extent is Mill’s CRG philosophical and 
to what degree does it cover fundamental and general issues about political values and 
aims? 
Recently, such problems related to the status of political sciences, theory and philosophy 
have been very synthetically but clearly illustrated by Jeremy Waldron (2013). Scholars 
(and students) of political issues must be aware of the manifold aspects they involve, 
Waldron warns: indeed, one may consider politics simply in a legal, or procedural, way, 
and in general by means of the institutions of political process; on the other hand, one 
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may investigate moral qualities and virtues of the ruler and, in general, of the 
individuals involved in politics, and so on. Furthermore, people interested in political 
issues may direct their attention to the aims of society in terms of the values such a 
society should pursue and to which institutional means should be used in order to 
espouse such values. In other words: “The question now is whether we should direct 
our theoretical energy to questions about (1) the individual virtues that good 
governance requires, or (2) the political institutions that are needed in a good society 
formed of humans rather than angels, or (3) the ends and ideals that a good society 
should be seeking to promote” (p. 5). Of course, political and legal institutions in which 
political processes occur must not be underestimated; the point is that any form of study 
or reflection on any aspect of politics cannot just be empirical. Indeed, justice, individual 
liberty, fairness, humanity, respect and dignity are not just vague or highly theoretical 
philosophical concepts but are also everyday practical, legal, political and institutional 
concerns. Hence, the questions of which values we ground our political model and which 
kind of goals we seek to achieve when we establish a legal code or a political institution, 
are not just empirical or descriptive concerns. They require higher level reflection, and 
need to concretely face society, history, even symbolism of some political processes. 
It is not to be ignored that Mill is well aware of such a contrast: at the beginning of CRG 
he examines to what extent forms of government are a matter of choice or not (CRG, CW 
XIX, pp. 374-382) or, in other words, whether philosophical speculations on political 
institutions should be descriptive (since any form of government is just a sort of natural 
product of a living, social organism) or normative (as a nation’s government is just a 
matter of choice, or at least the result of premeditated political and social engineering 
which can be theorised beforehand, and consequently modelled, accordingly to human 
wishes, purposes, values etc., the core issue is how a government ought to be). Mill 
affirms that any of these theories considered individually is absurd, and that both of 
them contain partial truth: it is true that political institutions are theorised and then 
forged by men, but, also, no form of government can be imposed or be successful in 
achieving its purposes in the long run if its citizens are unable to fulfil the condition it 
requires, if they have not arrived at an adequate stage of civilisation, or if they are not 
interested in political participation (particularly in representative government). So, 
when it comes to political investigation, both views must be taken into consideration, 
and it is quite hard (or sterile) to separate philosophical research on political values and 
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aims from the institutional and legal tools they need to be achieved and satisfied3. Mill’s 
project may somehow resemble Aristotle’s plans in Politics in which certain elements 
regarding the ideal city are specified (e.g. they must reflect the right size in terms of 
territory, wealth, number of rulers and magistracies): indeed, Mill carries out an 
examination of the forms of the existing constitutions and their degenerations, with a 
focus on the analysis of the polis and their genealogy as well, quite far from proposing 
purely utopian projects, but still addressing a number of philosophical issues. 
A final element gives further insight to the ‘philosophical status’ of this book: as will be 
illustrated in this thesis, CRG contains many assumptions and implications related to 
Mill’s ethics and to his view of the human being as a progressive being. According to Mill, 
political institutions need and, at the same time, promote both social and individual 
improvement; they work in a manner to lead to a process of personal, political and 
cultural Bildung which, in turn, is necessary to strengthen democratic institutions.  
This is how CRG ought to be a considered from a philosophical perspective. 
I.II. THE AIMS OF THIS STUDY 
This work aims, at first, to illustrate Mill’s political philosophy and to offer a discussion 
of leading interpretations of some other contributors to the study of John Stuart Mill’s 
political thought. It does not offer new or unused sources, but it rather is an attempt to 
analyse the plausibility of some interpretations of Mill. The goal of such attempt is to 
give an hopefully comprehensive view of Mill’s political theory and to subsequently 
focus on some specific points which may constitute a Millian theory. Therefore, the 
discussion regarding some of the many scholars who have contributed to the study of 
Mill’s thought and provided different interpretations is used as a means within this 
thesis, rather than as its end; it aims to provide a lense, or a filter, for: 
 
3  This is an example of Mill’s “half-truths theory” (Coleridge, CW X, p. 122), which is 
illustrated and discussed infra, chapter III, section II. 
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- a discussion on the relevance of a Millian democracy today (see Chapter VI, on 
Mill’s place in a “liquid” world, and on the role of the nation-states and European 
federalism),  
- some hints on potential new research (such as in political ethics, see section 
IV.VI),  
- a discussion on political problems (such as the role of “technocrats” in a 
representative democracy, see section IV.V.) which have, for example, arisen in 
recent years in Europe.  
However, another way to describe and explain the aims of this thesis may be to consider 
the path which led to it. When my research began, its main purpose was to look for a 
comprehensive description of Mill’s theory of democracy, his political theory and his 
links with other intellectuals, among whom it is worth mentioning the Philosophical 
Radicals (James Mill, Jeremy Bentham), Alexis de Tocqueville, Samuel Taylor Coleridge 
and François Guizot. In other words, it started as a plan of readings within the attempt 
to collect, analyse and investigate the philosophical roots of Mill’s CRG. It was more a 
scholarly work on history of philosophy than a genuine philosophical investigation. In 
fact, at the beginning of my work the focus was on the intellectual influences of James 
Mill and Jeremy Bentham on John Stuart Mill, as the latter was exposed to philosophical 
radicalism from his youth, and his intellectual activity and his newspapers writings had 
the goal of supporting and promoting the Radical political agenda, primarily concerned 
with institutional reform. At that stage of research, the existence of several key 
differences between the democratic proposals of Bentham and James Mill became 
clearer and clearer4. For example, aside from some practical and institutional issues, a 
relevant difference emerged between the two thinkers regarding the role and degree of 
independence granted to the representatives of the people: Bentham expected the MP, 
or the politician in general, to be independent in representing his electorate, because 
there is no coincidence of interests between the rulers and the ruled in a democracy. 
Instead, the elder Mill claimed in his famous Essay on Government such coincidence does 
exist, granted that a limit to the duration of the term as a representative is established 
(Mill, James, 1992 (1819-1823), pp. 22-26). So, Bentham could use American democracy 
 
4 In this sense, I have found a number of relevant considerations in Rosen, 1983, as they 
sketch a comparison of Bentham’s Constitutional Code with James Mill’s political doctrine 
(which was the "official" doctrine of the philosophical radicalism) and with CRG. 
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as an example and he at least avoided a part of Macaulay’s criticism of the Radical 
democratic model and of the a priori model applied to social and political sciences.  
Regarding the differences between Bentham and John Stuart Mill on the role of the 
people, during my research it has emerged how John Stuart Mill is deeply influenced by 
concerns regarding individual development, and the educative argument is probably 
the most relevant swerve from the typical utilitarian political philosophy: Mill’s aim is 
to find a counterweight to mass voting in order to create a well-functioning 
representative system in which everyone’s voice is heard (included that of the 
intellectuals), the dangers of democratic government are hindered and a process of civic 
and moral education takes place; this problem in some sense was already considered 
by Bentham, who feared abuses of the rulers (and not of the people somehow unfit for 
democracy, as Mill did) and searched institutional and educational tools in order to 
solve problems posed by the principle of competence; however, differences exist at the 
level of practical institutional solutions, such as the electoral law and the role of 
government5. So, with respect to Mill's political proposals, the first questions I have 
tried to answer during the initial stages of my research are: What are the differences 
between Mill’s theory and Philosophical Radicals' political thought? Why did Mill change 
his political proposal during his life?  
It may be worthwhile to remember here that the radical legislative and political 
proposals were: adoption of universal suffrage, reform of the electoral constituencies 
(that over-represented aristocracy and landowners), abolition of slavery, systematic 
reorganisation of British legislation and of the common law system, along with a set of 
economic reforms according to free trade and laissez-faire principles. 
However, although Mill kept supporting most of the radical political proposals, the ideas 
on which they were grounded faced a change (sometimes a deep change) throughout 
his life; Mill’s interest in defending the intellectual and rational élite of society from the 
 
5 It is interesting to notice that Rosen tries to answer – in Bentham’s stead – to John Stuart 
Mill’s criticism on the tyranny of the majority without taking into account other problems 
raised by Mill himself, such as the danger of mediocrity (which is a consequence of the 
tyranny of majority) and excessive homogeneity of democratic societies – a matter strictly 
connected to Mill’s theory of liberty. 
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more and more important role in public life obtained by low-skilled people became one 
of the most relevant aspects of this research. 
I have also been looking, at the beginning of my study, for a relationship between Mill's 
theory of development and some nineteenth century British institutional problems (i.e. 
suffrage, electoral reform, role of the parliament, role of the government, social 
problems, etc.); this study, indeed, initially tried to understand how his contemporary 
historical and political situation influenced Mill's political theory, how such theory was 
inspired by several different currents of thought and intellectuals, and how it differs 
from Radical politics. Alongside the importance of some elitist (or, at least, apparently 
elitist) elements that Mill introduced gradually in his political thinking, the study of the 
political, historical and intellectual processes from which CRG have originated has also 
highlighted how John Stuart Mill was intellectually born as a democrat – and he 
describes himself in his Autobiography as a democrat in the later stage of his life 
(Autobiography, CW I, p. 239) – how he supports until the end of his life the extension 
of suffrage to the working class as well as to women, and, finally, how contamination of 
his thought by some apparently non-democratic elements is, therefore, all aimed to 
protect the core and essence of his democratic political thought. 
When it comes to Mill’s description (and self-description) as a democrat, however, some 
debate may arise. Indeed, one of the traditional interpretations of Mill’s political 
philosophy suggests that he was not a genuine democrat. J. H. Burns (1968 (1957)), for 
example, highlights Mill’s distinction between true and false democracy, being the latter, 
according to Burns’ interpretation, a ”travesty of democracy”, a distortion of the 
representative system “in favour of the majority” which can only be corrected by 
proportional allocation of seats and representation of minorities (p. 327), and assumes 
another differentiation, i.e. the one between democracy and representative 
government6. According to Burns, Mill would prefer the latter, and therefore any critical 
position towards Mill’s democratic government is simply a misunderstanding, as it 
would wrongly include the English philosopher in the group of the supporters of 
democracy. Other mainstream interpretations of Mill's political theory, anyway, 
consider it still anchored to democratic solutions. Thompson (1976), for example, 
includes Mill within the democratic tradition of thought; furthermore, he identifies two 
 
6 For a longer account on Burns and on this distinction, see infra, chapter IV, section IV. 
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basic (but rich in their assumptions and implications) conflicting principles within Mill’s 
political and social philosophy: the principle of participation and the principle of 
competence. They are to some extent antagonistic: according to Thompson’s 
interpretation of Mill’s democratic theory, for example, the participation of a large 
number of voters, or even universal suffrage, are likely to influence the political life of a 
country or of a parliament in a poorly informed way. The solution to this antagonism is 
the principle of education, which covers both school-based, academic, cultural 
education in the broadest sense, and civic education; in other words, political 
participation is a means to increase policy expertise and civil, moral and intellectual 
qualities of citizens, and to reduce the dangers of bureaucratic routine and of, as 
evidenced by Tocqueville, the tyranny of the majority. There is also another different 
perspective (Urbinati, 2002) according to which Mill would be the advocate of a social 
and political philosophy in which free and rational discussion is the central point of the 
political system. In CRG, e.g., the legislative assembly is meant as the centre of political 
debate, the technical aspects of legislative activity would be largely left in the hands of 
experts while the deliberative activity and more broadly political discussion would 
remain in the hands of the elected representatives. According to this view, Mill proposes 
a kind of deliberative democracy based on the model of the Athenian polis, with 
emphasis on its deliberative aspects. 
The different interpretations regarding both On Liberty and CRG have a different weight 
in this thesis, and, of course, issues such as individual freedom, political ethics, links 
between John Stuart Mill’s political philosophy and classical utilitarianism are topics 
covered and discussed as necessary. However, Mill’s moral thought will always remain 
in the background. In fact, a global view of Mill’s works is to be taken into consideration: 
e.g., On Liberty suggests the limits of government action, and examination and 
understanding of the moral and social principles supported by John Stuart Mill have 
been preliminary steps of this research. At the same time, as the central point of this 
thesis is concerned with the most purely political aspects of Mill’s philosophical 
production, a straightforward approach towards political and social issues and closely 
regarded political and legal institutions has been required. One of the aims of this work 
is to investigate and underline both principles and practical proposals which were 
thought in order to protect best competences and skills from what Alexis de Tocqueville 
called “tyranny of the majority”, and it has perhaps to be remarked here that a further 
stage of my research, indeed, dealt with Tocqueville, and with other thinkers such as 
Guizot and Coleridge: Mill has in his mind and shares the views expressed in 
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Tocqueville's Democracy in America, according to which the transition process towards 
democracy in developed countries is almost unavoidable and one can discuss only the 
kind of democracy that one wants to set up. Another element of philosophical influence 
on Mill is Coleridge’s ideas on the importance of the so-called clerisy in education, as 
well as the role of traditional forces in society. In other words, the first part of my work 
tried to identify at least a substantial and relevant part of the philosophical, cultural, 
historical and political frame in which the author was involved. 
After this, my research has also considered what model of democracy Mill has in his 
mind: among the most important research topics related to Mill’s democratic theory and 
to his social and historical views, there are Mill’s interpretation of the Athenian agora 
against liberal and conservative points of view of the ancient world, and his reading of 
the works of the French historian François Guizot – whose aim to find general laws or 
tendencies during the process of civilisation influenced Mill – and of Alexis de 
Tocqueville’s Democracy in America. 
However, this thesis will not simply focus on the historical and philosophical 
background of CRG and on its critical reception and assessments, although the initial 
idea for this study, as I already said, was to track the formation of the main concepts 
behind Mill's political philosophy. In this sense it gradually became clearer and clearer 
during my research that a more challenging task would have been to study and describe 
and then critically assess, at least on some of its points, the ideal, theoretical foundation 
of a certain social and political order – in this case, of Mill’s political proposals. A number 
of concepts, a certain conceptual background, a precise point of view emerged over and 
over again while reading Mill: for instance, are not both the adoption of Coleridge’s 
clerisy and the worry for an adequate level of civilisation in a society a reflection of Mill’s 
interest in the intellectual development of individuals as well as of society as a whole? 
From here, then, the idea of focusing not on the intellectual itinerary that led Mill to 
write CRG, but on the political-philosophical core of Mill’s democratic thought, which 
assumes a form of democracy in which the civil and intellectual progress of society is 
both cause and consequence of the democratic process and of political participation. 
Education (or civilisation) and democracy, therefore, are closely interrelated. Mill’s 
democracy also requires representative institutions; so, in order to understand what we 
are dealing with, the concept of representation assumes a clear relevance: starting from 
this point of view, I then redirected and reshaped the work to which my study was 
intended to lead and I focused, therefore, on considering some cardinal elements of CRG.  
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Three fundamental ideas will thus comprise the main object of discussion of this thesis: 
education, democracy, and representation. The overall aim is to describe and question 
these concepts, as they are basic pillars of Mill’s political thought.  
Chapter II introduces the utilitarian political philosophy and chapter III considers 
education and its fundamental role for a democracy to succeed in accomplishing its 
goals.  
Chapter IV is on democracy and illustrates which form of government John Stuart Mill 
has in his mind; it will be, in part, a description of the institutional system of course, but 
also an investigation of its philosophical roots and meaning. Democracy, as a stand-
alone term, is too vague to be fully understood without proper contextual expansion. It 
therefore requires proper specification and illustration: is it just a form of classical 
representative government, or does it involve and imply more sophisticated social and 
political interactions? The final section of chapter IV deals with Mill’s political ethics: 
what are (if there are any) the moral obligations of citizens/members of a 
representative democracy?  
In chapter V attention is finally drawn to political representation and on how should an 
MP or an elected ruler should behave in relation to his or her constituents’ will, values 
and needs. 
Chapter VI contains two points of possible relevance for a Millian approach to today’s 
social and political practical and theoretical problems: 
a) I employ Zygmunt Bauman’s theory of liquid modernity in order to show that 
perhaps Mill’s political and social philosophy today may show some problems 
if happiness and freedom depart from each other.  I argue, on the one hand, 
that a number of elements (the weakening of common class, political or group 
sentiment; the possibility, over one’s life, to be on different rungs on the social 
ladder; the increasing power of multinational/supranational economic and/or 
financial powers; the decline of the effective political power of nation-states) 
may lessen the strength of Mill’s argument in favour of a representative 
government or, at least, the efficacy of a representative democracy devised in 
the way he describes in CRG. Yet, on the other hand, the ever-increasing 
possibility of networking and the ‘liquid’ structure of society may assist 
intellectuals and the well-educated to play a useful role and, perhaps, discharge 
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more fully their moral obligations to participate in political life. Therefore, how 
to deal politically with the possible detachment of liberty from consequent 
happiness (i.e., what if liberty turns out not to be very effective in promoting 
the pursuit of pleasures, satisfaction and happiness?)? 
b) Another issue arises from the outcome of this work, i.e. how Mill’s political 
ideas can be practically applied with special reference to the case for and 
against European federalism. I argue in favour of a federalist view of Mill’s 
thought, which leaves room for supranational political federations, despite 
stressing the importance of protecting different national cultures. 
Chapter VII deals with my conclusions, mostly based on the discussion on Mill’s 
relevance and on the possible inadequacies and weaknesses of existing accounts 
presented in the previous chapters of this thesis, mainly those that see Mill as strongly 
paternalistic.  
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II. A NOTE ON THE UTILITARIAN POLITICAL 
PHILOSOPHY 
In this chapter, I provide a description of the assumptions which underlie John Stuart 
Mill’s political philosophy. Even though it would definitely take too much space to 
discuss at length and in detail the intellectual background and philosophical grounds of 
Mill’s thought, a summary must first be provided in order to put Mill’s ideas in context 
and give them proper foundation. Hence, the aim of this chapter is not to provide 
justification or criticism or assessment of utilitarianism and philosophical radicalism, 
or even liberalism and progressivism in general, but rather to summarize and describe 
for the purpose of the argument what utilitarianism is, on which assumptions it lies, 
what are its core concepts – mainly with reference to Mill’s re-elaboration of it.  
In the first section, I summarise John Stuart Mill's Utilitarianism, trying to simply clarify 
what its main arguments are. 
In the second section I assess the political-philosophical relevance of utilitarian ethics 
within Mill's thought: I stress the relevance of progress and equality, since everyone's 
happiness has to be maximised, and how these concepts may not seem, at least at first 
sight, perfectly consistent when we look at the rest of Mill's political philosophy.  
This is an introductory chapter (perhaps a second introduction), and the attempt here 
is to give an overview of Mill's utilitarianism and to conclude on its consequences, 
implications and features in the field of social and political philosophy, and to provide 
at least a substantial part of the background of Mill’s take on democracy. 
II.I. MILL’S  UTILITARIANISM 
Printed in its first edition in 1863, and subject to further revisions in its fourth edition 
(1871), Utilitarianism is the text which best summarises Mill’s views in the field of 
utilitarian ethics. 
Utilitarianism is defined by Mill as follows: 
The creed which accepts as the foundation of morals, Utility, or the Greatest 
Happiness Principle, holds that actions are right in proportion as they tend 
to promote happiness, wrong as they tend to produce the reverse of 
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happiness. By happiness is intended pleasure, and the absence of pain; by 
unhappiness, pain, and the privation of pleasure (Utilitarianism, CW X, p. 
210) 
Mill, however, does not rely solely on this formulation of the utilitarian moral principle; 
he also admits that there are consistency and compatibility between the greatest 
happiness principle and “the fact, that some kinds of pleasure are more desirable and 
more valuable than others” (p. 211). Mill introduces the figure of the competent judge, 
from whose verdict “there can be no appeal” (p. 213).  In order to decide which is the 
object or experience, between two available, which causes more happiness (either 
presence of pleasure or at least absence of pain), both have to be tested. In other words, 
competent moral judgement is provided by the experience of different forms and 
qualities of pleasure and pain7. Furthermore, the concept of dignity may be included in 
 
7 However, this is quite a controversial or at least not obvious point. What happens, for 
examples, if judges disagree? In terms of pleasure, moreover, some may find allegedly lower 
pleasures better than allegedly higher pleasures, even if they have experienced and are 
acquainted with both. For instance, not all football-playing philosophers would say that 
philosophy is better than football in terms of pleasure (Scarre, 2002, pp. 56-57). However, a 
football-playing philosopher may still maintain that philosophy is better than football 
because it helps investigating and hopefully attaining some truths which may help us to have 
a more enjoyable life (if you are an optimistic philosopher). Another one may even sensibly 
say that doing sports is actually better than philosophy on a consequentialist basis, at least 
under some circumstances, because it is good for health, and being in good health provides 
some form of pleasure or at least of pain avoidance. Much can be said on this topic, and as 
this a sort of foundational chapter where some principles are introduced as if they were 
reasonably valid at least in a large number of circumstances, I will just point out here the 
fact that the figure of the competent judge may be object of discussion and what matters for 
my purposes (i.e. a research mostly and primarily on political matters rather than moral 
ones) is rather the relevance of competence as a means to usually bring about some form of 
pleasure both at an individual and a more general social level, even if it may occur to 
competent people to suggest things not so clearly enjoyable. I am assuming, in other words, 
the idea that most, although perhaps not all, forms of competence are, although not always 
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such view: if we consider satisfaction of our higher faculties as included in our sense of 
human dignity, we can conclude that it may become a source of happiness in itself and, 
hence, the sense of human dignity may turn itself into an object of desire. The point is 
that the preference for higher pleasures in spite of lower pleasures does not sacrifice 
happiness: actually those who have experienced both would normally favour the former 
rather than the latter, because only those who have experienced higher pleasures – i.e., 
those that commit the highest intellectual faculties – may prefer (in the sense that they 
may both think better and choose more frequently) them to lower pleasures. It is clear, 
therefore, that, from this point of view, different experiences of life and an empirical 
attitude become important within Mill’s philosophy, since it is from experience (not just 
of a single event, but rather of a set of facts and of a whole lifestyle in its moral, social, 
cultural and intellectual aspects), and not from a given, ideal, theoretical system of 
thought, that Mill’s ethical reflection arises. 
Mill’s utilitarian ethics is not devoid of elements which have become object of criticism, 
even from the same philosophical utilitarian field to which Mill himself belongs. For 
instance, T. H. Green, in his Prolegomena to Ethics (pp. 170-173 and pp. 178-179), has 
pointed out that including dignity in such a system of morals could undermine 
hedonism, as the reason for which we would get pleasure from the activity of higher 
faculties would be their intrinsic value and not because of the pleasure it provides, while, 
vice versa, we should attach greater value to an object or an activity stimulating our 
higher faculties because of the amount and quality of pleasure they give. Also, the 
problem with the competent judges of the higher pleasures doctrine has been 
extensively discussed by many scholars8. Treating it properly and at length in this thesis 
– which aims to address social and political topics rather than moral ones – might take 
up too much space. The central point I wish to make here is Mill's emphasis on the 
difference of pleasures and pains, which are anything but homogeneous, and which 
differ according to their characteristics and (this is an important Millian distinction) in 
quantity and quality. Another key point he makes is the need for experimenting with 
 
and not under any circumstances, generally inclined to cause good in society and, as it will 
be clearer later in this thesis, that they have both a moral and a political importance. 
8 For a brief overview on this topic: Skorupski, 1989, pp. 303-307; E. S. Anderson in Lyons 
(ed.), 1997, pp. 126-130; F. Wilson, in Skorupski (ed.), 1998, pp. 255-292. 
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different kinds of happiness: what makes the wise man competent is not an intrinsic 
quality or his alleged virtues, but the fact that while experiencing various forms of 
pleasures, he also knows that a lifestyle marked by the use and development of the 
higher faculties is what fulfils the principle of utility. In Mill's example, the choice 
between two forms of pleasure, a high and a low pleasure, is made on the basis of a sort 
of direct knowledge (empirical) of both, and anyway Mill – as Fred Wilson says – “does 
not regard only the quantity as normative; he regards both quantity and quality of 
pleasures and satisfactions as normative or productive of good. He also regards both as 
“empirical” (Fred Wilson, in Skorupski (ed.), 1998, p. 263). In any case, even if one may 
wish to maintain the utilitarian ethics and philosophy simply as a doctrine of regulative 
and perfectionist nature, which would see the validity of moral actions in terms of 
human self-development and maybe just consider their long-term outcome and our 
lifestyle as a whole (see Brink, 2013, pp. 46-78), the most important implication of the 
higher pleasures doctrine is not that there is something else greater than pleasure 
guiding our moral choices, but rather that higher pleasures are attached to greater 
satisfaction, improved quality and quantity of pleasure, and that – as we shall see in On 
Liberty – everything is connected to the need to experiment with different lifestyles. 
Human beings are not just animal beings, so they are able to appreciate and enjoy a sort 
of non-hedonistic happiness, which does not directly derive from the enjoyment of 
physical pleasures or fulfilment of animal appetites or similar things. Humans can enjoy 
feelings, imagination, intellect - in this sense, they do not have only animal faculties. 
When we achieve excellence, we get gratified in our higher faculties – i.e., we have a 
higher pleasure. In addition to this, Mill points out that the utilitarian moral standard is 
not just the individual greatest happiness, but the general greatest happiness: basically, 
as A’s happiness is good, B’s happiness is good, and C’s happiness is good, then A’s 
happiness plus B’s happiness plus C’s happiness (i.e. general happiness) is good overall 
(H. R. West, in Lyons (ed.), 1997, p. 94). So, we may also conclude that while Jeremy 
Bentham's utilitarianism considered attaining the greatest happiness of the greatest 
number as the end of morals and legislation, Mill, re-elaborating the same principle, also 
proposes to contemplate the fact that individual happiness cannot be reduced in the 
mere search of individual well-being in the strict sense, and actually one should devote 
himself to purposes which only apparently are not utilitarian (for example, contributing 
to other people's happiness, cultivating the higher human faculties) but actually help to 
achieve more easily the individual happiness.  
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The second part of Utilitarianism (CW X, pp. 209-226) deals with possible criticisms and 
objections to the utilitarian system, as well as misunderstandings and misconceptions 
concerning its fundamental concepts and the way it works. For now, we should perhaps 
enquire as to the foundations of the ethical system just described. Next in the exposition 
of his arguments in Utilitarianism, Mill expounds on a form of psychological hedonism, 
which, however, is not just about the direct experience of pleasure, but also includes the 
objects that we find pleasing (and effectively provide pleasure) and the pleasing 
representation we make of an object. Among other things, this pleasure comes from a 
group of objects:  e.g., the book is not in itself a cause of pleasure, but the exercise of 
reading and all that it entails. 
When it comes to the proof of the principle of utility (pp. 234-239), Mill affirms, at first, 
that evidence shows that utility is an ultimate end of conduct and a criterion of morality 
– and this is indisputable if we look at the facts. However, a proper foundation of 
utilitarian ethics would require utility to be the sole ultimate end of human conduct, and 
that other ends (e.g. financial wealth, virtue) are somehow connected to utility, part of 
it or derived from it. Indeed, this is what Mill states in chapter IV of Utilitarianism: the 
association of means to ends has caused the means to become parts of the ends: 
What was once desired as an instrument for the attainment of happiness 
has come to be desired for its own sake. In being desired for its own sake it 
is, however, desired as part of happiness (p. 236). 
Hence, what was originally a means, a way, a source or a cause originating happiness or 
satisfaction of our primitive desires, has become, because of such association, an end in 
itself. This applies to virtue as well: originally, according to Mill, virtue is not an end in 
itself, but, through the association with utility, it has progressively been considered has 
a moral end in itself.  That is why, basically, the sole ultimate desire driving human 
moral action is happiness, as it is an ultimate end and other ends are a part of or a 
derivation from it, desired in association with happiness and not in themselves.  
This passage is relevant because it shows that whatever the relevance of virtue in Mill’s 
moral (and social and political) system is, it is in any case subordinate to the utilitarian 
principle. Some scholars have, instead, argued that in Mill’s moral thought virtue 
acquires prominence and becomes an end in itself. Semmel (1984), for instance, stresses 
the importance of virtue over mere material happiness in Mill’s ethics and claims that 
Mill moves away from the theory of the greatest good and from orthodox Benthamism. 
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Influenced by Thomas Carlyle and from German philosophy, Mill considered “the 
commercial and increasingly egalitarian society of nineteenth-century England” as 
“inherently hostile to virtue” (p. 82). Semmel advocated an interpretation of Mill as a 
supporter of virtue as a moral end in a neo-Stoic, or ideal and intuitive Romantic fashion, 
even if without recurring to supernatural or religious implications. Semmel interprets 
On Liberty primarily as a “plea for positive liberty, for the sense of participation and self-
realization in the idea of freedom associated with the German thinkers” (p. 166); he also 
writes that in Utilitarianism “Virtue, Duty, and Truth became his chief injunctions” (p. 
174). Semmel acknowledges that Mill does not consider virtue as a departure from the 
utilitarian principle, because, actually, virtue is a part of happiness (p. 178). It is true 
that some non-utilitarian elements enter Mill’s philosophy, as we shall also see later in 
this work; however, Mill’s own words in Utilitarianism show that the appreciation of 
virtue as good in itself is valid only if we consider it as a component of happiness, a part 
of a whole (see the lines quoted above), and also if we maintain that the will of virtue is 
only a consequence of a habit attached to an utilitarian evaluation of pain and pleasure:  
Those who desire virtue for its own sake, desire it either because the 
consciousness of it is a pleasure, or because the consciousness of being 
without it is a pain, or for both reasons united; as in truth the pleasure and 
pain seldom exist separately, but almost always together, the same person 
feeling pleasure in the degree of virtue attained, and pain in not having 
attained more. If one of these gave him no pleasure, and the other no pain, 
he would not love or desire virtue, or would desire it only for the other 
benefits which it might produce to himself or to persons whom he cared for 
(Utilitarianism, CW X, p. 237). 
In this process of transformation of means to (parts of) ends, indeed, habit plays a 
relevant role: Mill criticises the fact that every action is moved by a desire and he makes 
a distinction between the concepts of will and desire, whereas desire is directly 
connected to an object of desire, while will is a psychological consequence of habit 
leading, in the long run, to a detachment from desire. “Will is the child of desire, and 
passes out of the dominion of its parent only to come under that of habit” (p. 239), and 
virtue (the will to do right) can be cultivated independently from the desire of happiness, 
however it is not intrinsically a good but it is just a means to happiness or attached to it. 
Happiness is associated with virtue, money etc. by habit (however it cannot be claimed 
that only the pleasure component of virtue, money etc. is effectively desired, as Mill 
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never makes such a strong statement9). Moreover, this proves, according to Mill, that 
ethics based on virtues are not inconsistent with the claim that happiness is the sole 
ultimate end of moral actions and that it is desirable by itself. What also may help us 
here are Mill’s words in his Autobiography about Thomas Carlyle influence on 
utilitarianism during the period following the mental crisis: 
The experiences of this period had two very decided effects on my opinions 
and character. In the first place, they led me to adopt a theory of life, very 
unlike that on which I had before acted, and having much in common with 
what at that time I had never heard of, the anti-self-consciousness theory 
of Carlyle. I never, indeed, wavered in the conviction that happiness is the 
test of all rules of conduct, and the end of life. But I now thought that this 
end was only to be attained by not making it the direct end. Those only are 
happy (I thought) who have their attention fixed on something other than 
their own happiness: on the happiness of others, on the improvement of 
mankind, even on some art or pursuit, followed not as a means, but as itself 
an ideal end. Aiming thus at something else, they find happiness by the way 
(Autobiography, CW I, pp. 145-147). 
This demonstrates that depicting Mill as a neo-Stoic or a conservative Romantic as 
Semmel does (“I see Mill as distinctly more conservative than he has generally been 
depicted”,  Semmel, 1984, p. ix; “Mill appears to be – in his own well-known dichotomy 
– more a conservative Coleridgean than a liberal Benthamite”, Semmel, 1998, p. 50) is, 
perhaps, slightly excessive, while the improvement of individual character and of 
inward conditions surely are amongst the aims we find in Mill’s philosophy.  
The final chapter of Utilitarianism deals with the idea of justice as a quality in itself and 
not a feature of things. Mill investigates whether justice and injustice are an intrinsically 
peculiar thing or a combination of other qualities, because “people find it difficult to see, 
in Justice, only a particular kind or branch of general utility, and think that its superior 
binding force requires a totally different origin” (Utilitarianism, CW X, p. 241). So, Mill 
tries to find the common attributes of the various definitions of justice: for example, if 
we had to run together examples of justice, it is common to think that deprivation of 
 
9 See on this, for instance, H. R. West, in Lyons (ed.), 1997, p. 91. 
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liberty is unjust (but this is not a definition of justice), as well as withholding a person 
of his moral right (nor is this a definition); merit is often considered a standard to define 
what is just or not; breaking faith and being partial are also commonly believed to be a 
form of injustice (pp. 241-243). Furthermore, the idea of justice is often linked to the 
idea of equality (unless it is inexpedient to the pursuit of justice); however, there are 
different forms of equality, which can be believed to be equality in rights, equality in 
opportunities, social equality, even income equality (this is the opinion of some 
Communists, for example) (pp. 243-244). There are, Mill maintains, many different 
applications of the concept of justice, and what connects them all together is not obvious. 
Nevertheless, justice as a unified concept is often used, and we do have a sentiment of 
justice regardless of whether we realise its foundation and what it is based on.  
Hence, a further part of Mill’s investigation of the concept of justice goes on to deal with 
the etymology of the term and its historical use: if we look at the meaning of it in Greek, 
Latin, German and French, or if we take into consideration the use of the idea among the 
Christians, the Jews, the Greeks and the Romans, we may notice that justice, although in 
several different ways, is often attached to the concept of law, from which the idea and 
practice of legal constraint follow (pp. 244-246).  
In this sense, the idea of ethics is connected to punishment and duty, which then means 
that it becomes a conceptual feature of morality itself and it thus transforms our 
perceptions of utility as advantage or disadvantage to an imperative and absolute idea. 
The feeling of justice, in fact, was born out of our desire for self-defence substantially 
expanded later, through sympathy and empathy, to others, in a gradual process of 
generalisation which has led to the creation of the law. 
To recapitulate: the idea of justice supposes two things; a rule of conduct, 
and a sentiment which sanctions the rule. The first must be supposed 
common to all mankind, and intended for their good. The other (the 
sentiment) is a desire that punishment may be suffered by those who 
infringe the rule. There is involved, in addition, the conception of some 
definite person who suffers by the infringement; whose rights (to use the 
expression appropriated to the case) are violated by it. And the sentiment 
of justice appears to me to be, the animal desire to repel or retaliate a hurt 
or damage to oneself, or to those with whom one sympathizes, widened so 
as to include all persons, by the human capacity of enlarged sympathy, and 
the human conception of intelligent self-interest. From the latter elements, 
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the feeling derives its morality; from the former, its peculiar 
impressiveness, and energy of self-assertion (pp. 249-250). 
Mill affirms that justice still remains an ambiguous term and that cases of justice are 
also cases of expediency – although justice still is an appropriate term and idea for vastly 
important social utilities, it is just another form of morality related to, or even based on, 
the ideas of punishment and obligation (p. 259). 
II.II. UTILITARIANISM’S CORE  POLITICAL CONCEPTS 
For the scope of this work, it is relevant to point out the political features and 
consequences of utilitarianism.   
Firstly, it should be stressed that utilitarianism is a form of progressivism10: human 
actions are driven by the pursuit of individual happiness and, as everyone’s happiness 
matters, actions have to be morally assessed according to the greatest happiness 
principle. That means, politically, that social and political institutions have to be 
designed in order to maximise and promote general happiness. 
Secondly, utilitarianism is also a form of egalitarianism, since everyone’s happiness 
matters equally. Hence, although the higher pleasures theory entails different forms and 
sources of happiness, everyone is morally entitled, under the same conditions, to (seek 
to) enjoy the same kind of happiness, and someone’s pleasure should not be threatened 
in order to ensure to someone else the same pleasure. 
Recently, the case for strengthening Millian forms of progressivism has been made by 
David O. Brink (2013), according to whom the idea of secondary principles as 
 
10 It may be questioned whether progress is self-evidently the road to happiness. Surely, as 
I remark in other sections of this thesis, in Mill there is a distinction between the idea of 
progress and that of improvement. Furthermore, the idea of active character Mill outlines in 
CRG suggests us that there may be changes in society for the better (e.g. in terms of 
technological advancement, wealth, scientific achievements) and, anyway, what would 
really matter would still be, instead, the existence of active characters, which would promote 
and strengthen democracy and all the virtuous process of individual and civic flourishing it 
stimulates. 
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temporary substitutes for utility and for the higher pleasures doctrine may somehow 
safeguard the consistency within Mill’s theory in the light of moral perfectionism: 
indeed, secondary principles may fit as imperfect, although regulative, moral norms to 
be regularly assessed from time to time in the light of strictly utilitarian ethics. Such a 
perfectionist approach involves, conceptually, the idea of human development, and, still, 
is able to save some forms of moral pluralism (pp. 278-279).  
When it comes to democracy and liberalism, Brink stresses the importance of equality: 
Utilitarianism says that everyone’s interests matter, not just those of a 
privileged few, and that everyone’s interests matter equally, no one’s 
interests mattering more than anyone else’s. When Mill defends liberal 
rights, these are rights that each person has and that protect her from the 
tyranny of majority preference (Brink, 2013, p. 283). 
However, of which kind of equality are we talking? Brink makes the case for considering 
Mill an egalitarian according to the idea of equal concern rather than equal treatment, 
“in particular one that assigns great importance to equal opportunity” (p. 284). 
Although sensible and well-grounded, Brink's stress on equality in Mill's philosophy 
somehow seems to slightly miss the role of equality in relation to democracy, its 
constitutional design and the social processes it brings about, and to rather focus on 
social, economic and political equality per se. In chapter IV I expound on Alexis de 
Tocqueville's influence on Mill's philosophy, and how according to Tocqueville equality 
is the driving force of democracy, under which everyone seems to feel entitled to 
express his own opinion on every specific subject, regardless of the level of his actual 
competence on it. 
In other words, although both utilitarianism and liberalism surely entail the notions of 
progress and equality, as Brink writes, it may be useful to investigate carefully the 
philosophical consequences within Millian political thought. Indeed, the concept of 
equality arises from two elements:  
 28 
 
a) a philosophical element, i.e. utilitarian ethics11, according to which – as we have 
seen before – everyone's happiness equally matters under the same 
circumstances; 
b) according to Alexis de Tocqueville in Democracy in America, equality is the 
strongest sentiment we can find in a democracy12, within which it acts as a 
levelling force – not just socially or economically, but also, and in particular, 
intellectually and morally. 
In the rest of this thesis, one of the things I will try to show is the way Mill attempts to 
reconcile these two elements, which are prima facie a little inconsistent. In utilitarian 
ethics, the progressive element is the maximisation of the general happiness; in 
democracy, equality may not be a force of progress in itself, as it may actually lead to 
uniformity of thought and mediocrity. Where is the room for progress, for 
experimenting with different lifestyles and exercising the higher faculties in a political 
system in which such homogenising force is in place? Perhaps this is a way to formulate 
a possible question to which Millian philosophy may be a reasonable and well-grounded 
philosophical answer. The solution is formulated in terms of democracy as a political 
process within which the safeguard of individuality, originality, competence and genius 
and the protection against class interests are vital elements to make it successful and to 
promote both individual and general happiness. 
Hence, at this point Mill needed a system which would: 
 
11 Which, although, in its turn claims to be a consequence of empirical and psychological 
observations – but for the sake of simplicity I would just name it purely 'philosophical'. 
12 «La première et la plus vive des passions que l'égalité des conditions fait naître, je n'ai pas 
besoin de le dire, c'est l'amour de cette même égalité (…) Les biens que la liberté procure ne 
se montrent qu'à la longue, et il est toujours facile de méconnaître la cause qui les fait naître. 
Les avantages de l'égalité se font sentir dès à présent, et chaque jour on les voit découler de 
leur source (…). Je pense que les peuples démocratiques ont un goût naturel pour la liberté 
(…). Mais ils ont pour l'égalité une passion ardente, insatiable, éternelle, invincible; ils 
veulent l'égalité dans la liberté, et, s'ils ne peuvent l'obtenir, ils la veulent encore dans 
l'esclavage. Ils souffriront l'asservissement, la barbarie, mais ils ne souffriront pas 
l'aristocratie». (Tocqueville, 1986 (1840), pp. 137-142). 
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- promote political and social processes protecting and fostering the general happiness 
- protect individual autonomy, in order to let anyone pursue different lifestyles 
- safeguard society from the dangers of equality and mediocrity and enhance the 
positive effects of democracy (and democratic practice) on the population at large. 
As we shall see in the following chapters, individual liberty, the refusal of at least a 
strong and coercive version of paternalism, and education are fundamental elements in 
this political project. Furthermore, we shall notice that the need for confrontation of 
different ideas, conceptions, and feelings is relevant for the development of both the 
individual and the society as a whole – both morals and politics need the same internal 
rational mechanisms in order to fulfil their aims. 
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III. EDUCATION  
This chapter presents two objects of investigation: the first is the concept of education 
taken in its broadest sense - education in a cultural, intellectual, moral sense - within a 
path of learning and self-improvement, while the second concerns the political 
implications of this concept. 
Some aspects of education and of training of the individuals – or, to use a term involving 
a few more political implications, citizens – directly concern the functions of the modern 
state, as, for example, in school and academic education. We can also expand the role of 
the state in the creation or funding of places and institutions such as museums, libraries, 
cultural organisations. As regards John Stuart Mill’s philosophy, however, we find a very 
complex concept which has widespread ramifications in the context of individual rights 
on the one hand and in the forms of social organisation on the other. 
At first, I need to justify the use of the word ‘education’: I could have referred to concepts 
such as self-improvement, Bildung, individual growth, development and so on – words 
which in any necessary case I will not hesitate to use, of course – but they somehow do 
not capture what I intend to stress in this work. More clearly: the structure of society 
and its institutions, the virtuous loop that they cause, and the role, though not 
patronising, of the élites in Mill's thought, imply an active role of political institutions 
and elaborate lifelong processes in the formation of citizens’ characters. With reference 
to the links between education and life in the polity, one may say, in the first instance 
and in very general terms, that education has a threefold significance, in the sense that 
the progressive growth of the individual is at the same time a) cause, b) reason and c) 
goal of Mill's system of government: 
a) it is a cause, as we will see later on in detail, because the possibility of 
establishing a representative government arises only when a society reaches a 
certain level of progress and civilisation, i.e. when there is no longer the need 
for the existence of leading and authoritative guide controlling individuals 
which still are largely in a condition of intellectual minority. The exit from this 
stage and the entry into one in which citizens – or at least the majority of them 
– are more or less free, rational, autonomous and responsible subjects, involve 
a process of individual progress concerning every single person. Democratic 
government is not possible without such process of civilisation;  
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b) at the same time, the human as a progressive individual is the reason of 
representative democratic government, for this is, in fact, a system of 
government based on the interaction of free and rational social and political 
subjects, and seeking to protect – at least in Mill's model – citizens' individual 
freedom. For this reason, representative democracy must have the political 
instruments and institutions to protect itself from any authoritarian and 
tyrannical degeneration; 
c) finally, the progressive aspect of the human being, or rather, the strengthening 
of the progressive aspects leading to individual self-improvement, is both 
consequence and purpose of a democratic society, because active democratic 
participation leads to and prompts a virtuous process such to develop citizens' 
personality in a democratic, civic sense, strengthening their sensitivity towards 
rational debate and general interests. 
In this chapter I intend to show two things under a Millian perspective: development of 
the individual and development of the polity are closely interlinked and feed off each 
other especially through the use of reason; individual and social development are 
somewhat similar, i.e. they follow the same dynamics, and thus the political structures 
and processes are a sort of external revival of the same dynamics that occur, or should 
occur, within the individual mind.  
In order to do this, I will expand on the following arguments: 
a) the idea of self-improvement as traced in Mill’s inaugural address to the 
University of St. Andrews in 1867; 
b) Mill’s idea of liberty and the relevance of Mill’s detachment from standard 
Benthamite utilitarianism; 
c) liberty, political participation and their role in the formation of an active 
character; 
d) James Mill’s take on the way education should be imparted and what are the 
effects of Coleridge’s writings on John Stuart Mill’s ideas on education, 
civilisation and cultivation; 
e) the case in favour of an anti-paternalistic interpretation of John Stuart Mill on 
education, liberty, and the limits of state action in promoting citizens' individual 
progress. 
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III.I. A ROMANTIC SELF-IMPROVEMENT? MILL AND THE IDEA OF 
EDUCATION 
What is the relevance of education in John Stuart Mill's political philosophy? Although a 
recurring topic in his writings, there is no major work specifically dealing with 
education, a subject in many ways connected to other fields of knowledge (such as 
psychology, ethics, politics). Probably Mill’s most relevant contribution which may be 
discussed here is the inaugural address he delivered to the University of St. Andrews 
(CW XXI, pp. 215-257), in which he expounds on the topic of education, both academic 
and at large. Mill argues that specialization in education is really useful for professional 
purposes and, thanks to it, at the end of one's own educational path, one should become 
a reliable expert in his own field of study or work; however, this is an extremely 
insufficient form of education, according to Mill, as “(m)en are men before they are 
lawyers, or physicians, or merchants, or manufacturers; and if you make them capable 
and sensible men, they will make themselves capable and sensible lawyers or physicians” 
(p. 218). Indeed, a more general education is needed, although not superficial, and it 
should include both humanities and natural and mathematical sciences, and, in general, 
“every useful branch of general, as distinct from professional, knowledge, should be 
included in the curriculum of school or university studies” (p. 224). In particular, Mill 
praises the study of classical languages as they would enhance the ability to use logic – 
by virtue of their peculiar grammatical structures – and because Latin and Greek 
literature constitute a remarkable example of use of the written word, in which every 
term is used properly and not for the sake of the beauty of expression, and nonetheless 
they are still works of great perfection in the sense of clearness, completeness and 
harmony to which moderns should look and get inspired in order to improve their prose, 
their style and their reasoning. The relevant element here is the importance of the 
purposes for which every literary work is written, not for the use of literary stylistic 
ornaments which attract attention by themselves, but to somehow contribute to 
the ”higher purpose of the human discourse” (p. 231) rather than to regard, to pursue 
and to accomplish the task of art as if it were for the art’s sake. Basically - Mill says - the 
need for studying foreign (both classical and modern) languages, literature and cultures 
is grounded on the fact that “it is the habit of mankind to mistake familiarity for accurate 
knowledge” (p. 225): the only chance to ascertain the truth or, at least, to improve 
ourselves and to have better informed and well-founded opinions – i.e. based on matter 
of facts – consists in realising that they are fallible and can be subject to amendment and, 
secondly, that the only way to do this is somehow to compare different opinions and 
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beliefs among individuals and, also, to focus on other languages and cultures, not just as 
a matter of curiosity or a sort of exoticism, but to expand our intellects, to see what other 
civilised people have achieved and, maybe, to change our mind on a specific topic or 
habit or belief and make it more adherent to the facts rather than just a consequence of 
given and unquestioned education and lifestyle – and the best way to get in touch with 
other cultures is to know their idiom.   
More in general, the idea in this address is that education must provide the tools to 
enhance critical thinking and be able to rationally challenge established beliefs or to 
defend – still rationally – one’s own belief. That is why not just intellectual education, 
but moral education as well is important in the academic system in particular (the 
Inaugural Address mainly focuses on the university’s curriculum) and in the broader 
lifelong education as a whole. Indeed, according to Mill the concept of education seems 
to not imply just intelligence, training or the provision of notions, rules and anecdotes: 
for instance, morals and religion would also actually complete education, as they cover 
the formation of the will and go beyond what schools and academic institutions can do 
in this field. Despite this limit, since morals and religion are mainly a matter of family 
influence and education, universities and schools have still to be aware of the proper 
way these subjects should be approached, taught and discussed; Mill’s fear is that 
dogmatic lectures will be based on given beliefs and on the principle of authority, while 
academic spirit – even in the field of religion, characterized by strong and often 
unquestionable truths – should be totally different: 
not to tell us from authority what we ought to believe, and make us 
accept the belief as a duty, but to give us information and training, and 
help us to form our own belief in a manner worthy of intelligent beings, 
who seek for truth at all hazards, and demand to know all the difficulties, 
in order that they may be better qualified to find, and recognise, the 
most satisfactory mode of resolving them (…). An University ought to be 
a place of free speculation (p. 250). 
Another hint of the multifaceted aspects which, according to Mill, mark out education, 
is the importance he gives to aesthetic and artistic education along with the intellectual 
and moral one, and to the start of a process of personal cultivation and the influence on 
individual character that artistic and beautiful objects can cause and provide. More in 
general, in this inaugural address there seems to be a quite complex idea of what 
education is: academic education should not be restricted to the major subject in which 
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the student intends to achieve broad and deep knowledge and specialization mainly for 
professional purposes, as all knowledge in itself is valuable and it enables us to better 
judge different opinions and some basic scientific notions as well – in other words, a 
quite complete ignorance in this or that field may hinder the possibility to have different 
views, different perspectives on this or that problem, and basically force us 
(inadvertently) to stick to our given beliefs which would actually turn out to be, if 
challenged, false beliefs, ungrounded and irrational opinions or even superstitions. 
Mainly, it is the creation of a critical and rational spirit what really matters for Mill: 
neither the notions nor the laws or the methodologies in themselves (which, still, 
maintain their own importance, of course), and neither a radically sceptical attitude 
towards every form of established knowledge or of every philosophical or religious 
system, but a more reasoned critical attitude which – and this is fundamental – must, 
above all, find its roots in a rational and well-informed criticism. Furthermore, 
education is a process attaining schools and universities, of course, but also individual 
study and research, the family’s influence over the individual in his early age, and, 
mainly, debate among peers. 
Although in some points Mill makes reference to virtues13, which, as already noted 
above14, may apparently seem to contradict the utilitarian foundations of his thought, 
the aim education should help and allow people to achieve is the research and 
ascertainment of truth, “(t)he most incessant occupation of the human intellect 
throughout life” (p. 234). In a minor writing published in 1838, a review of William 
Ware's Letters from Palmyra, he already addresses the theme of education in its 
broadest sense, arguing that education is, amongst the other things, to waken high 
aspirations and, in romances and narrative works, to show models of exemplary 
characters from which youth should take proper inspiration. Books of this sort are of 
high value for the education of young people, according to Mill, as “(n)ot what a boy or 
a girl can repeat by rote, but what they have learnt to love and admire, is what forms 
 
13 “If we wish men to practise virtue, it is worth while trying to make them love virtue and 
feel it an object in itself (…) to pursue other objects. It is worth training them to feel (…) the 
absence of noble aims and endeavours, as not merely blameable but also degrading” (pp. 
253-254).   
14 See chapter II, section I. 
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their character” (Ware's Letters From Palmyra, CW I, p. 460); however, he laments that 
the forms of narration which he maintains so useful and so positively influencing 
intellectual and moral growth are disappearing, becoming more focused on customary, 
ordinary characters and events, and the consequence is that “for the first time perhaps 
in history, the youth of both sexes of the educated classes are universally growing up 
unromantic” (p. 460). These words show that, although in a different style of language, 
the issues Mill discusses in his inaugural address delivered to St. Andrews, hence, seem 
to have old roots, at least about thirty-seven years before his appointment as Lord 
Rector in 1865.  
Another example of Mill’s ideas on education is the essay On Genius, an article written 
in 1832, “in the height of my Carlyism” (letter to George Henry Lewes, 1840, CW XIII, p. 
449), which is probably one of the best expressions of the influence of Romantic spirit 
and thought on Mill in the years he reacted to his strict radical education and to the 
Benthamite forma mentis. It investigates the characters which constitute a genius and 
why at the time it is written (the first half of the XIX century) there is, at least according 
to Mill, a lack of geniuses. As for the definition or the description of genius, Mill affirms 
that a genius is not who discovers new truths never known before, but who actually is 
able to be an original thinker - “whoever says Originality says Genius” (On Genius, CW I, 
p. 332) -  and originality is meant by Mill as a process of analysis and induction through 
observation. Mill describes two different sorts of genius: the “creative” genius, for 
instance the painter, and the “conceptive” genius, the one who understands (and not 
just feels) the work of the creative genius, and who maybe possesses an even higher 
mental faculty.  Why are there no more geniuses? Mill blames dogmatism and authority 
in matters of thought: doing an historical-philosophical excursus, Mill points his finger 
at the transformation of Platonism, Aristotelism and Hellenistic philosophies into 
systematic schools, and at religion as well, as it became a dogmatic belief carried on by 
authority rather than by thought and reasoning - he does not blame religion in itself, 
namely Christianity, anyway. Modern education too is “all cram – Latin cram, 
mathematical cram, literary cram, political cram, theological cram, moral cram” and 
“(a)ny purpose, any idea of training the mind itself, has gone out of the world” (p. 337). 
The consequences of this are the triumph of classicism and mannerism in the arts, and 
rarer and rarer original creations. Although Mill will no longer use such Romantic tones 
in his later writings, this short essay maintains its relevance because it somehow 
anticipates some later Millian topics: importance of originality, criticism of education 
superficially based on mere notions, condemnation of dogmatism in religion, in 
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philosophy and in every field of knowledge and teaching. These themes will constitute 
a substantial part of the late Mill's opinions on the subject of education.  
In the following sections of this chapter, I try to show how and why education for Mill is 
as good for the individual’s self-development as a person, as it is for his development as 
a member of a polity. Hence, we need to have a look at Mill's essay On Liberty (why are 
individuality and critical thinking important?), at Mill's own education and at the 
Coleridgean influence on him, with particular reference to the idea of clerisy. 
III.II. LIBERTY IN INDIVIDUAL ETHICS AND IN POLITICS 
In the third chapter of On Liberty John Stuart Mill makes his case for individuality as a 
means stimulating and fostering the genius, the improvement of social, civic and 
intellectual virtues of the people, and as a justification, along with truth (the main 
argument of the second chapter of the book), of individual freedom. In his investigation 
on liberty and individuality, Mill concedes that actions should not be as free as opinions 
and that, therefore, they can be hindered; actually, he adds, there are cases in which 
words and opinions have to be stopped too, such as in the event, for instance, that they 
may bring about an immediate and specific risk for someone. From this it derives that 
individual liberty “must be thus far limited”, but, however, if actions do not harm what 
concerns others, and a person just “acts according to his own inclination and judgement 
in things which concern himself”, then the same reasons for which freedom of opinion 
should be granted, apply to the case of freedom of actions (On Liberty, CW XVIII, p. 260).  
Diversity of opinions is required in order to ascertain the truth, Mill writes in chapter II 
of On Liberty; in the following chapter he states that “different experiments of living” are 
required too, and “the worth of different modes of life should be proved practically, 
when any one thinks fit to try them” (p. 261). Traditions and customs may influence 
people’s behaviour, in the sense that they are the result of other people’s experience 
and what such experience has taught them. However, it may be that tradition does not 
fit everyone and that some people may need to find their own way of life. Moreover, 
even in the case of good customs and traditions, conforming to them merely as a 
tradition or as a custom is not advisable, according to Mill, because it would not educate 
or develop any of the human qualities of the individual.  
The mental and moral, like the muscular powers, are improved only by 
being used. The faculties are called into no exercise by doing a thing merely 
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because others do it, no more than by believing a thing only because others 
believe it. If the grounds of an opinion are not conclusive to the person’s 
own reason, his reason cannot be strengthened, but is likely to be 
weakened, by his adopting it (p. 262). 
Mill points out that human nature is not “a machine to be built after a model” (p. 263), 
and also that feelings and desires should not be tamed or restricted (as some moral and 
religious theories suggest, e.g. Calvinism), but, actually, accompanied with a strong 
conscience. A person with no strong feelings and impulses has “no character, no more 
than a steam-engine has a character” (p. 264), while an energetic character belongs to 
who owns his own desires along with a strong will. Mill writes that in the past, perhaps, 
the danger of lack of discipline and control of impulses did exist, but, at his time, the 
actual danger threatening human nature “is not the excess, but the deficiency, of 
personal impulses or preferences” (p. 264). Mill wants people to avoid conformity, and, 
actually, to develop their own individuality: in this context, geniuses can emerge, and 
“set the example of more enlightened conduct” (p. 267). Mill insists “emphatically on 
the importance of genius, and the necessity of allowing it to unfold itself freely both in 
thought and in practice” (p. 268). As different things can help a person or hinder another 
in achieving his own cultivation and spiritual development, different ways of life should 
be permitted, and eccentricity and genius should be allowed to abound, Mill says. Sadly, 
everything seems to lead to uniformity and to the reduction of “variety of situations”: 
new and improved means of communication, politics, education (“because education 
brings people under common influences, and gives them access to the general stock of 
facts and sentiments”), and, above all, “the ascendancy of public opinion in the State” 
(pp. 274-275). As a remedy, “the intelligent part of the public” should be “made to feel 
its value” (p. 275). 
What a government can do in order to foster or deteriorate individuality and character 
is one of the criteria that should be used in judging whether a form of government is 
good or not, Mill writes in CRG (CW XIX, pp. 383-398). In CRG again, Mill make a 
distinction between passive and active character, and seems to recall what he writes in 
On Liberty: 
The commonplaces of moralists, and the general sympathies of mankind, 
are in favour of the passive type. Energetic characters may be admired, but 
the acquiescent and submissive are those which most men personally 
prefer. The passiveness of our neighbours increases our sense of security, 
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and plays into the hands of our wilfulness. Passive characters, if we do not 
happen to need their activity, seem an obstruction the less in our own path. 
A contented character is not a dangerous rival. Yet nothing is more certain, 
than that improvement in human affairs is wholly the work of the 
uncontented characters; and, moreover, that it is much easier for an active 
mind to acquire the virtues of patience, than for a passive one to assume 
those of energy (…). The character which improves human life is that which 
struggles with natural powers and tendencies, not that which gives way to 
them. (p. 407). 
Subjection to the will of other and the virtues of self-government and of a strong and 
active character are not compatible, Mill states (p. 410). Indeed, Mill’s words in On 
Liberty already suggest this: “He who lets the world, or his own portion of it, choose his 
plan of life for him, has no need of any other faculty than the ape-like one of imitation” 
(On Liberty, CW XVIII, p. 262). In terms of political consequences, it follows from Mill’s 
view that political participation is needed in order to use and improve one’s moral and 
intellectual faculties; so, the plan in On Liberty and in CRG seem to be the same with 
respect to individuality, excellence and genius, and a representative government in 
which forms of political participation are required is a suitable organisation of the 
polity if a path of improvement of the individuals has to be followed. In other words, it 
can be said that On Liberty and CRG are part of the same plan of moral, social and 
political reform. 
In On Liberty there are a few traces of elements which were characteristic of the young 
Mill: although some Romantic traits disappear, here we can read the classical, well 
known, famous argument stressing individuality and diversity, the need for exemplary 
characters as well as progressive improvement. Individuality is “one of the elements of 
human well-being” - as it is defined in the chapter title – and it should be subject to the 
freedom of experiencing and experimenting different ways of life. What emerges is a 
multifaceted view of human nature: there are recurring words such as “pleasure”, 
“inclinations”, “desires” ac similia, which show us two aspects of what Mill thinks human 
nature is and should as well be: higher pleasures are recommendable, this is true, and 
the use of reason and good sense are important for our own cultivation, however there 
is not an ideal rational man to serve as a regulatory example of conduct; in human 
nature, as well as in society, a number of forces are at play, competing and balancing 
each other and giving birth to diversity and excellence. Although diversity exists, 
customary habits inherited from the past should not be totally downplayed: if they are 
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widely accepted in society, it is very likely that there is a good reason for them, but, still, 
they may not fit a specific, peculiar inclination of character or personal spirit; even if 
they fit, they should be not passively embraced because of their wide acceptation, but 
rather for the reason for which such wide acceptance occurred. Even customary habits 
have to meet and satisfy the characteristics of individuality. Excellence is what we may 
otherwise call (and Mill himself calls, indeed) genius, a man able to see what others 
cannot, or able to create things others have never created before. A genius is a man 
whose influence on society should hinder the negative effects of the mediocrity so vastly 
and deeply characterising the middle class and the mass society (On Liberty, CW XVIII, 
pp. 267-270). Custom and liberty, for Mill, are substantially two antagonistic principles: 
The despotism of custom is everywhere the standing hindrance to human 
advancement, being in unceasing antagonism to that disposition to aim at 
something better than customary, which is called, according to 
circumstances, the spirit of liberty, or that of progress or improvement. The 
spirit of improvement is not always a spirit of liberty, for it may aim at 
forcing improvements on an unwilling people; and the spirit of liberty, in 
so far as it resists such attempts, may ally itself locally and temporarily with 
the opponents of improvement; but the only unfailing and permanent 
source of improvement is liberty, since by it there are as many possible 
independent centres of improvement as there are individuals. The 
progressive principle, however, in either shape, whether as the love of 
liberty or of improvement, is antagonistic to the sway of Custom, involving 
at least emancipation from that yoke; and the contest between the two 
constitutes the chief interest of the history of mankind (p. 272). 
Liberty is not the only means towards progress and welfare, but it surely is the stronger 
and more resistant one, able to support an enduring improvement of mankind, thanks 
to the continuous practise of different lifestyles, to the comparison of different options 
of life, to the experience of variegated forms of pleasures and to the space left for the 
influence and the exemplary role of men of genius and excellent individuality (although 
everyone has got his own form, albeit largely imperfect, of individuality). This influence 
exercised by the few excellences in society and history is not to be confused with a form 
of pure paternalism or a way to impart education like a teacher does with his pupils; yes, 
it is related to human cultural and intellectual growth and development, anyway “it is 
not only a co-ordinate element with all that is designated by the terms civilization, 
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instruction, education, culture, but is itself a necessary part and condition of all those 
things” (p. 261). 
Mill's views on liberty have been the subject of several forms of criticisms by various 
scholars and philosophers, mainly with reference to the relationship between On 
Liberty and Utilitarianism, and on whether Mill is consistently liberal or he instead 
accepts some non-liberal, paternalistic or even authoritarian views in his moral, social 
and political philosophy. As concerns the definition of Mill as a liberal, in the nineteenth 
century James Fitzjames Stephen had already argued that a certain inconsistency or 
incompatibility between utilitarianism and classical liberalism exists, and that Mill 
sacrifices too much authority in order to preserve freedom. This view, which is one of 
the two composing the so-called standard interpretations of Mill’s views on liberty and 
of their consistency or inconsistency with utilitarianism15, in the twentieth century has 
been picked up by Isaiah Berlin, Gertrude Himmelfarb and C. L. Ten. Berlin (1969), for 
example, points out that in On Liberty one can find a tension between the individual and 
social dimensions of the person and a stress on the multiform variety of human nature. 
Berlin maintains that this is not perfectly consistent with the original utilitarian theory, 
which instead considers the human being and his nature as stable and observable 
entities. Berlin states that Mill “is officially committed to the exclusive pursuit of 
happiness” (p. 178) and that “it is difficult to suppose that it was not liberty and justice 
(at whatever cost) but utility (which counts the cost) that were uppermost in his mind” 
(p. 179): indeed – Berlin maintains – if a sort of pill of happiness existed, for Jeremy 
Bentham swallowing it would have been morally acceptable for all the mankind, while 
John Stuart Mill would have probably been much more hesitant on such choice.  
According to Berlin, the pursuit of the greatest happiness and liberty appear to not have 
any direct connection with each other (p. 180): of course, liberty is a means to 
experience new, different lifestyle and thus to maximise happiness (or to reduce pain), 
however, he maintains the definition of happiness (or utility) seems to be unclear in Mill. 
 
15  This standard interpretation on Mill, or “consensus view” as formulated by Joseph 
Hamburger (1999), pp. 3-5, is the one according to which Mill was willing to expand liberty 
as much as possible, whether consistently or not with his own Utilitarianism. 
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In this sense, Berlin points out three aspects of Mill’s thought: at first, in his opinion, in 
Mil’s writings the meaning of happiness refers to something like relaxation of one’s 
wishes, whatever these wishes may be; second, some secondary principles are attached 
to the utilitarian principle (an allegedly vague principle, according to Berlin’s views); 
third, truth seems to be always provisional, subject to an ever further assessment and 
to change. Actually, as regards the vagueness of the utilitarian principle and the fact that 
some secondary principle may seem attached to it16, Mill makes clear in Utilitarianism 
that every principle which looks apparently independent from any basic consideration 
on pleasure or pain is just a consequence of habit applied to the utility principle, as what 
was once deemed an instrument or a means for the attainment of happiness has become 
on object desired by itself because of habit: if something looks continuously and 
consistently desirable in order to attain pleasure, then, at one point, it will start being 
desired as an end (Utilitarianism, CW X, p. 236). The deduction stemming from Berlin’s 
arguments (although, perhaps, one of them appears to provide a partially unclear or 
untruthful account of Mill on primary and secondary principles) is that the plausibility 
of Mill’s argument in favour of liberty is based on the assumption that human knowledge 
is incomplete (at least in principle) and infallible (Berlin, 1969, p. 188), and no 
prediction or rule can be deduced from social sciences: 
Mill’s entire view of human nature turns out to rest not on the notion of the 
repetition of an identical pattern, but on his perception of human lives as 
subject to perpetual incompleteness, self-transformation, and novelty (p. 
189). 
This view would contradict, according to Berlin, the utilitarian foundation of Mill’s own 
philosophy: although it makes it more plausible and more human, it becomes less 
consistent with utilitarianism, and albeit we may concede that we may somehow and 
sometimes attain the truth, new opinions have to be formulated in order to challenge it 
and corroborate it (pp. 189-190). Berlin highlights the fact that Mill stresses the many-
sidedness of truth and the need to study and “gain illumination” (in Berlin’s own words) 
from different and contrasting doctrines, and this can be noticed in Mill’s Autobiography 
and in the essays on Bentham and Coleridge (p. 192). Indeed, if we have a look, for 
instance, at the latter, a clearer idea of Mill’s ‘half-truths theory’ may emerge. Mill 
 
16 And as already discussed earlier in this thesis, see chapter II, section I. 
 42 
 
expounds such view in Coleridge (CW X, p. 121) and questions Benthamite radicalism 
and vision of society, history and civilisation; Mill’s conclusion is that Benthamism must 
somehow be integrated with romantic conservative theories. So, given that Coleridge 
was one of the two great “seminal minds” of nineteenth-century Britain according to Mill, 
it is relevant to investigate what Mill means when he refers to “half-truths”. 
This theme is an important point of the essay on Coleridge, because it involves the idea 
of social and political conflict, or at least the presence of different conflicting 
philosophical and cultural positions in society, and it describes the way these partial 
truths influence and complement each other, and, also, the way this dialectical process 
(certainly far from that of German Idealism) occurs is part of a dynamic social, cultural 
and political process which differs from what is present in Coleridge’s thought, and 
therefore puts a different light on Mill's appreciation of the idea of the clerisy. The 
description of the theory in Coleridge, indeed, highlights the temporal aspect of this 
process, described as an oscillation between two extremes, whose median point is a 
complete and complex truth, or something very close to it; this process takes place as a 
continuous succession of reactions and counter-reactions to philosophical positions 
and concepts, including the need to point out, to enhance, to bring out any new idea or 
speculation considered relevant or focal for a new interpretation of reality, and the 
closer this oscillatory movement is to the centre (i.e. to the understanding that different 
theories show different aspects of the same reality, and they all describe the truth), the 
more it brings improvement to mankind and greater understanding of the complexity 
of  truth. As F. E. L. Priestley notices (Introduction to CW X, p. xxix), this description 
already appeared just two years earlier in Bentham, when it seemed to be just a sort of 
incidental corollary, a particular remark in the frame of the overall reflection and 
assessment of the importance of the thought of Coleridge in the evolution of British 
philosophy, and of European thought in general too (Bentham, CW X, pp. 93-94). 
Moreover, already in 1832, Mill writes at length about the “half-truths” theory: in a letter 
to Gustave d'Eichthal there is a long part concerning this theme and closely linked to 
Saint-Simonian theories for which some ideas may be considered true as a principe 
critique, but false as a principe organique, in the frame of the positivist theory of the 
different epochs of humanity - and of thought and philosophy as well – considered as 
organic or critical periods. This Saint-Simonian vision, Mill finally writes, is fundamental 
in the search for “practical political truths” (letter to Gustave d’Eichtal, 7th November 
1829, CW XII, pp. 38-43). So, this is a theory that, in few words, describes the existence 
of opposing forces in society and in different historical ages, during which the 
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predominance of an idea or a principle makes society stable, but at the same time stops 
human, social, political, cultural improvement, whereas lively, divided and different 
positions strongly contribute to the attainment of truth and progress. How such a view 
is consistent with Coleridge’s thought, in which social, cultural and political tensions, 
and the role of education, culture, philosophy and, in some sense, scientific research (as 
we would call it today) are managed and resolved in a static and conservative – 
conservative in strict sense - social vision, is to be questioned.  
The “half-truths” theory comes back later in Mill’s life, in 1865, when he writes about 
Auguste Comte’s Positivism: 
M. Comte has got hold of half the truth, and the so-called liberal or 
revolutionary school possesses the other half; each sees what the other 
does not see, and seeing it exclusively, draws consequences from it which 
to the other appear mischievously absurd (Auguste Comte and Positivism, 
CW X, p. 313). 
In this case, Romanticism is excluded from the two sides of the truth, which is instead 
composed of Utilitarianism and French Positivism, both of which have a negative 
attitude towards what Mill maintains to be a metaphysical approach (pp. 300-301).  
For Berlin, the ‘half-truths theory’, along with Millian philosophy of liberty, shows that 
Mill is well aware of the differences in human circumstances, of their role in society and 
history, and of the variegated ways of human change and mutations: Mill maintains 
variety and individuality highly important because he is an empiricist (Berlin, 1969, p. 
194). However, at the end of his essay, Berlin also points out Mill’s notes on English 
mentality, usually afraid of general ideas (unlike the French), and he affirms that 
although not being an original innovator, many of Mill’s merits lie in his ability to apply 
ideas – general ideas – to different fields (p. 203). Mill was a man of an age whose “mass 
neurosis” - Berlin’s words – was claustrophobia, meanwhile our age (or, at least, the age 
in which Isaiah Berlin writes, i.e. about 60 years ago) is rather an age of agoraphobia – 
that is why Mill may sometimes be misunderstood: although his psychology is 
nowadays a bit démodée, his philosophy has to be considered in context, i.e. as a reaction 
to the suffocating spirit of Victorian England (p. 198). Despite his criticism of Mill’s 
theory of liberty, Berlin still believes there is a persuasive core stemming from Mill’s 
own life, from concrete causes, from his rebellion against his father and from ‘half-
truths’. This core is meant to be a remedy against the unintended and potentially 
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oppressive and destructive modern democratic societies (pp. 201-202). Although Mill 
somehow advocates a role for the intellectuals – Berlin affirms – he never proposes the 
rule by the intellectuals and he cannot be accused of pedantocracy17 (an accusation 
Mikhail Bakunin made against Karl Marx, for example): Mill is probably just thinking of 
a form of intellectual authority, a way to give voice to rational people, to the best-skilled, 
the well-educated and the more experienced. From his multifaceted and complex view 
of human character, seen as creative, fallible, imperfect, contradictory etc. stems, 
according to Berlin, Mill’s figure as an advocate of freedom, although inconsistent with 
his own utilitarianism (pp. 202-206). 
John C. Rees and Alan Ryan, instead, have framed Mill’s liberalism as a substantially 
consistent part of his utilitarianism: individual liberties are necessary in order to 
preserve personal moral autonomy, and moral autonomy is in its turn a necessary 
element to pursue the greatest happiness principle. Ryan (1987), for instance, points 
out that the major elements of concern for Mill are “diversity, spontaneity and 
individuality” (p. 253), that these goods have to be safeguarded as “the ultimate goods 
of individual life, and that we must safeguard them by leaving people the room to 
experiment and inquire into them” (p. 254). Ryan highlights that, in Mill, action must be 
motivated by one’s own happiness, and what moral rules are for is the pursuit of 
happiness. So, a moral restriction or permission should be accepted to the extent it 
pursues the maximisation of happiness (pp. 200-204). In this sense, Ryan argues, the 
utilitarian account is justified and consistent, and there is no license for coercion on 
other persons, as the permanent interest of a progressive being is in exploring his 
nature and the different ways in which he can express himself. Coercion, indeed, would 
 
17 The term ”pedantocracy” is used by Mill twice in his writings: for the first time in On 
Liberty, CW XVIII, p. 308 (“If we would possess permanently a skilful and efficient body of 
functionaries—above all, a body able to originate and willing to adopt improvements; if we 
would not have our bureaucracy degenerate into a pedantocracy, this body must not engross 
all the occupations which form and cultivate the faculties required for the government of 
mankind”), and then in CRG, CW XIX, p. 439 (“A bureaucracy always tends to become a 
pedantocracy. When the bureaucracy is the real government, the spirit of the corps (as with 
the Jesuits) bears down the individuality of its more distinguished members”), What this 
term entails (routine, mediocrity) and how it is related to democracy will be object of 
investigation later, mostly in section IV.II. 
 45 
 
be at odds with a spontaneous, although rational, character in its development, and with 
acceptance of diversity as a prerequisite for investigating different modes of life (pp. 
254-255).  
Besides these, there are other original and critical interpretations of Mill's On Liberty: 
Maurice Cowling (1963) gives a politically conservative description of a philosophy that 
in reality seems rather dogmatic, as - he asserts - Mill’s primary aim is to replace 
aristocracy and Christianity from their pre-eminent place in England and to claim 
considerable authority and moral leadership for intellectuals, thus replacing one ruling 
class with another. Mill’s advocacy of liberty, according to Cowling (whose work 
received harsh critical responses, see for instance Rees, 1966), is a means to create a 
body composed of an intellectual élite of competent, liberal opinion-makers. Joseph 
Hamburger (1999), instead, sketches a sort of illiberal Mill: he highlights Mill’s attempts 
to reconcile freedom and control while morally accepting individual behaviours aimed 
to influence and improve the self-regarding conducts of others, as “to advise, 
remonstrate, and persuade, after all, is not to punish” (Hamburger, 1999, p. 185). The 
main distinction is, probably, that between coercion and persuasion, and, actually, 
Hamburger writes, Mill’s wish of reshaping individual moral characters maybe led him 
to overlook the coercive aspects of some forms of persuasion. Hamburger traces several 
passages of Mill's works in which a form of social control, of shaming, of acting 
censoriously, would have been permitted even towards the so-called self-regarding 
actions, i.e. those actions which neither harm nor affect others, in a sort of action of 
pressure targeting the depraved and the less civilised and carried on by those with 
individuality, those who in the current society are a cultivated and high-minded 
minority acting for a cultural transformation of society and humanity, thus tackling and 
altering beliefs and behaviours (pp. 166-202).  
Hamburger stresses the importance of Comte's influence on Mill and, particularly, the 
idea of a religion of humanity, i.e. a religion or a system of beliefs which would not need 
to appeal to transcendental, supernatural elements, would be based on non-selfish 
feelings and would serve as a means to the development and improvement of humanity. 
At this stage, such forms of social/intellectual pressure would no longer be necessary, 
and an almost totally free society (in which different ways of life and thought can be 
experimented) would take place. According to Hamburger, “(t)he specific role Mill 
sought for himself in his religious project was limited by the need to face the fact that 
the religion of humanity would be in place only in the distant, even remote, future” (p. 
148); moreover, he states that, while Mill discovered this project in Comte’s writings, in 
 46 
 
which altruism and a sense of duty were held as the final goal of changes in habits and 
motives, he actually had similar ideas as early as the late 1820s, when he first read 
Comte’s Système de politique positive. Even later on, in his Auguste Comte and Positivism, 
Mill seems to see Comte’s philosophical system as a natural ally of Utilitarianism, as 
remarked earlier in this section.  
In Comte’s writings, Mill finds an interesting theory as for historical and social laws, 
while he thinks Benthamism is still useful as regards psychological, individual and 
moral aspects. Indeed, Mill maintains that Comte’s position in the field of psychology as 
a “grave aberration” in the French philosopher’s “view of the method of positive science” 
(Auguste Comte and Positivism, CW X, p. 296). In the first edition of the System of Logic 
Mill highly regards Comte’s work, praising it and quoting it at length. In the following 
editions, instead, positive and laudatory comments on Comte are less frequent and the 
relevance of his work in Mill’s text becomes marginal18. Mill, hence, is just partially and 
not totally convincingly inspired by Comte as regards the role of the intellectuals; as 
concerns their very relevant role in the creation or at least the inspiration of a religion 
of humanity, Mill differs under two aspects. The first one is the institutionalisation of 
the intellectual class, which Comte favours while Mill rejects:  
“in order that this salutary ascendancy over opinion should be exercised by 
the most eminent thinkers, it is not necessary that they should be 
associated and organized (…). It is because astronomers agree in their 
teaching that astronomy is trusted, and not because there is an academy of 
Sciences or a Royal Society issuing decrees or passing resolutions” (p. 314). 
Hamburger maintains that the idea of a religion of humanity was already latently 
present in Mill, who had a sort of an illumination when he encountered this idea in 
Comte (Hamburger, 1999, pp. 121-124). However, Mill rejects Comte’s version of this 
religion, for a number of reasons: personal reasons (Comte basically wanted Mill to be 
his disciple across the Channel), authoritarian aspects of the Comtean project (in 
particular in his practical details), Comte’s opinion on women (he was much less prone 
to accept gender equality than Mill was). An analysis of minor writings, posthumous 
publications, and letters reveal, at least according to Hamburger, Mill’s real intentions: 
 
18 See John M. Robson, Textual Introduction, in CW VII, pp. lxxxii-lxxxiii. 
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such religion would be a perfect substitute of supernaturalism, accepting Comte’s 
general idea that the religion of humanity would help in achieving the objective of 
making compliance with altruism a habitual routine (pp. 124-139). Unlike Comte, Mill 
does not think that altruism should be forced; it should rather be encouraged if it does 
not emerge spontaneously (p. 137). According to Hamburger’s interpretation, then, On 
Liberty is just a proposal of a set of means whose aim is the destruction of social norms 
and values, in order to instil new and altruistic ones. 
The second aspect on which Mill differs from Comte has been neglected by Hamburger, 
whose argument on the religion of humanity partially lies on an interpretation of Mill’s 
acceptance of the Positivist theory of natural and transitional states, the former being a 
society characterised by unity, harmony and stability, and the latter being an 
antagonistic society, where conflict and disagreement among opinions and beliefs 
towards the establishment of new institutions are common. According to Hamburger, 
Mill, in a sort of utopic fashion, hoped the establishment of a new natural state in which 
his religion of humanity would have substituted old moral norms and systems of values 
(pp. 108-113, mainly with reference to Mill’s The Spirit of the Age, published in 1831 
and in which Mill depicts the transition from old natural states of society to new one, 
and the emergence of new moral and intellectual authorities replacing the old ones). 
This is at odds, however, with what Mill maintains in his review of Guizot’s historical 
writings19. 
While Cowling’s work is a form of politically conservative criticism directed against 
liberal and allegedly dogmatic thought, Hamburger hesitates in placing Mill in the liberal 
field: Mill tries to balance both liberal and non-liberal elements, as he thinks that no 
doctrine represents the whole truth regarding a particular subject or issue. So, 
according to Hamburger, Mill may be a sort of communitarian liberal. Basically, in 
Hamburger's opinion Mill would concede a large degree of freedom only to people of 
genius or of remarkable individuality, interested in higher pleasures after a process a 
social control - however, this seems to be a process, perhaps antagonistic, taking place 
among individuals, as it is not carried on by society as a whole, by the masses against 
the few (actually, in Hamburger's interpretation, it is an action conducted by the 
 
19 See infra, section IV.III. 
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elevated few), by the political body through legislation. Hence, even though Hamburger 
may still be criticized (he maybe overestimates what in some points may just be loose 
language; Mill seems to recognise different personal models of perfection and 
individuality, and virtually everyone has his, or her, own individuality to enhance and 
defend20), the form of social pressure he describes and investigates does not seem to 
take place at a political and legislative level, in which, as I will try to suggest in the next 
chapter, wider room for freedom is allowed, and Mill seeks to devise an institutional 
system and a democratic polity in which every voice is heard, and where moral 
character is influenced not in a pervasive way, as Hamburger argues - for instance, he 
says, this pervasiveness is demonstrated Mill’s will in reducing opportunities for the 
satisfaction of selfish attitudes (Hamburger, 1999, p. 226) - but rather persuasively and 
rationally.  
More recently, in order to find reasons for which we should read Mill today, Skorupski 
(2006) has looked at some typical elements of Mill’s philosophy, such as free thought, 
the concept of the good of humanity, freedom, modernity. Mill belongs to a tradition - 
Skorupski reminds us – according to which free thought is not based on the mere 
rejection of any sort of assumption in our reasoning or from any given idea or belief, but 
it rather concerns an attitude of constant open-mindedness towards what we already 
believe to know without any type of exception (pp. 8-11): Skorupski calls this attitude 
“constructive empiricism” (p. 8), which is naturalistic, because it puts us in the world 
that we study, and holistic as well, because it concerns the whole of our knowledge, and 
calls into question all our beliefs, even those which we initially take for granted or 
proved (such an attitude does not mean, in fact, that we have no beliefs to start with). 
In Mill there is an idea of collaboration with others in the service of humanity and of the 
common good – that is why he sympathises with Comte’s religion of humanity - and the 
way to judge an idea with reference to the general good is to see if it contributes to the 
good of humanity or not. No one’s happiness matters more than that of any other 
individual, and the pursuit of happiness in general, not only one’s own happiness is 
important (in the terms that we have seen previously): the general rule is that each 
individual seeks to achieve his or her own happiness in his or her own way, within the 
limits established by the fact that everyone must be able to do the same, i.e. the pursuit 
 
20 See On Liberty, CW XVIII, pp. 267-270. 
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of pleasures and the avoidance of pain. Skorupski traces the development of these ideas 
and reminds us that happiness is also a justification, a method of monitoring the course 
of our actions. There are behind this reasoning some truths and convictions about 
human beings, what they are, their stories, their condition, the fact that they discover 
what makes them happy by making mistakes and by exercising their freedom within 
their personal sphere, their relationships with their family or with friends, their social 
and political relations, and so on (pp. 15-38). So, the state of liberal society is not based, 
for Mill, on concepts such as natural rights or social contract, it is rather based on 
considerations regarding the fallacy of human belief, the human condition itself, the fact 
that human beings make mistakes , they learn from them, and in this way they come 
close to happiness. Human action is the foundation of Millian liberal theory: humans, 
therefore, need freedom to be happy. Skorupski in his text explores at length this subject, 
and what he emphasises is that nothing is more important to understand the ethical 
vision of Mill that his conception of human being as a dynamic and developing individual, 
“man as a progressive being”, and there is a kind of potential released during the course 
of human life and, also, during the process of development of humanity. The fullest self-
development, then, gives access to the highest forms of happiness. The possibility of 
development within society is fundamental, and that is, according to Skorupski, one of 
the main elements why we should read Mill today. 
Another point that Skorupski examines is the concept of freedom, and the analysis of 
human development and of the human condition is the foundation of freedom according 
to Mill, Skorupski emphasises. A liberal accepts that the authority comes from the 
people, but also that popular sovereignty has limits of principle (p. 40), while a 
collectivist deems that popular sovereignty has no limits and that all the power is in the 
hands of the people, thus attacking the individual will in order to favour the collective 
will. Here we go to the core of the problem, which concerns the relationship between 
individual freedom and collective democratic decision, so much so that Skorupski 
emphasises the Millian concept of backward states  of society and the idea of progress 
towards more freedom as a mental process that takes place at both a moral and 
individual level, and a collective one: freedom makes its appearance and prevails in a 
society in which barbarism and its oppressive and violent elements have been expelled 
or at least substantially weakened. Freedom of discussion and the fact that we should 
not harm other people's feelings occur only at a certain level of development. Morality 
and freedom concern the individual who must be not only encouraged but almost driven 
to take a path of personal, individual and even original development - at a social level, 
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what does this mean? That we must have a society in which there is a wide variety of 
characters and lifestyles - this is what emerges from Mill’s theory. What might be called 
the liberal elitism of Mill is the opposite of an authoritarian populism, because on the 
one hand, Skorupski argues (p. 55), Mill mixes his liberalism with a certain civic and 
political egalitarianism, on the other hand there is a certain hierarchy of values, and 
there are differences in what we consider good and beautiful, as well as the creativity of 
some people respect to the masses, and Mill is looking for some intellectual and moral 
recognition of those who deserve it. 
Skorupski makes a list of propositions of Mill’s philosophy: 
1 The greatest fullness of life comes through developing one’s nature – in 
all aspects of feeling, reason and will. 
2 Aesthetic, intellectual and moral self-development is open to all. 
3 Open and universal culture requires unchecked diversity and dissent 
4 It requires contributions of the highest order of greatness. These can only 
be made by a creative few, and are most favoured in an atmosphere of 
freedom. 
5 Democracy without an entrenched Liberty Principle threatens mediocre 
conformism, and even a political despotism of the majority. (pp. 55-56) 
Despite providing a good summary of Mill’s moral and political philosophy, these 
propositions perhaps lack some elements. The fifth one, for instance, could mention the 
fact that the liberty principle is necessary in and for the polity, of course (at least from a 
Millian point of view), but that perhaps it is not sufficient (not evidently, at least) and 
that further considerations regarding cultivation and competence have to be made 
when it comes to a democratic polity. Although the fourth proposition mentions 
“contributions of the highest order of greatness”, whether it is just a matter of liberty 
that these are not ignored thanks to “an atmosphere of freedom” against “mediocre 
conformism” and “a political despotism of the majority” is not obvious. As I will try to 
show in the rest of this work, competence, even in the sense of a proper political 
competence/technē, play an important role alongside liberty. As Skorupski maintains, 
freedom of thought and discussion triggers a mechanism in a liberal and democratic 
society through which some opinions and individuals will emerge. Despite the tension 
between the liberty principle and the intellectual and moral authority that Mill faces, 
this authority, thanks to freedom itself, gains some influence which will have to take 
place in the implementation of democratic representative activities. Skorupski 
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emphasises the objections regarding the fact that Mill unrealistically assumes high 
standards of integrity and selfless action of many - too many - people on many - too 
many - topics or issues (p. 60). Yet, Skorupski also states that any élite in itself is just 
another group of fallible and corruptible humans, dialogue is actually what really 
appeals to reason, which is a faculty common to all human beings, and leaving it in the 
hands of a group means failing in providing a mechanism to eliminate particular 
distorting perspectives from that specific group (pp. 60-61). So rationality and 
responsibility are qualities developed by education and practice of dialogue in the polity 
- this is the point that Skorupski makes. However, it is not just the “atmosphere of 
freedom” what helps. The way political institutions and representation are devised and 
work may or may not help in fostering the advantages of liberty. 
As for the modernity of Mill’s thought, and going back to Skorupski’s question (Why read 
Mill today?), we must not forget the cultural-philosophical context of the time, in Europe 
and in Britain, the communitarian tendencies (Hegel and Marx, for example), as well as 
the influence French positivism has had on Mill, although Mill, as seen in the essays on 
Bentham and Coleridge and in his Autobiography, has never supported a complete and 
total criticism of Enlightenment and rationalist tendencies, but he has rather carried out 
a critical and complex process of re-thinking and re-elaboration. In this regard, and also 
in regard to the way a Millian political and social theory may come useful to us in the 
XXI century, it could be stressed that our cultural life and self-conceptions are still 
heavily influenced by Enlightenment and Romanticism, and this is why, for example, 
Victorians are so close to us (see Taylor, 2003, pp. 393-418), and indeed, when it comes 
to social sciences 
Even more strikingly, the very picture of history as moral progress, as a 
going beyond our forebears, which underlies our own sense of superiority, 
is very much a Victorian idea (p. 394). 
The idea of reducing suffering too came to us from the Enlightenment and some 
eighteenth- and nineteenth-century thinkers (of course Bentham and the Utilitarians, 
but also Cesare Beccaria and his proposal of penal reform, for instance). Another idea of 
the age was the subject as self-determining, stemming from the decline of cosmic ideas 
on a determined universal order and from reflections on the internal powers residing 
inside the subject, i.e., typically, reason and imagination (pp. 394-395). 
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Turning now to the concept of education in itself, we shall see some of Mill's ideas at the 
time of his anti-Utilitarian reaction (during which he developed some of the convictions 
on the individual genius I have mentioned and discussed earlier in this chapter) and the 
idea of education proper (school and academic) and at large, and how it is strongly 
woven with political matters according to Mill. 
III.III. POLITICAL PARTICIPATION, COMPETENCE AND 
EDUCATION 
Why is education relevant to Mill's democratic theory? Because in it, as we shall see, we 
have a two-fold argument: on one side, the importance of competence deriving from 
education and experience is a relevant element in representative government – in any 
form of government, actually. This is quite obvious, in very truth; however, a class of 
competent rulers and bureaucracy might somehow endanger liberty. On the other side, 
political participation has educative consequences. 
As in Jeremy Bentham's philosophy, in Mill's theory we find the basic principle that 
every man is, at least prima facie, the only sure guardian of his rights and interests. So, 
Mill thinks that the exclusion of individuals or groups from any political activity can lead 
to ignoring, misunderstanding or underestimating their interests. However, the 
justification of the principle of participation is incomplete on the basis of this first 
argument: unlike Bentham, John Stuart Mill has learned that the public interest is not 
the full satisfaction of particular interests. The interests that individuals pursue may not 
be their true interests, and the same goes for the general interest. We have seen in On 
Liberty that people know what their interest is, but, also, that there are higher and lower 
pleasures, and that the experience of different lifestyles and the challenge to established 
truths are important.  
There is a second reason for defending political participation: its influence on education 
and character education. It favours the creation of an “active and energetic”21 character. 
What, in particular, are the consequences of democratic participation? Indeed, when we 
mention education with reference to Mill’s political thought we are actually talking 
about something more than school, academic, professional or technical education. We 
 
21 CRG, CW XIX, p. 407. 
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are also talking of elevation of character and of the creation of a polity which would lead 
to the creation of characters as described in On Liberty, where, indeed, he sketches the 
link existing between the number of people exercising some form of political power and 
the need for informed judgements: 
No government by a democracy or a numerous aristocracy, either in its 
political acts or in the opinions, qualities, and tone of mind which it fosters, 
ever did or could rise above mediocrity, except in so far as the sovereign 
Many have let themselves be guided (which in their best times they always 
have done) by the counsels and influence of a more highly gifted and 
instructed One or Few (On Liberty, CW XVIII¸ p. 249).  
There are three concepts I will try to single out in the subsequent sections of this thesis 
and in its particular interpretation of John Stuart Mill’s political thought. First of all, 
political participation enforces a sense of citizenship, matures the spirit of 
independence and critical reasoning, it leads so to express publicly any disagreement 
with political decisions and take action to change them. Secondly, it broadens the views 
of individual interests and ensures that every citizen tends to satisfy their desires even 
beyond those that are short-term interests. Finally, participation leads citizens to better 
understand what is the interest of the community, and then to act on the basis of such 
general interest, and not in view of one's exclusive individual, partial, private interest. 
Those who engage actively in politics, in short, have more elaborate opinions, possess 
better information, and are able to better understand the differences between parties 
and candidates. Political participation is not reduced, for Mill, to the mere action of the 
vote, since it also affects education of the citizens, interest in the problems of national 
politics and, above all, direct business in local government, as this, on a smaller scale 
compared to national government, gives more opportunities for anyone to take part in 
political decisions, providing an excellent training for government activity, and allows 
to acquire a greater sense of responsibility. 
The principle of participation as described in Thompson (1976, pp. 13-53), however, 
seems insufficient to justify a form of representative government without any particular 
provision to prevent undesired consequences of the democratic rule. On the one hand 
the democratic participation makes every citizen, even poorly qualified intellectually 
and culturally, more and more suited to political life; on the other side, the condition of 
many individuals, ill-prepared and uneducated, is a reason to keep them away from 
political and administrative life, precluding any possibility of their individual moral and 
 54 
 
civil progress. In some of his writings Mill argues, however, that, along the current lines 
of progress and civilisation, democracy may be an inevitable fact of life and history (De 
Tocqueville on Democracy in America (I)¸ CW XVIII, p. 158),  although not an “absolute 
principle” but rather a “question of time, place and circumstance” (Autobiography, CW 
I, p. 177), and there is a need for preparing and educating individuals who belong to the 
lowest classes to participate in politics; it is extremely likely, also, that in every society, 
however, there will always be individuals or classes, with greater moral and intellectual 
qualities, more educated, more prepared than others to the government of public affairs. 
At the beginning of participation is necessary, therefore, a support provided by the 
expertise and the quality of the best on the other side; the principle of competence 
indicates that in a democratic society as much space as possible must be granted to 
those élites who have the most in-depth knowledge of the most important skills and the 
highest intellectual qualities. 
It is possible to identify two arguments for this principle: the first argument points out 
the dangers of incompetence; the second emphasises the importance of educated 
minorities in the process of political education of the majority of the population. The 
competence of bureaucracy, which is technical and not moral or intellectual, can 
certainly be considered high due to the experience accumulated over time, but it suffers 
from a serious flaw: routine (CRG, CW XIX, pp. 439-440). Mill affirms that rules and 
procedures cause bureaucracy to become rigid and inappropriate to any change or 
reform. He is afraid of the fact that bureaucratic governments perish by the 
immutability of their rules. A popular government, according to Mill, requires men of 
genius and original people to obstruct the spirit of mediocrity. A government of 
experienced officials would not be able to do things for a nation that can be made from 
a free government (even though, Mill concedes, we can still assume that government 
officials may be able to perform those tasks that a free government would not be able 
to achieve by itself). In other words: an external element of freedom is effectively and 
permanently indispensable to ensure the government officials are able to achieve the 
objectives of a democratic society. Competence of technical sort, therefore, must 
necessarily be accompanied by the presence of intellectuals, geniuses, I would even say, 
philosophers, otherwise it may probably turn into a regime that depresses moral and 
intellectual qualities, and would, therefore, hinder the chances to have a good 
government, which, instead, would need those qualities, and which, therefore, must be 
able to stimulate them. Furthermore, an excessive power of bureaucracy may transform 
the public political sphere in a private matter, because it would be structured according 
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to decisions of technical nature with respect to which the many have no skills to assess 
and judge. A democratic and free government is therefore not only fairer but also more 
useful and effective. This is not simply because it fits the character of modern society, 
but also because it contains in itself the antidote against pedantocracy22. 
Finally, a representative democracy is a government based on the criterion of 
accountability, according to which governments are accountable to their citizens and 
selected through public and open electoral competition. John Stuart Mill appeals to 
competence in matters of government, but at the same time he points out that the 
accountability of the governors to the governed is a guarantee of good government 
(Urbinati, 2002, p. 45 and p. 59). 
Looking at these potential dangers, therefore, it becomes clear, as we shall see in the 
following pages and chapters, the role the intellectual minority (i.e. that section of 
population composed of intellectuals, competent people, highly educated citizens and 
so on) should have in society, a minority whose superior competence – moral as well as 
technical – justifies their influence within society.  
It can be assumed that just keeping in mind the need for a solution to the tension 
between these two principles (participation and competence, see Thompson, 1976, pp. 
13-90) Mill comes to state that if the constitution of representation does not favour the 
presence of competent and educated people in the parliamentary assembly, the dangers 
faced by representative government become significant. 
III.IV. EDUCATION, SOCIETY AND STATE 
A focus on John Stuart Mill’s ideas on education requires not only a study of his writings 
on the subject (for instance, his inaugural speech at St. Andrews and other minor 
contributions outlined in the previous sections of this work) and a reflection on his 
philosophy and on its emphasis on the relevance of individual human development, but 
also a look at his own early education: indeed, a substantial part of his Autobiography 
(more precisely, the first chapter) regards his own education and the way it was 
 
22 The way intellectuals can make their mark will be shown in the next chapters of this work, 
in particular in section IV.VI. 
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conducted by his father, James. The young John Stuart went through a quite rigorous 
and dense curriculum studiorum during his childhood: he started learning ancient Greek 
at the age of three, and he proceeded reading Aesop’s Fables and other works by several 
classical authors such as Xenophon, Herodotus, Diogenes Laertius, Lucian, Isocrates and, 
at the age of seven, Plato (Autobiography, CW I, p. 8); then, he went on learning 
arithmetic, reading some history books and, when he was eight-years-old, studying 
Latin and approaching Greek poetry. However, at this age, he was not just a pupil, he 
was a teacher as well: indeed, he started giving lessons to his brothers and sisters, 
consistently with the plan of monitorial system of education set out by his father James 
in order to maximise the efficiency of education and, more generally, to increase the 
number of educated and literate children and to improve the educational system 
nationwide. In this sense, John Stuart was raised in a way reflecting his father’s 
pedagogic ideas – a sort of direct application of utilitarian ideas in the field of education. 
However, later on, such education proved to be less effective than it was supposed to be 
by James Mill: although John Stuart revealed himself to be an acute thinker already at a 
young age, this caused him some discomfort due to overwork and to want of affection 
during his childhood, later leading him to his ‘mental crisis’ and to review some 
utilitarian ideas; these changes in John Stuart Mill’s thought, however, occurred not just 
because of his personal feelings and experience, but also because he later realised that 
the teaching method he and his siblings experimented was “very inefficient as teaching” 
and that “the relation between teacher and taught is not a good moral discipline to 
either” (p. 13). Furthermore, Mill’s education seems to have been based on a quite 
different view from what he himself will have held later in On Liberty: 
Human nature is not a machine to be built after a model, and set to do 
exactly the work prescribed for it, but a tree, which requires to grow and 
develope itself on all sides, according to the tendency of the inward forces 
which make it a living thing (On Liberty, CW XVIII, p. 263) 
So, what was the theory that John Stuart Mill rejected in the field of education? James 
Mill's theory was based on the theories of associationist psychology: according to the 
associationist school, ideas are formed and stabilized, leaving physical and material 
traces (like grooves or furrows) in the nervous system, thanks to the repetition of 
experiences: there is not such a thing as purely abstract and/or innate ideas, rather 
there are experiences and phenomena that recur together, and from there the forms, 
even the most complex, of our rational and intellectual world are originated, as the 
phenomena recur in the same order. Such psychological theory, of course, has 
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implications for the debate over human character, whether it is innate or whether it is 
the result of the surrounding environment. According to Helvétius and to the 
Philosophical Radicals in England, education can contribute to the achievement of the 
greatest happiness of the greatest number, through an educational tool based on the 
association of ideas – and James Mill grounds his son's education precisely on this 
pattern. Furthermore, James Mill adopts the Benthamite principle according to which 
the individual character is the product of education as much as a nation’s character is 
the result of its laws; however, “(h)ad not nature triumphed over nurture (John Stuart 
Mill) would either have lost his reason or at any rate have been unable to accomplish 
the noble work of his life”, because the “bookish” education he was put through was 
useless even for the aims it was devised to, i.e. the construction of a sort of Utilitarian 
robot, and because, at the very end, “education is not all-powerful” (Cavenagh, 1931, p. 
x). 
John Stuart Mill affirms that among his father’s theories, the one on education is the 
most important, although it later became contradictory with the following 
developments in psychology and pedagogy. The first version of James Mill‘s essay on 
education was published in the Supplement to the Encyclopaedia Britannica (1819-23): 
a new, enlarged and corrected edition was then printed in 1825 in an autonomous 
volume along with other essays previously included in the Supplement and reprinted in 
1828. In this work there are a number of occurrences showing James Mill using the word 
‘education’ in a wide sense, i.e. environment or nature, as distinguished from nurture – 
but even when he uses the word in the narrow sense, education still remains as what 
creates differences among men, classes, etc. (see also Cavenagh, 1931, p. viii).  
James Mill’s essay is composed of four sections, each of which expounds a different part 
of the subject: the first section deals with the psychological theoretical foundation of 
Mill’s theory of education; the subject of the second section still is a psychological theory 
of mind, although applied to the subject of education; then, James Mill turns his attention 
to the end of education (happiness, as we shall see); the fourth and final section focuses 
on some practical aspects of education. 
Although it is the specific subject of investigation in section III, James Mill makes clear 
from the very beginning of his essay what the end of education is: 
The end of education is to render the individual, as much as possible, an 
instrument of happiness, first to himself, and next to other beings (…) 
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Education, then, in the sense in which we are now using the term, may be 
defined, the best employment of all the means which can be made use of, 
by man, for rendering the human mind to the greatest possible degree the 
cause of human happiness. (James Mill, 1992 (1828), p. 139) 
The way we can make education fruitful, rather than useless or even detrimental to the 
pursuit of a utilitarian end, is to ground it on a correct theory of mind. James Mill’s 
theory of education is a psychologically-founded pedagogy, as it is based on a theory of 
functioning of the human mind. James Mill pays tribute to David Hartley’s (the founder 
of the associationist school of psychology) and the Abbé de Condillac's theories, in 
opposition to Thomas Reid and his followers in Britain, Immanuel Kant and the “school 
of metaphysicians in general on the Continent” (p. 144). In James Mill’s psychology, 
there is a distinction between matter of experience (which is real knowledge) and what 
constitutes “matter of guess” (p. 142). When it comes to the experience of our mind, it 
is included under all to which we apply the expression I feel. Hence, we have feelings 
and, then, we have memory; feelings may get closer and become complex feelings, while, 
simple feelings may just be impressions (from the senses) and ideas of sense (i.e. copies 
of sensations from the sense) 23 . These two forms of knowledge apply to events 
regarding both our body and our mind – but why is a psychological investigation of the 
way our mind works relevant? James Mill affirms that feelings or thoughts produce all 
the actions of a person, and happiness, which is the end of education, depends upon 
these actions, and therefore “the business of education is, to make certain feelings or 
thoughts take place instead of others. The business of education, then, is to work upon 
the mental successions” (p. 147).  Hence, the elder Mill is interested in the qualities of 
mind education should promote: at first, it should provide knowledge and sagacity, the 
latter being the ability to use the former, and they would be constitutive elements of 
intelligence. Furthermore, a second power is required, and it is the power of resisting 
pain and pleasure, what – James Mill affirms – the ancient philosophers would have 
called temperance. These qualities would be able to promote individual happiness to 
the highest degree – but, what about general happiness? In this case, two further 
 
23 Here comes James Mill’s criticism of Kant and Reid, as they would be part of a “class of 
philosophers who think that there are original feelings beside impressions and ideas; as 
those which correspond to the words remember, believe, judge, space, time, &c.”. 
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qualities are required: justice, in order to avoid harm to others, and generosity, in order 
to do good to the others. 
In his essay, James Mill lists and describes four forms of education: domestic, technical, 
social and political education. Domestic and technical education occur in young age: the 
former is constituted by “all that the child hears and sees” (p. 175) and is already 
decisive in the formation of the character and for the future education, as “(i)t seems to 
be a law of human nature, that the first sensations experienced produced the greatest 
effects” (p. 175). In this stage of education the child has to be surrounded by all those 
impressions which would foster in him the qualities of intelligence, temperance, justice 
and generosity, and this has to be done by associating, with words or other signs, the 
proper impressions to thoughts of happiness or pleasure or, if it is the case, of pain and 
misery. These moral qualities are necessary to people of every social background: 
indeed, as for technical education, James Mill distinguishes between specific, class 
qualities, and general, non-class qualities. Intelligence, for example, is a fundamental 
requirement for the working classes as it would constitute an obstacle to their 
oppression – and the issue whether one should be happy or unhappy equally concerns 
all the mankind. Problems arise when dealing with the degree of knowledge and, 
therefore, intelligence attainable by the working classes, as they do not have much time 
to spend in the acquisition of thoughts or of ideas which would elevate their level of 
intelligence. However, whether we are talking of future labourers24 who undertake a 
specific educational path, as “there are branches of knowledge and art, which they 
cannot all acquire, and, in respect to which, education must undergo a corresponding 
variety” (p. 187) or of those who are, by virtue of their social and wealth conditions, to 
seek a more complete and deep education in the academic system, “there ought to be a 
provision for perpetual improvement” as “(t)hat he is a progressive being is the grand 
distinction of Man” (p. 189): this is why James Mill attacks the forces of conservatism in 
universities, the “old and opulent establishments for education” and the “old practices” 
 
24 As regards young labourers and their education, James Mill points out that they should be 
kept out of labour until the age of fifteen or sixteen, and that a good method for the low 
classes to be properly educated is what Jeremy Bentham had called Chrestomathia, i.e. 
‘useful learning’ in ancient Greek, with a predominant use of senses and perception, visual 
aid and diagrams, regrouping the different subjects according to logical ‘priorities’. For an 
interesting account of Bentham’s Chrestomathia, see Itzkin (1978). 
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(p. 189), as they would not foster the progressive aspects of humanity and would not 
lead people towards happiness – while we have seen that, according to James Mill, 
education in the early stages of life has to operate in order to impress on human minds 
those ideas which would better promote individual and general happiness. 
The other two forms of education, social and political, operate later in the life of people. 
Social education is based on the power of imitation and on the influence society can 
exercise over feelings such as happiness and grief. Mill remarks that people feel an 
intense desire of being considered with favour by their fellows and by mankind in 
general, and that it is hard for people to live as members excluded by the rest of society. 
If both domestic and technical systems of education are properly conducted, then social 
influence upon us will enhance those ideas calculated to be impressed upon us during 
our childhood. Political education is defined by James Mill as the key-stone of the arch 
(p. 193), as the political machinery influences the way our mind sees objects of desire 
and how to achieve them: 
When the political machine is such, that the grand objects of desire are seen 
to be the natural prizes of great and virtuous conduct – of high services to 
mankind, and of the generous and amiable sentiments from which great 
endeavours in the service of mankind proceed – it is natural to see diffused 
among mankind a generous ardour in the acquisition of all those admirable 
qualities which prepare a man for admirable actions; great intelligence, 
self-command, and over-ruling benevolence (p. 193). 
On the contrary, if in a society what matters is subservience to the will of few people, 
and not personal qualities, skills or virtues, most citizens will begin pursuing all the 
means of pleasing these few people in command or above them. This state of things 
would consequently lead to “intrigue, flattery, back-biting, treachery, &c.“ (p. 194) as 
the outcome of a society based on the interests and happiness of the few rather than of 
mankind (o, at least, of the many), unleashing all the negative forces and habits to which 
the previous stages of education had attempted to attach and impress pain and 
contempt. 
James Mill’s theory of education, as just outlined, does appear to make room for the 
cultivation of at least some feelings. Actually, it may also be noted, if we go and trace the 
philosophical and psychological roots of such theory, we can see that, for instance, 
Helvétius – who influenced James Mill’s psychological convictions and pedagogic 
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proposals – used to admit that some natural aptitude or innate abilities might influence 
a man’s growth, education, skills and achievements (the ability to become a violinist 
depends on, e.g., “du gout plus ou moins vif que l’élève prend our son instrument”25). 
However, as already remarked previously, the effects of James Mill’s methods of 
education on his son did not exactly go as planned; furthermore, John Stuart Mill’s 
criticism mainly lies on the ground of his father lack of comprehension of the complexity 
of the human mind. Alexander Bain also noted that the mistake the elder Mill makes in 
designing his theory and plan for education26 is the same mistake he makes in his essay 
on government: lack of empirical evidence27.  
This is, in short, the pedagogic theory which James Mill supported and of which, as all 
the other areas of his father’s philosophy, John Stuart Mill was an advocate in his youth 
– however, as the young Mill would have later maintained, such theory considered the 
human mind a machinery which, if set on the right path, would have automatically 
worked out its own development. John Stuart Mill’s fundamental idea on education, with 
reference to his father’s theory, is that pedagogic theories have to be grounded on the 
knowledge we have of the functioning of the human mind. John Stuart Mill’s criticism of 
his father psychologically-founded pedagogy regards the lack of understanding of the 
complexity of the human mind, in the same fashion in which he criticises Bentham’s 
philosophy in 1835 (see Cavenagh, pp. xi-xxiv). James Mill’s mistake in his treaty on 
education is the same he makes in his essay on government, Cavenagh says with a 
behaviourist approach. On the other side, James Mill’s modernity was clear in his will to 
extend education to everyone. 
As an example of the consequences of his reaction to his father’s pure form of 
utilitarianism, John Stuart Mill’s essay on Samuel Taylor Coleridge may look like a 
perfect counterpoint, both in the field of education in society and in that of the analysis 
 
25 Helvétius, De l’Homme, de ses Facultés intellectuelles et de son Education (a posthumous 
work), sect. x, chap. vi, cit. in Cavenagh 1931, p. xiii 
26 It is a plan which – it has to be said – under aspects other than its psychological premises 
looks really modern, mainly for being a system of universal education. 
27 Alexander Bain, James Mill, London: 1882, p, 247, cit. in Cavenagh, 1931, p, xi. 
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of the social and political forces at play in the modern nations. Indeed, after his father’s 
death Mill finds a new inspiration in Coleridge’s romantic theories: the need for an 
educational system that brings discipline and intellectual maturation into society had 
already been remarked by the Philosophical Radicals; it is new, or more relevant than 
before, the fact that society must not only meet the needs of the utilitarian greatest 
happiness principle, but also take into account national internal dynamics - Coleridge 
would call them forces of Permanence and Progression (Coleridge, 1976 (1830), p. 24) 
- and support educational tools for the people, as well as economic measures aimed to 
strengthen social cohesion. Moreover, the importance of the historical, social or ideal 
reasons that structured British political and social institutions gradually assume 
increasing importance in the thought of Mill, more than in Jeremy Bentham’s original 
radicalism; indeed, many years later, in CRG¸ Mill writes: “In treating of representative 
government, it is above all necessary to keep in view the distinction between its idea or 
essence, and the particular forms in which the idea has been clothed by accidental 
historical developments, or by the notions current at some particular period” (CRG, CW 
XIX, p. 422), and this seems to recall what Coleridge states about the Idea and the 
Conception of a Constitution:  
By an idea, I mean, (in this instance) that conception of a thing, which is not 
abstracted from any particular state, form or mode, in which the thing may 
happen to exist at this or that time; nor yet generalized from any number 
or succession of such forms or modes; but which is given by the knowledge 
of its ultimate aim. (…) The latter, i.e. a conception, consists in a conscious 
act of understanding, bringing any given object or impression into the same 
class with any number of other objects, or impressions, by means of some 
character or characters common to them all (Coleridge, 1976 (1830), pp. 
12-13).  
So, the fact that this original Idea of the English Constitution has spread its influence for 
centuries (p. 19) seems consistent with Mill’s purpose to save the original reasons which 
led to the birth of many of the British social, political, cultural and religious institutions: 
for instance, as regards the church, the feudal state and religion, in his essay Coleridge 
Mill writes that in these realities there was something good, even if at his time there is 
little left of their original purpose and function in society; so, the reformers should look 
at what these systems, these entities, these institutions are still supposed to do and 
whether it justifies their continuation and it still fulfils the purposes for which a specific 
political or social institution was established. So, at some point, faced with the demands 
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of political reform, John Stuart Mill joins Coleridge’s conservatism in this regard - both 
Coleridge and Mill were really disappointed about the status quo, and they both adopted 
the view that considers history and politics as a process of conflictual antagonism of 
forces. Mill makes particular reference to the case of England, whose government was 
born under a set of guiding principles and specific aims (identified by Coleridge in 
state’s unity, social cohesion and protection of property – the so-called Idea) which have, 
in modern times, to be reshaped. In this essay, Mill seems to agree with Coleridge, 
despite his theory’s “manifest insufficiency” (Coleridge, CW X¸ p. 155), on the fact that in 
every civilised country the antagonistic forces or the conflicting interests under which 
all the other interests of the polity can be included are those of conservation and 
progress (pp. 151-152). The interests of conservation would be defended by 
landowners, while those of progress would instead be pursued by the merchant and 
manufacturing classes. Particular, or sinister, interest (i.e. that class interest which 
exerts a sort of undue influence on government decisions and tends to subvert the 
public interest) and general interest were already key concepts in Bentham’s social and 
political theory, and they are based on the utilitarian idea of the greatest happiness of 
the greatest number. In fact, the notion of general interest – which should be the end of 
every government – refers to a concept that regards a quite complex state of things; it 
requires, for instance, a sophisticated classification of what interests are at stake in a 
particular field, and government can only partially be able to meet the general interest. 
Coleridge supports an almost similar theory: according to him, the Idea of a Constitution 
consists in the unity of the polity by concentration as well as by balance and 
interdependence of the forces operating in society: antagonistic forces in Britain, as Mill 
also reports in his review (as we have just seen) are Permanence (landed property) and 
Progression (mercantile, manufacturing, professional classes). So, for both Mill and 
Coleridge social composition is the feature which has shaped British society, and 
considering its relevance is part of the foundation of a good political proposal: e.g., Mill 
mentions Jeremy Bentham and his idea according to which representative democracy 
is the best form of government in any place and at any time in history 28 , whose 
applicability is, therefore, universal (pp. 153-154); however, following Coleridge, Mill 
also argues that the correct method of State reform is not the one suggested by Bentham, 
because a government must be composed of the elements already existing in society 
 
28 We have already seen that this is not exactly what Mill will maintain in successive writings. 
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and the distribution of powers within the constitution cannot change very much with 
respect to their distribution in society (p. 154) – and here once again one of the main 
ideas of this writing appears, i.e. polarity of opposing forces of conservation and 
progress that interact with each other and may be contaminated by each other. On the 
other side, it is to be noted29 that a general idea of history as a process of conflicting 
stationary and progressive forces is rather due to the great influence during the 1830s 
and the 1840s of some French thinkers on Mill, such as Guizot and Tocqueville 
(Varouxakis, 1999).  
However, even though Mill and Coleridge seem to agree on this point (i.e. the conflictual 
view of historical processes), they actually draw different conclusions from it. With 
regards to politics and the way it works in England, we have also to consider – as pointed 
out by John M. Robson (1968, pp. 64-65) – that, at least in a further stage of his political 
thought’s evolution, Mill seems to share in many aspects  Coleridge’s opinion about the 
existence of two different forces, i.e. parties, in English politics - repeating them again: 
one of permanence, i.e. the landed property, and one of progression, i.e. the mercantile, 
manufacturing, distributive and professional class – but not completely, as in On Liberty 
he writes: “In politics (…) it is almost a commonplace, that a party of order or stability, 
and a party of progress or reform, are both necessary elements of a healthy state of 
political life: until the one or the other shall have so enlarged its mental grasp as to be a 
party, equally, of order and of progress, knowing and distinguishing what is fit to be 
preserved from what ought to be swept away” (On Liberty, CW XVIII, p. 253). So, not 
everything is about antagonism, although it may be a healthy, constructive, dynamic 
force if driven through open debate and aimed to a rational choice following an open 
confrontation of these interests as well as of different opinions.  
Actually, in one of his later works Mill directly quotes Coleridge as concerns the two 
forces that act - or would act – in society: in the second chapter of CRG he takes the 
concepts of Permanence (or as he prefers to call it, Order) and Progress, whereas the 
first is, in general, the conservation of what already exists, while the latter is its growth 
and improvement. The point, however, is that in Coleridge’s thought these forces are in 
a play of balances which, while leading to the cohesion of society and its improvement 
(in Coleridge’s terms, of course) - because they altogether respect the Idea on which the 
 
29 See also section IV.III. of this thesis. 
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State is established – they nevertheless remain conceptually separate. On the other 
hand, in Mill’s philosophy Order is an assumption of Progress, in the sense that Order 
or Permanence (i.e. the preservation of wealth and a form of stability of the current state 
of things) is a prerequisite for progressive actions and forces: “Progress is Permanence 
and something more, and it is no answer to this, to say that Progress in one thing does 
not imply permanence in everything” (CRG, CW XIX, p. 387). First of all, there are not 
necessary or obvious contradictions between the conservation of the existing and its 
growth; secondly, the only difference regards the quantity and the scale of force and 
effects: prudence, justice, industry, protection of property are virtues and basis of both 
Order and Progress, while intellectual reflection, courage, spirit of enterprise, 
originality are conditions – especially intellectuals – typical of Progress. At the end, this 
particular antagonism, seemingly consistent with Coleridge’s social philosophy, 
disappears because Mill considers the concept of Progress as not satisfactory to give a 
criterion of a good form of government; in Mill’s words, more than twenty years after 
the publication of his essay on Coleridge, “this division is plausible and seductive (…). 
But I apprehend that (however admissible for purposes of popular discourse), the 
distinction between Order, or Permanence, and Progress, employed to define the 
qualities necessary in a government, is unscientific and incorrect” (CRG, CW XIX, p. 384) 
for the relevant cause is the character of individuals, and that is why Order and Progress 
are maintained by John Stuart Mill as misleading concepts at the time he writes CRG.  
In his 1840 essay on Coleridge – an essay which is a review of the Constitution of the 
Church and State – Mill describes the Coleridgean contribution to political thought as 
sort of anti-Enlightenment reaction seeking to catch the genesis of those principles of 
society and institutions that les philosophes had – according to Mill – instead ignored 
(Coleridge, CW X, p. 131-133), rediscovering those basic principles which over time have 
shaped society along with the national character of each country, and hence becoming 
the basis of political obligation to the government and of social cohesion.  Mill writes 
that these basic principles covered by such anti-Enlightenment reaction are three. First 
of all, Mill highlights that obedience to the state has to be consolidated through 
education since childhood. Its most important ingredient is restraining discipline, i.e. 
education of the human habits and then the ability to turn one’s own impulses and 
desires to those which are considered the ends of society, and to control all those 
feelings that could possibly collide with such purposes and to encourage those tending 
to their achievement. This sort of educational system (along with its purposes) was at 
the centre of the ancient communities, while in modern nations it is devised in order to 
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preserve religious education (Coleridge, CW X, p. 133). The second principle at the 
foundation of obedience to the government and to the law is loyalty to something sacred 
or considered as such (for instance, to a god, to a monarch, to laws and ancient liberties, 
to the principles of individual freedom and political and social equality), a kind of fixed 
point contestable in theory but never challenged in practice: questioning this point 
would mean, for any community, the possibility of civil war (p. 133). The third principle 
is national sentiment, which, however, is not to be meant as mere nationalism, but 
rather as a strong union among the members of a polity, driven by sympathy among the 
members of such polity and by a desire for cohesion and commonality of interests 
within the same territorial boundaries (pp. 134-135). 
In particular, the first factor highlights the role of civil and ecclesiastical institutions in 
education and training of the individuals and, therefore, of the people; Mill points out 
the way Coleridge re-evaluates past institutions, e.g. the Church of England and feudal 
religious institutions, which had, as a ratio for their own establishment and existence, 
the role of forging a class of leaders and educators, to be patron of the arts and of peace. 
According to Coleridge, the Church also has an educative function: the clerisy should be 
a sort of a national church dealing with education and cultural and moral training. So, 
this national religious institution should promote growth of knowledge, civilisation and 
education of the community; the clerisy, according to Coleridge, must be composed of 
professors, researchers, scholars, unlike the past in which the role of religious education 
was given to priests and religious people (mainly because theology was considered on 
the top of the hierarchical order of all disciplines). How, however, should this system of 
education be supported financially? There must be provisions for the use of state land 
and ownerships, called by Coleridge “nationality”, i.e. an endowment of properties to be 
used for the moral and intellectual improvement of the people. They should be given in 
usufruct to the institutions making up the clerisy, and, moreover, the state may even 
reserve itself the right to intervene directly in the upbringing and education of citizens, 
through subsidizing and sending professors and teachers all over the country - thus 
making a national church of priests unnecessary for this purpose. 
Something similar as regards the high importance of the role of the educated classes 
emerges from another source of Mill’s partial rejection of Benthamism, Thomas Carlyle, 
who suggested that those possessing higher intellectual qualities should also, therefore, 
possess a higher authority. This would offer a solution to the question: who should rule 
the new, modern, commercial and industrial world? Carlyle proposed a literary and 
intellectual class of rulers and was worried about the influence of the working classes 
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on society as a whole (see Clayes, 2013, pp. 26-28). Labour, therefore, should be 
restricted and perhaps coerced (on this point, see Packe, 1954, p. 405). Such an 
authoritarian approach would not have suited Mill’s views: indeed, during his life, Mill 
also rejects Comte’s plan for the same reasons. Moreover, Carlyle’s views imply a strong 
leadership exercised by a narrow circle of men: in On Liberty Mill writes that he is not 
“countenancing the sort of “hero-worship” which applauds the strong man of genius for 
forcibly seizing on the government of the world and making it do his bidding in spite of 
itself. All he can claim is, freedom to point out the way. The power of compelling others 
into it, is not only inconsistent with the freedom and development of all the rest, but 
corrupting to the strong man himself” (On Liberty, CW X, p. 269). This is a clear reference 
to Carlyle30.     
As regards Mill on Bentham and Coleridge, it seems that in his eyes they are two 
counterparts that complement each other and greatly influence the English thought of 
their time. But the question is: is Coleridge’s thought a real counterpart? In other words: 
does Mill’s account really show Coleridge’s social thought as a “half-truth” of his 
rethinking of radical political thought? The point is that the clerisy’s role, and school and 
academic education in general, have two different functions in Mill and Coleridge’s 
philosophies: according to Mill, it is part of a broader philosophical purpose, a social and 
political reform which, preserving the democratic character of the state, finds a remedy 
to the danger of mediocrity of the electorate, of the elected representatives, and of that 
technical knowledge typical of modern states’ bureaucracies, which are always likely to 
become routine. In this context, the democratic participation educational role (i.e. the 
fact that a successful democratic participation and political involvement promote a sort 
of civic training and education) is clearly important in John Stuart Mill’s political 
philosophy, in association with what has been called the principle of competence 
(Thompson, 1946, pp. 54-90), indicating the idea according to which in a democratic 
society as much room as possible must be allowed to those élites possessing the most 
in-depth knowledge, the higher skills and the most significant intellectual qualities. It is 
possible to identify two arguments for this principle: the first argument is the one 
pointing the finger at the dangers of the lack of competence; the second stresses the 
importance of educated minorities educated in the process of political education of the 
majority of the population as a matter of efficiency of political affairs, since, thanks to 
 
30 See J. M. Robson’s note to Mill’s text just quoted. 
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their involvement, a rational element would be included within the political arena. 
Competence, anyway, is not just technical, but it must necessarily be associated with 
what might be called moral competence, that is possessed by men of culture or genius, 
or by people well skilled and engaged in politics. In some of his later writings (for 
instance, CRG) John Stuart Mill deals at length with the issues related to a substantially 
bureaucratic government (indicating as bureaucracy as a form of state itself, and 
substantially setting aside the issue of bureaucracy within a democratic regime). 
Bureaucratic technical competence is neither moral nor purely intellectual, and 
although it can certainly be considered as a high form of competence because it is the 
product of experience over time, it suffers from a serious defect: routine – so far this 
seems to be like Coleridge, but let us proceed a bit further and see how this idea of 
competence develops. 
Moral competence is necessary to counteract the special class – and therefore 
potentially sinister – needs and interests and, in general, the tyranny of the majority (as 
described Alexis de Tocqueville's Democracy in America), as regards both the political 
decisions of the majority of representatives and the concerns regarding the influence of 
conformist public opinion over society as a whole and over individuals. Looking at these 
dangers, therefore, the role the intellectual minority must have in society, whose 
influence in society is justified superior competence – moral but also technical – 
becomes more evident. This role must be exemplary, e.g. through speeches and 
parliamentary election campaigns, public debates, in order to stimulate a dialectic in 
society leading opposing points of view to somehow meet and fostering critical thought 
about means and ends of government, as in the way it took place in the Athenian 
democratic polis31. It is worth noting that such dialectical reflection is not just a means 
to give a sort of public political education, but it is also supposed to influence the 
decisions that the government takes. Since those possessing moral and intellectual 
authority are just a minority, this often is the only way they can influence the 
government. Through these reflections, public debate, engagement, etc., their influence 
is greater than their numbers. It can be assumed that only keeping in mind the need for 
a solution to the tension between participation and responsibility is possible to 
understand completely what Mill writes many years after Coleridge: “Such are among 
 
31 See Urbinati, 2002. 
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the dangers of representative government, arising from a constitution of the 
representation which does not secure an adequate amount of intelligence and 
knowledge in the representative assembly” (CRG, CW XIX, p. 441). 
An educational view like the one just described is part of a dynamic and progressive 
vision of society and of a philosophical system which in many aspects is very different 
from that in which the idea of clerisy initially originates. Indeed, Coleridge strongly fears 
popularisation of science, and the clerisy finds its moral foundation in the Bible - and 
then, more than moral, we could call it a religious, almost prophetic, foundation - and 
its deep political and social meaning lies in a completely static social vision. Ben Knights’ 
description is very interesting: 
we have a theory of mind and of education of a wonderful fruitful sort, a 
psychological intelligence of enormous power which becomes committed 
to a limiting desire to separate the faculties of mind. In weighting the 
proposed dialectic in favour of the so-called ‘higher’ faculty, it impoverishes 
intellect, and (while appropriating the higher form of intellectual health for 
the few) sustains class society by proposing a merely partial and dutiful 
notion of intellectual health for the many. Dialectical interplay resolves into 
the subordination of one faculty to another, and the dynamic philosophy 
ends up supporting an organic and largely static idea of the state (Knights, 
p. 69).  
This is an Idealistic conception of the state, above all if we consider that Coleridge 
describes a State as a “synonymous with a constituted Realm, Kingdom, Commonwealth, 
or Nation, i.e. where the integral parts, classes, or orders are so balanced, or 
interdependent, as to constitute, more or less, a moral unit, an organic whole; and as 
arising out of the Idea of a State I have added the Idea of a Constitution, as the informing 
principle of its coherence and unity” (Coleridge, 1976 (1830), p. 107) and he states that 
a Constitution must dwell on the idea of unity in itself by concentration of its forces, and 
on the idea of unity in itself by balance and interdependence of forces. Coleridge 
considers them to be respected by the British Constitution, event though not perfectly. 
Among the other things, this kind of vision seems to show also some light Platonic trait 
when Coleridge, in the seventh chapter of On the Constitution of the Church and State, 
criticizes the so-called plebification of science and culture, maintains right to make 
everybody moderately religious through a moderate amount of education, because, 
regardless of whether a true or false religion is taught, the unity of the State is best 
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preserved by providing its citizens with a sort of immutable idea, by instilling an 
attitude of simplicity, since religion is the centre of stability of every kingdom; one of 
the aims of the State is to provide knowledge and develop intellectual faculties so that 
everyone may be an adequate member of the state, growing and living in a condition of 
civilization and not in a barbarian one. It must be noted that Coleridge uses the word 
civilization, a quite different idea from cultivation: “civilization is itself but a mixed good, 
if not far more corrupting influence, the hectic of disease, not the bloom of health, and a 
nation so distinguished more fitly to be called a varnished than a polished people; where 
this civilization is not grounded in cultivation, in the harmonious development of those 
qualities and faculties that characterise our humanity. We must be men in order to be 
citizens” (p. 107). True philosophy, instead, or a certain habit of contemplating the Idea 
in its unity, is essential for only two categories: rulers and teachers. The way this system 
of ideas can be reconciled with Mill’s philosophy - even in its elements of review of 
philosophical radicalism, in the interest in conservative and romantic philosophies, in 
the growing scepticism and criticism of Bentham’s thought and even under the theory 
of half-truths – raises some problems, if one considers what Mill writes about 
universities more than twenty years after Coleridge: “At least there is a tolerably general 
agreement about what a University is not. It is not a place of professional education. 
Universities are not intended to teach the knowledge required to fit men for some 
special mode of gaining their livelihood. Their object is not to make skilful lawyers, or 
physicians, or engineers, but capable and cultivated human beings” (Inaugural Address 
Delivered to the University of St. Andrews, CW XXI, p. 218). Actually, John Stuart Mill view 
on education seems still to maintain the radical philosophical and political point of 
view32. If we enlarge these remarks to the whole educational system imagined by Mill, 
one point seems clear: its aims are both civilisation and cultivation to the greatest 
 
32 In particular, see James Mill’s Education. One sentence by the elder Mill seems to be a sort 
of anticipated reply to Coleridge’s remarks on civilisation and cultivation: ”That he is a 
progressive being is the grand distinction of Man. He is the only progressive being upon this 
globe. When he is he most rapidly progressive, then he most completely fulfils his destiny. 
An institution for education which is hostile to progression, is, therefore, the most 
preposterous, and vicious thing, which the mind of man can conceive” (James Mill, 1992 
(1828), p. 189). 
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possible extent, while Coleridge educational proposal’s target is just civilisation for 
some people and cultivation for everyone – actually, Coleridge fears ‘over-civilisation’. 
It is necessary to be clear on this point: taking into account only the field of social and 
political philosophy, the proposal of a clerisy, i.e. a class of highly educated people 
largely financed by the nationality, is widely accepted by Mill. From the standpoint of 
purely philosophical significance of the proposal, however (even though Mill recognises 
large merits to Coleridge’s “seminal mind”) this must be calibrated in a direction which 
argues that the opinion according to which the role of clerisy’s education is limited 
solely to providing support for the maintenance and improvement of the material 
conditions of the masses is not wholly in accordance either with the idea of the 
individual as a "progressive being" exposed in On Liberty, or with the democratic project 
whose dangers Mill captures in Tocqueville’s Democracy in America and which he shows 
years later in his CRG, i.e. a society led by democratic government where the reason for 
the very existence of a government, in order to protect the general interest against the 
partial interests, is free and rational debate. It might be in accordance if the idea is that 
the clerisy works hard to substantially promote critical thought, urging people to 
become more reflective and autonomous (as befits the citizens of a democratic state)33, 
but this would be a further departure from Coleridge’s original proposal, according to 
which the state provides an education whose goal is people’s cultural development and 
improvement only to a certain extent, promoting cultivation (in Coleridge’s meaning of 
the term) while, e.g., feeding people with religious ideas which they are not supposed to 
criticize but just meekly accept.  
III.V. PATERNALISM AND ANTI-PATERNALISM, INDIVIDUAL 
IMPROVEMENT AND POLITICAL PROCESS: ANALOGIES AND 
CONSISTENCIES 
 
33 As for what Mill thinks about funding of education and choice of educators, Mill was at 
first inclined to a system based on endowments, and only later he supported a full state 
intervention in education, although distinguishing the attainment of a minimum level of 
education, from full government control of direction and provision of education (Garforth, 
1980, p. 140). 
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An important point on which this chapter is aiming to focus is the affinity, or the analogy, 
existing between the principles advocated in On Liberty and the assumptions and the 
objectives that guide the design of CRG. In order to explain this point better, I refer to an 
article by Richard Arneson (1982) regarding both books.  
Arneson claims, in short, that there is a substantial inconsistency between On Liberty 
and CRG: while the first is an anti-paternalistic text, he says, the second would propose 
solutions of a paternalistic sort, because of the involvement of the élites and because of 
a kind of real lack of confidence in popular participation. According to Arneson the very 
educative element in itself is a main source of paternalism in Mill's political doctrine in 
the attempt to improve the citizenry and the quality of the interests that the members 
of the polity seek to protect, promote and pursue, a sort of “Coleridgean, clerisy-seeking 
side of Mill's thought” which would constitute “its dark Victorian underside” (p. 48). 
Furthermore, according to Arneson, Mill's argument linking education and 
representative government is substantially weak: Mill would claim in CRG that an 
enlightened régime would not fulfil its duties towards the education of the citizens 
because it would not foster the active character of the people, Arneson writes. Basically, 
he criticises the view according to which Mill would have proposed a sort of 
participatory democracy: passivity of character would not automatically mean political 
powerlessness and activity would not imply a continuous, almost uninterrupted daily 
involvement in practical political business. “The essence of democracy is collective 
control, not collective involvement” (p. 53), and popular sovereignty, popular 
representation and popular participation are not synonyms, Arneson claims, thus 
participation is not so obvious to occur under a representative government, and the only 
things which would be assured in Mill's proposal are popular sovereignty and 
representation: the first would be limited by non-popular bodies and constitutional 
provisions, the  second by a system of voting reducing the power of the working classes 
in favour of the educated élites. Arneson concludes on this suggesting that in CRG there 
are strong paternalistic features, in clear contrast with On Liberty and its strong anti-
paternalism.  
I argue that this view is flawed for at least three reasons: 
a) Arneson does not consider the changes of Mill’s opinion about electoral reform; 
b) his argument is based on a misunderstanding of what Mill writes about political 
participation in CRG; 
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c) Arneson overestimates Mill’s paternalism as regards the role of the educated 
class. 
More in detail, as regards the voting system, in some parts of his article Arneson 
overvalues the role of the electoral law in Mill's political system or, more in general, 
what the limits to the rule of majority are for: while it is true that the purpose for which 
such electoral law should be adopted is the representation of minorities, in particular, 
of the educated, Arneson excessively focuses on plural voting. In fact, in just two years 
Mill changes his mind twice about the electoral model to be adopted: in 1859, just over 
two months, after proposing plural voting in Thoughts on Parliamentary Reform, he 
enthusiastically adopts the electoral system proposed by Thomas Hare; later, in 1861, 
he re-introduces plural voting in CRG. It is true that Arneson bases its reflection on only 
two texts (as already mentioned, On Liberty and CRG), but it is equally true that 
appealing to a theoretical point on which Mill, in a short time, has proved himself to be 
hesitant, may seem exaggerated, and as we shall see later34 Mill's conclusions are not 
rarely guided by principles of practical realism rather than aimed to draw an ideal 
model of government. 
The second point concerns the criticism of Thompson's theory of participation; my 
claim is that such criticism is largely based on a misunderstanding of the following 
quotation from CRG: 
From these accumulated considerations it is evident, that the only 
government which can fully satisfy all the exigencies of the social state, is 
one in which the whole people participate; that any participation, even in 
the smallest public function, is useful; that the participation should 
everywhere be as great as the general degree of improvement of the 
community will allow; and that nothing less can be ultimately desirable, 
than the admission of all to a share in the sovereign power of the state. But 
since all cannot, in a community exceeding a single small town, participate 
personally in any but some very minor portions of the public business, it 
 
34 Chapter V. 
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follows that the ideal type of a perfect government must be representative. 
(CRG, CW XIX, p. 412) 
Arneson argues that, according to Mill, participation should be maximised up to a 
minimum level necessary for a representative government to operate. Perhaps, actually, 
in this case, Mill is supporting a rather classical liberal argument: although participation 
is good in itself, in a numerically and geographically wide society a maximum level of 
participation in the management of public affairs is not possible, so this should be 
reduced and must leave room for representative institutions. Implications of any sort 
regarding the minimization of political participation are a non sequitur. 
Third point: in regards to the role of the intellectual and most competent élites in which 
Arneson distinguishes a clear paternalistic element, Mill is actually just trying to find a 
space for the most qualified people within a parliamentary system; this does not give 
them any explicit leadership post or a role aimed at protecting or substituting other 
representatives. The role of the intellectual seems instead to be – as we shall see in detail 
in the next chapters – an influencing role, i.e. being the person capable of intervening in 
the debate, of introducing elements of rationality in the political discourse and thus 
triggering the process of seeking the truth described earlier in this thesis. Indeed, as we 
shall see in the next chapter, Mill dismisses the idea of a pure and perfectly even balance 
of powers and affirms that in a democracy (whether representative or not), although 
limits and boundaries to the exercise of political powers may be included in the 
constitution, there always is a strongest power able to, if pushed to its limits, overwhelm 
the others, and such power is the popular power (pp. 422-423).  
Actually, I maintain that a sort of analogy between On Liberty and CRG may be traced: in 
both books discussion and exchange of opinions and different backgrounds and 
experiences bring people closer to the truth and to ways of life (in the case of individuals) 
and to political decisions (in the case of the government) which can be helpful in 
promoting the utilitarian principle of the greatest happiness. While those who have 
experienced different lifestyles, especially the higher and more sophisticated ones, are 
able to identify the best solutions and to enjoy higher (i.e. intellectual) pleasures, finding 
satisfaction in activities exercising and involving the higher human faculties and not just 
in those related to our lower instincts, in the same way the intellectually most gifted and 
most competent may help to kick-start or give a positive, well-argumented and 
substantial contribution to a free and rational discussion leading to wise political 
decisions respecting and pursuing the general interest. 
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Furthermore, Mill seems to have thought that an utilitarian morality could be applied 
only if human nature satisfies certain conditions and has reached a sufficient degree of 
sophistication, rationality, self-consciousness - “in the maturity of their faculties”, as Mill 
said (On Liberty, CW XVIII, p. 244). So, there seems to be a double social policy in Mill's 
thought (Wollheim, 1973): a policy or strategy for people who have reached a certain 
level of self-development and another policy or strategy for those who have not reached 
such a level yet. At the same time, in chapter IV of CRG Mill states that society needs a 
certain degree of civilisation to be fit for a representative government.  
This analysis of Arneson’s article – despite being such article a minor contribution in 
the field of the comparisons between On Liberty and CRG, and of Mill on paternalism and 
elitism – helps us in setting aside some arguments according to which these two books 
show a different degree of paternalism. So, are these books paternalistic or anti-
paternalistic? It can be accepted, in theory, that On Liberty is a paternalistic text, as well 
as CRG. Hamburger, as we have seen, excessively stresses some aspects, on which, then, 
an argument in favour of paternalism is founded. There are some elements, though, that 
may lead us to maintain that, if paternalism exists in both books, it is a form of soft, 
elaborated and nuanced paternalism. If Mill is really so concerned with the creation a 
coercive moral system why does not he address directly the issue and write a book 
advocating social coercion? On the other side, it is also true, however, that On Liberty 
describes limits to self-regarding and non-self-regarding actions, and in general the 
boundaries between legitimate and illegitimate interference35. An important aspect, 
however, may be that in On Liberty the educative element is pointed out with reference 
to an active contribution or participation by the uneducated few:  
No government by a democracy or a numerous aristocracy, either in its 
political acts or in the opinions, qualities, and tone of mind which it fosters, 
ever did or could rise above mediocrity, except in so far as the sovereign 
Many have let themselves be guided (which in their best times they always 
have done) by the counsels and influence of a more highly gifted and 
instructed One or Few. The initiation of all wise or noble things, comes and 
must come from individuals; generally at first from some one individual. 
The honour and glory of the average man is that he is capable of following 
 
35 See also Kumar, 2005, pp. 28-30. 
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that initiative; that he can respond internally to wise and noble things, and 
be led to them with his eyes open (On Liberty, CW XVIII, p. 269). 
The many should “let themselves be guided”, and this indicates an active predisposition 
by the masses, not a strong elitist view in which values are imposed or opinions are 
spread thanks to some persuasive action towards the otherwise inactive and lazy 
populace. A sphere of active freedom of the many is left untouched by Mill, the guiding 
role and the best judgement of the educated few are not substantial elements fostering 
the moral and intellectual elevation of individuals in society, but not the main. Mill’s 
argument for the organisation and management of the polity finds its strength chiefly 
when the institutional political system is considered as a whole, and not if the focus is 
just on a specific set of citizens. In other pieces of Mill’s works there are some 
unquestionably elitist references (as, for instance, in The Spirit of the Age), but, as we 
shall see later in this thesis36, it is the existence of a parliamentary arena, of a rational 
debate, of individual freedom, of a specific voting system etc., and basically of the 
relational elements of the system of government devised in CRG (as well as in other 
political writings), that helps and introduce an influence multiplier with regards to the 
intellectual class, and that lets the less educated participate in politics and actively take 
part in a process which elevates civic spirit37. 
An important contribution on Mill and paternalism has been given by Gregory Claeys 
(2013), who illustrates some interesting aspects of Mill’s paternalism and offers an 
argument based on the fact that most accounts unhistorically overestimate the weight 
of On Liberty within Mill’s thought and according to which a contextual and historical 
 
36 Section IV.VI. 
37 However, again, what “elitist” means is a matter of definition. Hamilton (2008), collects 
some useful definitions: while the Shorter OED defines elitism as “advocacy of or reliance on 
the leadership or dominance of a select group” (cit. in Hamilton, 2008, p. 54), Hamilton also 
mentions John Skorupski, who says that elitism is the denial of populism, and therefore 
elitism bears the weight of philosophical analysis (Skorupski, 1999, cit. in Hamilton, 2008, 
p. 54), and Wendy Donner, according to whom the contrast is actually between elitism and 
egalitarianism (Donner, 1991, cit. in Hamilton, 2008, p. 54). After distancing himself from 
Benthamism, Mill starts following Comte and Coleridge’s strong illiberal elitism, which 
proposes the creation of an educated and vanguard class in society, but then comes back to 
more liberal positions, as we shall see later in this thesis. Hamilton defines Mill’s position, as 
a “moderate elitism”, “anti-autoritharian but not anti-elitist” (p. 56), which just accepts the 
existence of an influential role of the educated. As we shall see, the picture is a bit more 
sophisticated. 
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reading of Mill’s work shows support for some substantial intervention by the state. 
Such intervention would affect the lives of the poor and of the less civilised (p. 14). 
According to Claeys, three elements are to be factored in assessing Mill’s leaning, under 
some circumstances, towards an interventionist stance: social justice, Malthusianism 
and feminism.  
As regards social justice and the lines along which authoritative state intervention may 
be justified according to Mill, Claeys analyses a number of political and social issues, 
such as the scope of government, taxation and inheritance, poor relief, franchise 
regulations, education, foreign intervention with reference to the cases of India and 
Ireland, plus a number of other minor and miscellaneous matters. As for the scope of 
government, Claeys relies mostly on Mill’s concession in  Centralisation about the limits 
of the state intervention: “the function of the State naturally does widen with the 
advance of civilisation” (CW XIX, p. 602). What Claeys points out is the distance between 
Mill’s principles regarding government activity and interference with the individual, 
and some pure form of laissez-faire principles. Despite what Mill claims in the Principles 
of Political Economy, i.e. that laissez-faire is the general set of rules to which government 
conduct should conform apart from some exceptions, the number and the extension of 
these exceptions are quite wide and therefore state intervention in a number of areas 
in order to provide a higher degree of equality, liberty and happiness is justified (Claeys, 
2013, pp. 118-123). However, although it is true that in a number of matters Mill can be 
regarded as paternalistic to some extent, it might seem an exaggeration to claim that 
“Mill shared with the Tory paternalists a sense of the guiding role of educated elites”, 
although the aims were different, as he “sought no more hierarchy but less, not more 
unthinking  forelock-tugging, but an end to deference on any other but intellectual and 
moral grounds” (p. 122). Mill in On Liberty justifies despotism as “a legitimate mode of 
government in dealing with barbarians, provided the end be their improvement” (CW 
XVIII, p. 224) and in many of his writings, such as Civilization and CRG he distinguishes 
among different stages of evolution of mankind and argues that under a certain degree 
of civilisation and education a despotic rule is acceptable38.  
 
38 An hint, however, of the state of civilisation during his age according to Mill is provided by 
what he writes in 1869: “In the less advanced states of society, people hardly recognise any 
relation with their equals (…). Existing moralities, accordingly, are mainly fitted to a relation 
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Claeys correctly highlights “the absolutely crucial importance of free, open, balanced, 
unprejudiced and well-informed debate” along with education and “a leading role for 
educated elites” (Claeys, 2013, pp. 214-215), since Mill “left no road open but 
persuasion” in order to achieve his goals (p. 215) and intellectuals should not compel 
others to pursue some particular end, but only the power to persuade and to point out 
the way (p. 220). Indeed, how far this goes in order to justify the fact that the most 
educated have a “guiding role” might be disputed, at least if such role is intended in a 
strong sense. More than guiding and leading, the intellectual class should rather 
persuade and foster a rational debate in society and within the political arena; it is a 
more subtle action than guiding that is indirectly triggered by the participation of the 
most educated in politics, to whom Mill does not confer a role of direct political 
leadership. Even in the case an intellectual is directly involved in politics, he is still 
confined within some limits as regards independence from his constituents’ will39. As 
regards democracy, however, the educative power does not lie in the persuasion and 
the discussion led or promoted by the educated class; it rather lies in the democratic 
process in itself, of which the intellectuals are an important part. Without democratic 
participation, the guiding and persuasive role of the educated would just be an 
excessively paternalistic imposition over the uneducated. 
Claeys in his book points out that under many aspects (birth control, marriage, taxation, 
private property) the government should intervene or to be at least somehow softly 
paternalistic (even though this is a label whose significance and extension might be 
controversial). Benthamism may have already played a role in inspiring the young Mill 
and providing him some paternalistic idea, mostly on the side of social control (see 
Claeys, 2013, pp. 16-21); Bentham also thought that MPs had to be strongly independent, 
not guided by the will of their voters40. However, Mill’s essay on Jeremy Bentham shows 
a partial rejection of the sharpest aspects of Benthamism, and how Mill is influenced on 
this may be open to debate. Moreover, on the economic side, James Mill supported 
laissez-faire principles, while his son did not: at least on this, John Stuart Mill’s alleged 
 
of command and obedience (…). Already in modern life, and more and more as it 
progressively improves, command and obedience become exceptional facts in life, equal 
association its general rule” (The Subjection of Women, CW XXI, p. 294). 
39 See infra, chapter V. 
40 See supra, p. 11. 
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paternalism (indeed, he is at least softly paternalistic, this has to be at least conceded 
here) does not derive from his Utilitarian and Radical education.  
The point is that impositions on many important bits of legislation and on some basic 
aspects of social order and structure is democratically debated and consented in order 
to promote individual freedom, equality and happiness, and therefore not strictly 
speaking paternalistic, or, anyway, an example of positive paternalism, “which may 
promote both individual and social well-being, including autonomy and deliberative 
capacity” (p. 221). The educational side is non-coercive too. Besides this, Claeys 
maintains that Mill’s views on democracy are weak, as they do not predict the fact the 
“widespread manipulation of opinion in democracies might undermine and possibly 
negate the educative role elites, ‘the aristocracy of scribblers’, had necessarily to play in 
reforming society” and that in politics “emotion, style and image often take precedence 
over substance and programme” (p. 224). It is true that Mill has not foreseen many of 
the problematic aspects of representative democracy. Claeys, however, identifies the 
core of the educative argument in the exemplary moral and intellectual guidance of the 
educated few, and not in the democratic process in itself, in the mechanism in which 
intellectuals do have an important place, but that would not activate beneficial 
consequences in term of education without active participation of the citizens.  
What the next chapters will try to illustrate, indeed, is that democratic institutions as a 
whole, their organisation and the sort of rational debate that takes place in them, and 
not simply the example of the intellectuals or their virtues and moral guidance, are the 
means thanks to which elevation of the individuals is attained. This could be linked with 
what Mill says about nurturing education and the present civilisation in less developed 
societies, one of the issues that will emerge over the next pages, along with the way the 
political debate in the legislative assembly should occur, the antagonistic aspects of 
politics and history according to Mill, and what are the founding principles of democracy 
and the evils which it has to avoid. 
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IV. DEMOCRACY 
In the previous chapter we have seen the positive impact of liberty on society according 
to John Stuart Mill – mainly in terms of civic and social education - and how the 
progressive education of the citizens can let democratic institutions and political 
participation flourish, and vice versa. In other words, we have seen how Mill’s approach 
to the matter involves or at least assumes a sort of self-feeding virtuous loop: a certain 
level of education, individual liberty and civic self-consciousness are necessary 
requirements for democracy, which, in its turn, fosters individual characters, political 
participation and a possibly wider, better informed and more rational debate; such 
‘democratic consequences’ increase cultivation and education in society, and so on. 
The purpose of the present chapter (which will be mostly descriptive of Mill’s political 
proposal) is to extend the account of such an approach and also to provide a more 
specific view of John Stuart Mill’s theory of representative democracy.  
The first section introduces the methodology of the social sciences, as expounded in the 
System of Logic, and reasons and conditions to establish a representative government 
(chapters I-IV of CRG), sketching a possible philosophy of history; then a section on 
democratic institutions and elections (chapters V-XIV of CRG, excluding chapter XII, 
which will be object of investigation in the following chapter of this thesis) follows. The 
third section deals with Alexis de Tocqueville and François Guizot’s influence on Mill, 
which will eventually reveal itself to be fundamental to the deeper understanding of 
Mill’s political thought in conceptual and theoretical terms, as it introduces the concepts 
of the tyranny of the majority and of systematic antagonism in society. 
Finally, I try to investigate and assess whether Mill’s theory of government is really 
democratic or if, actually, it hides some forms of elitist rule, and whether there is room 
for technocrats in a representative democracy. Hence, I argue that there are some 
specific moral obligations for representatives. 
IV.I. METHODOLOGY OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES AND PHILOSOPHY 
OF HISTORY  
Mill’s ideas on the way an investigation on the forms of government should be 
conducted can be obtained from CRG; however, many issues are already considered in 
the System of Logic, at least as regards the methodology of the social sciences.  
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CRG are introduced by introducing and discussing two alternative approaches to 
political theory: 
a) political systems are an almost natural product of a society and influenced by 
people’s existing social, cultural and character conditions (if not their direct 
consequence);  
b) such political systems may be reduced to merely abstract elaboration, a set of 
pre-defined institutions suitable to every kind of society or a consequence of a 
nation’s characteristics and therefore, once the best form of government is 
identified and characterized, it has to be applied in every state, without any 
particular concern for existing and contingent situations.  
Mill rejects both theories. According to the theory which would see the government 
merely as a mechanism to be put in motion in any case and under any conditions, the 
first step would be to identify the hypothetical best form of government, and those who 
adopt this method look to a constitution in the same way they look at a steam engine or 
a threshing machine, Mill writes.  When it comes to the point of view according to which 
institutions are just the inevitable result of history, traditions and character of a people, 
Mill does reckon that political institutions derive from human will, and the organisation 
is decided by individuals, and that therefore men did not wake up one morning in the 
summer and found them to have blossomed; however, at the same time, we must not 
forget that no machine - including the political - moves on its own (CRG, CW XIX, pp. 
374-382). Mill honestly recognises that nobody is a supporter of any of these theories 
in their pure form: both the supporters of the naturalistic version (institutions as 
products of traditions, habits, circumstances) and those of what we may somehow call 
idealistic (as it moves from a theoretical political reflection applicable to any concrete 
situation) or mechanistic (for it sees the political machinery, namely the government, 
as a sort of complex system of gears whose mechanisms have to be investigated in order 
to refine their functioning) use elements of the opposite theory. In other terms, the 
fundamental concept that we find in this preliminary examination of the subject is that 
both theories just show and represent a partial view: neither of these two theories about 
the birth of the government is completely accurate, and both, at the same time, contain 
elements of truth.  
For a good and effective government – Mill continues – an active participation of 
individuals is necessary, not just their acquiescence. He identifies three conditions for a 
representative government: 
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The people for whom the form of government is intended must be willing 
to accept it; or at least not so unwilling, as to oppose an insurmountable 
obstacle to its establishment. They must be willing and able to do what is 
necessary to keep it standing. And they must be willing and able to do what 
it requires of them to enable it to fulfil its purposes (CRG, CW XIX, p. 376). 
Although relevant, conditions such as numerical strength, social status and financial 
wealth can be contained and overwhelmed, i.e. they can be prevented from becoming 
the decisive factor in establishing a political power in society, mainly because the choice 
of the form of government is a fact of persuasion, “a great part of political power consists 
in will” (p. 381) and “(i)t is what men think that determines how they act” (p. 382); in 
other words, the polity is a space of practically exercised will (or will with practical 
consequences)41, which is not necessarily bound to or driven by social and economic 
powers. Indeed, a good form of government depends on “the qualities of the human 
beings composing the society over which the government is exercised” (p. 389), or, still 
in Mill’s own words, “the virtue and the intelligence of the human beings composing the 
community” (p. 390). On the other hand, the role of government, or, more properly, of 
its institutions – the machinery – consists in being able to promote such qualities in the 
governed, leading to a general elevation of moral, civic, intellectual, mental qualities 
within a society, which, in their turn, make government wiser, more effective in 
pursuing the general interest and, last but not least, increasing the aforementioned 
qualities, and so on. In this sense, a basic feature of a good government has to be 
progressiveness. 
It has to be remarked, however, that, according to Mill, different stages of society’s 
evolution require different forms of government for the reasons mentioned above: a 
government whose existence and purposes its citizens are unable or unwilling to 
actively protect, pursue and accept is unfit for the specific conditions of that specific 
community. Hence, backwards stages of human civilisation require a form of rule fit for 
less cultivated and civically engaged citizens and able, somehow, to let them reach the 
next step of civilisation. The second feature of good government, so, is adaption to the 
 
41 Which, as we shall see, in the Millian form of democracy becomes a political space of 
rationally exercised freedom. 
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existing conditions within society. Two years before the publication of CRG Mill already 
affirms: 
Despotism is a legitimate mode of government in dealing with barbarians, 
provided the end be their improvement, and the means justified by actually 
effecting that end. Liberty, as a principle, has no application to any state of 
things anterior to the time when mankind have become capable of being 
improved by free and equal discussion. Until then, there is nothing for them 
but implicit obedience to an Akbar or a Charlemagne, if they are so 
fortunate as to find one. But as soon as mankind have attained the capacity 
of being guided to their own improvement by conviction or persuasion (a 
period long since reached in all nations with whom we need here concern 
ourselves), compulsion, either in the direct form or in that of pains and 
penalties for non-compliance, is no longer admissible as a means to their 
own good, and justifiable only for the security of others (On Liberty, CW 
XVIII, p. 224). 
Given these principles, Mill reckons that the best form of government is representative 
government, and the main reason is that it both requires and fosters an active character, 
i.e. an individual character that, when the circumstances in society are favourable, tries 
to improve the current conditions of society and to prevent evils to occur, without 
merely and passively accepting them, and that, in virtue of this activity, improves itself 
morally and intellectually, and is a force towards social and moral progress. 
Furthermore “more salutary is the moral part of the instruction afforded by the 
participation of the private citizen, if even rarely, in public functions” (p. 412), as he is 
required to take into consideration not just his own interest, but all the different and 
conflicting interests or claims in society. This would hopefully associate him with more 
trained and experienced people in the work of government (and, somehow, I would dare 
to say, in the work of a sort of political and social conflict resolution), lead him to a better 
comprehension of the general interest of society as a whole, and let him feel part of a 
larger community. Even though in some stages of history an authoritarian and despotic 
ruler is needed, because of the uncultivated qualities of the population in general, it 
requires citizens with a passive character and substantially hinders both individual and 
collective improvement.  
Book VI of Mill’s System of Logic is relevant as well, as it deals with social sciences. With 
regards to our topic, we see that according to Mill character is the source of volition, and 
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the task of science is to ascertain its laws. Ethology, therefore, studies the formation of 
individual characters, which arises from the general laws of psychology operating in 
specific circumstances. For example, Mill introduces the notion of collective character; 
it is possible to speak of national character, something that manifests itself in what is 
typical of the nation, such as popular maxims, acclaimed literary works, institutions 
when they are accepted and supported, and so on (System of Logic, CW VIII, p. 867). As 
regards sociology, Mill believes that the correct approach is deductive, taking into 
account the co-occurrence of a multitude of causes that act together; he checks the 
outcome of deductive reasoning comparing it with the actual phenomena or, when 
possible, with their empirical laws. Also, the inverse deductive method (pp. 911-930) is 
to be used for historical research in order to get and draw generalisations from specific 
experiences, such as historical events, and these generalisations are to be verified 
comparing them with the general laws of human nature. Although these methods have 
their limits, the interesting aspect is the fact that society is a product of a variety and 
convergence of multiple aspects, similar to that which takes place in the various organs 
and functions of the physical structure of the animals, so we cannot ever say that a 
certain cause is responsible for a given effect. Also, even more important is the fact that 
individual characters have, in the manner just described, social and collective effects. 
Individuality, then, is a focal point of political analysis and action. 
With regard to the idea of and the role of history and the need for reform in order to 
foster rational elements, we may find substantial bits of strong interest in Mill’s thought 
and its potential relevance and impact on today’s social and political dynamics: 
Skorupski (2006) points out that perhaps at that time – and in Mill too - sociology had 
gone too far and that there are no historical laws in the strict sense, in spite also of some 
expectations in this regard by Mill; yet this does not mean that there are no historical 
instruments that may help explain or understand certain trends, certain events and the 
functioning of societies (pp. 64-65). Skorupski also interestingly stresses, although in 
few lines, that we may feel the need to use history to understand the present during 
times of crisis, as, for instance, in the case of the early nineteenth century, and that there 
might be less need for it in more stable periods, as, for example, in the decades 
immediately following the Second World War, in which social forms begin to appear, to 
the protagonists of that time, essential and definitive. So, having these caveats in mind, 
going back to CRG and in an attempt of abstraction from the text, I would stress the 
importance of the notions of history and progress. Indeed, Mill’s political theory may 
lead a hypothetical reader to ask: did Mill think there are general laws in the history of 
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mankind? And did he think that the history of mankind has a direction, follows a path? 
Another question would follow: does Mill’s philosophy of history somehow affect or 
influence his views on democracy? It surely does, at least in terms of the time and 
conditions (under determined stages of society, as we have seen) of the establishment 
of a representative government. Following Tocqueville, Mill seems to affirm that 
democracy is an inevitable event for western societies. Indeed, one of the political and 
philosophical works Mill recognises as a major contributor to the development and 
gradual changes of his own political thought is Alexis de Tocqueville’s Democracy in 
America. Indeed, in his Autobiography he states that, of the two substantial changes of 
opinion in politics occurred in his life, namely a shift towards a sort of “qualified 
Socialism” and a “modified” form of democracy (“which is set forth in my Considerations 
on Representative Government”), the latter stemmed from his reading (“or rather 
study”) of what can be considered Tocqueville’s master work or at least his greatest 
contribution to political theory:  
In that remarkable work, the excellencies of Democracy were pointed out 
in a more conclusive, because a more specific manner than I had ever 
known them to be even by the most enthusiastic democrats; while the 
specific dangers which beset Democracy, considered as the government of 
numerical majority, were brought into equally strong light, and subjected 
to a masterly analysis, not as reasons for resisting what the author 
considered as an inevitable result of human progress, but as indications of 
the weak points of popular government, the defences by which it needs to 
be guarded, and the correctives which must be added to it in order that 
while full play is given to its beneficial tendencies, those which are of 
different nature may be neutralized or mitigated (Autobiography, CW I, p. 
199). 
So, does Mill support democracy just because he cannot stop it “as an inevitable result 
of human progress”, or also because he believes in it? In order to give a proper answer 
to this question we need, at least, to have a look at the way the Millian version of 
representative government should work and on the principles it should be grounded on. 
It is not just a matter of political machinery, but also of social and political dynamics 
occurring in a context where multifarious interests, ideas and power coexist. A well-
structured representative government, indeed, may foster more goods than evils and 
make democracy a good in itself, rather than the result (no matter whether inevitable, 
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probable or just possible) of a historical process which we have to deal with and 
possibly harness. 
IV.II. PARLIAMENT AND GOVERNMENT 
The institutional design Mill describes in CRG resembles the typical liberal separation 
of state powers and assignation of duties: a legislative body, an executive body and a 
judiciary whose members should not be subject to popular approval (CRG, CW XIX, pp. 
526-528). In CRG Mill does not discuss the matter of separation of powers explicitly and 
at length, although he appears, as we shall see, implicitly to accept it. He does not even 
explicitly refer to Montesquieu, whose ideas, actually, are not even a frequent object of 
discussion in Mill’s writings: indeed, the longest piece we have about the French 
philosopher is the speech Mill held at the London Debating Society on the 3rd of April 
1829 (Montesquieu, CW XXVI, pp. 443-453) against John Sterling and in defence of the 
Benthamite political model and of Montesquieu’s investigation on the “the pervading 
principle of the laws of any country: his object was to enquire what are the 
circumstances which give to the whole body of the institutions of any country that 
peculiar character, which distinguishes them from the institutions of other countries. In 
doing this he of course had frequent occasion to shew not only why an institution had 
been established, but why it should be by adducing the reasons of expediency which had 
led to its establishment in different states: but what I wish to point out is that by the 
very nature of his design he was confined to the circumstances of difference in the 
situation of different nations, from which it by no means follows that he was insensible 
to the more numerous and far more important circumstances of agreement” (pp. 450-
451), and this is a piece of work which informs us of Mill’s early views on legislation and 
national character rather than on the matter of powers and their separation. 
If we focus back to CRG and to the form of democratic institutions it illustrates¸ we may 
notice some peculiarities in Mill’s plan for a representative government: at first, the 
rationally deliberative and debate-orientated – more than purely decisional – feature 
characterizing the parliament and the legislative process; second, the strong need for a 
balance between participation and competence; third, the dangers entailed by the so-
called pedantocracy, i.e. a bureaucratic body ruling a nation without any form of 
effective popular or democratic influence. The parliament has substantially two tasks: 
to control rather than to directly administer state affairs, and “to be at once the nation’s 
Committee of Grievances, and its Congress of Opinions” (CRG, CW XIX, p. 432). The direct 
intervention into public affairs is delegated to two other political bodies: the cabinet, 
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appointed by the head of state and whose prime minister only needs to win assent by 
the parliament, and what Mill calls Legislative Commissions (p. 430). The assembly at a 
whole still has to vote on legislation, i.e. to approve or reject bills; according to Mill, 
however, the legislation drafting process has to be carried on by the Legislative 
Commissions, permanent bodies composed of experts whose task is to write bills in 
detail, by virtue of their professional competence, and provide organic and well-devised 
legislation. Indeed, according to Mill, regular MPs could hardly achieve this objective, 
because it is very likely that many of them may not be into a specific subject to such an 
extent of experience and knowledge to be able to handle it properly in detail and 
accordingly write legislative proposals – giving way to political manoeuvres by few 
members of the assembly who, driven by particular interest, may be under such 
circumstances able to introduce pieces of legislation noxious to the general good. 
Furthermore, a numerous assembly is not fit, in terms of efficiency, to such a laborious 
task as the drafting of large pieces of legislation. However, the legislative body should 
still retain the power to approve, reject, and propose changes to the draft, and to give a 
general political address to the work of the Legislative Commission – in other words, 
the popular element, the strongest power in the British Constitution (p. 423), in Mill’s 
proposal still stands as the element which, ultimately, approves or rejects legislation, 
and, indeed, the Commission should not have any power to enact laws, as it “would only 
embody the element of intelligence in their construction; Parliament would represent 
the will” (p. 430).  
There seems to be a sort of balance of powers and constitutive elements (popular will 
and intelligence); however before introducing the description of the function of the 
representative body, Mill clarifies that a “perfectly balanced constitution is impossible” 
and that “the scales never hang exactly even” (p. 422). This argument on the lack of 
balance of powers resembles that of his father, James Mill, who, in his famous essay 
Government (published in its first edition in 1823 and, then, in his final and corrected 
edition, in 1828) discusses and indicates the means by which to reach the end for which 
the government is constituted and responsible. The elder Mill grounds his reflection on 
the typical utilitarian concept of the greatest good of the greatest number: according to 
him, the task of the government is to ensure that each citizen draws the maximum 
benefit and to avoid that the weakest is overwhelmed or exploited by the strongest 
subject in society – basically, to prevent that sinister interests (i.e. the interests of a 
particular social class in spite of the general interest) from excessively influence the 
conduct of parliament and government at the expense of the community. Since, then, 
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every man tends to seize the largest possible amount of “objects of desire”, what is the 
form of government more suited to the pursuit of the utilitarian goal in society 
according to James Mill?  
A democracy articulated in the legislative, in the executive and, finally, in the judiciary 
body, may be fit for such purpose, but it has necessarily to organize itself in the form of 
a representative democracy: discussions and decisions delegated to all citizens would 
inevitably be long and unfruitful, and eventually lead to a chaotic situation. James Mill 
also write that the government of the few over the many, i.e. aristocracy (or, even, 
oligarchy, when the number is small), unlike democracy, in which the rulers pursue the 
general interest and who generally can deviate from such task only by virtue of error 
and not on purpose of the rulers, would rather protect the interests of just a specific 
class or portion of society. According to James Mill, each group in power, without any 
restriction or control, usually tends to care mostly about their own interest and not 
about the collective good, as well as every man tends to abuse when he has uncontrolled 
power over the others. Furthermore, James Mill points out that aristocratic government 
also shows its limits mainly when it comes to the exercise of intellectual abilities in 
political offices, as power is passed by inheritance: it is not true what supporters of 
aristocratic government claim (i.e. that it would facilitate the use of more developed 
skills and better understanding of the purpose and the arts of government), because 
intelligence and knowledge are not elements of heritage, and it is not granted that 
descendants of a good ruler are in their turn wise, competent and aiming to pursue the 
public interest. The same objections are valid for monarchy – actually, for it is the 
government of only one person, such objections are even stronger.  
The elder Mill also rejects the theory of mixed government and balance of power, as the 
establishment of a mixed form of government would put at risk the ultimate goal of 
government itself. He affirms that, in a mixed state, pro-aristocracy and pro-monarchy 
sections of the state would easily subvert the democratic element, being in a position of 
majority (two against one, with the same force for any power), and the hypothesis of a 
balance between only two powers is essentially either non-realistic or just a temporary 
solution. Both aristocracy and monarchy require full power to be attributed to a single 
body or a simple section of society – power which cannot be split or diluted or limited 
by another, although different, form of political power (a democratic political body, for 
example), and even if it were possible, the pure idea of a perfect balance of power is 
simply infeasible (James Mill, 1992 (1819-23), pp. 3-20). These objections against 
monarchy and aristocracy, based on both the competence argument (it is not true that 
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aristocracy and democracy can assure a certain degree of competence in government) 
and the general interest argument (as opposed to the sinister interests pursued by the 
aristocratic class and by the monarch), are points on which John Stuart Mill seem to not 
depart from his father's lessons. On other points, there are differences instead. Indeed, 
while James Mill stresses the importance of representation of interests, his son would 
also intend to make the legislative body a place where different voices and ideas as well, 
not just interests, find their place. According to John Stuart Mill, the parliament has to 
be the place where, as far as possible, a sort of representation of opinions takes place: 
every view held by a section of society must be heard, challenged, scrutinised, assessed 
and accepted or rejected in such political arena, which, then becomes also a place of 
rational debate. Indeed, if any opinion is rejected, it is not because of any form of 
authority, i.e., by virtue of alleged intelligence or by the mere power of the majority, but 
because it has been rationally and with intellectual honesty discussed and properly 
debated. Mill affirms that, thanks to this, “where those whose opinion is overruled, feel 
satisfied that it is heard” (p. 432) and not because they simply recognise the authority 
and the force of the number, but because of “what are thought superior reasons”. There 
is no legitimacy argument here; rather there is a process of well-argued rational 
persuasion that lets the minorities accept the opinion of the majority. Before I have 
mentioned two elements needed by democratic institutions: they have to be progressive 
and they have to adapt to the reality of society; as we have just seen, a rational process 
has to take place within democratic institutions, as a mere parliamentary 
representation of classes, interests, etc. is not sufficient. Why is such rational element 
needed, according to Mill? And how does this process take place? 
A proper democracy does not just need an element of 'intelligence' counterbalancing 
that of 'popular will'. The opposite is also true, i.e. that the popular element is a proper 
counterweight to bureaucratic despotism. While reading CRG and moving from the 
description of the functioning of the legislative body (chapter V) to chapter VI, titled ‘Of 
the Infirmities and Dangers to which Representative Government is Liable’ (pp. 435-447), 
one has the impression that these two forces or powers, i.e. intelligence or competence 
on one side and popular will or representation on the other side, actually 
counterbalance each other in a reciprocal movement. The degeneration of bureaucracy 
– i.e. a form of government uniquely based on the intellectual, moral and professional 
skills of the rulers and of the officers – into what John Stuart Mill calls pedantocracy is 
the effect of a state where the element of popular will is substantially missing: the lack 
of individuality and genius let routine be the dominant force in managing public affairs 
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and create an “obstructive spirit of trained mediocrity” (p. 439). These themes also 
emerge when it comes to government, as for Mill the distinction between the executive 
body (the cabinet) and the bureaucratic administration assumes relevance not just from 
a functional point of view, but also in the light of the different principles at work within 
his political theory. Mill has in mind Continental governments rather than the English 
one when he discusses the problems of bureaucracy, which he appears to treat as a form 
of government in itself where the work of ruling a nation is “in the hands of governors 
by profession; which is the essence and meaning of bureaucracy” (CRG, CW XIX, p. 438; 
see also Thompson, 1976, p. 66) and “(t)he comparison, therefore, as to the intellectual 
attributes of a government, as to be made between a representative democracy and a 
bureaucracy” (CRG, CW XIX, pp. 438-439); however, at least in principle, it seems of 
almost no relevance if we are considering bureaucracy as a part of a representative 
government or as distinct form of government in itself: such a characteristic 
phenomenon of modern societies cannot be ignored when it comes to representative 
government. Furthermore, the fact that the issues of competence related to 
bureaucratic administration are treated in a book on representative government shows 
their relevance in a quite unequivocally obvious way, and, indeed, civil service is one of 
the institutions or of the parts of government where the so-called principle of 
competence (Thompson, 1976, pp. 54-90) must find its place. We just need to rely on 
Mill’s CRG, without the authority of any scholarly interpretations, if we want to include 
the considerations on bureaucracy within the larger set of considerations on 
representative democracy: chapter XIV of CRG, titled ‘Of the Executive in a 
Representative Government’ (CRG, CW XIX, pp. 520-533), exactly deals with the problems 
of skilled employment and professionalism in civil service.  
As regards Thompson’s analysis of competence, it has to be stressed the distinction he 
makes between instrumental competence and moral competence (p. 55), and civil 
servants are expected to possess only the first kind of competence. The idea that Mill is 
just working towards a balance of the two elements (competence and popular will and 
participation) has also been highlighted in an article by Beth E. Warner on Mill and 
public administration. According to her interpretation, this balance tends to be reached 
thanks to a “somewhat antagonistic relationship” (Warner, 2001, p. 410) in a sort of 
dynamic process halting the degeneration of both bureaucracy and the popular element. 
Although antagonistic elements exist in the Millian form of democracy, saying they exist 
even in the relationship between skilled public officers and the legislative body may 
perhaps mean going too far. It may be true, as Warner affirms, that bureaucracy 
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(although being non-neutral) has to be filtered through the parliamentary system 
(characterized by political partisanship) and that many people, unlike many civil 
servants, are substantially unable for a number of reasons to make informed decisions 
(p. 410), but, still, democracy may also be described as a sort of process of mutual 
compensation, in which every element positively influences the other, preventing its 
bad effects to be displayed in the polity, as well as incrementing its beneficial effects in 
society. Conceptually, the fact that we are talking of either balance or antagonism of 
principles means, in any of the two cases, that popular will is as important as 
competence.  
As we will see later in this work (although I have already mentioned it in the 
introduction) there is at least one interpretation, Burns’ article on Mill and democracy 
(Burns, 1968 (1957)), which stresses the prevalence of elitist elements over popular 
ones. However, if instead we prove that in Mill the popular element is at least as relevant 
as the one regarding competence, intelligence, education etc., then this interpretation of 
Mill as an anti-democratic thinker could be somehow dismissed. So far, for instance, 
there have been recurring references in this thesis to the problem of conciliating 
participation and competence as addressed by Dennis F. Thompson (1976), who has 
stressed the fact that the tensions inside Mill’s political works are intended to be 
resolved by education. According to him, Mill seeks to formulate a balanced and 
comprehensive political theory (Thompson, 1976, p. 3) invoking two principles – 
participation and competence, indeed – which would be realised at any particular time 
simultaneously through political institutions and in the long term and over time thanks 
to the gradual improvement of the qualities of the citizens (p. 11). As regards the 
principle of participation, Thompson identifies two arguments in his favour within 
Mill’s thought. The first one is what he calls “the protective argument”, which would 
basically be the defence of one’s interests against other particular interests, which 
would be potentially harmful to the others; anyway, as the mere sum of particular 
interests does not constitute the general interest per se, the individual interests have to 
become closer to the general interest through education (pp. 25-26). The second 
argument, then, is the “educative argument”, which would affect the national character 
of the polity as a whole, fostering an active attitude in public affairs and, accordingly, 
civic spirit (pp. 36-53). Thompson outlines a similar structure for the argument 
underlying the principle of competence: there is an instrumental competence, i.e. those 
forms of professional competence, technical knowledge and specific skills which are 
necessary to fulfil administrative and – as we have seen in the bill drafting process – 
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legislative tasks. However, the danger of pedantocracy42  requires a further form of 
competence, i.e. moral competence, or what we have seen to be the competence of the 
man of genius and of peculiar and cultivated individuality, and of those who look after 
the general interest. Fostering the influence of the cultivated few would not just be a 
way for balancing the power of mediocrity, but also for educating the less cultivated (or 
competent) majority: 
Just as the educative benefits of participation partly justify the extension of 
participation, so the educative value of superior competence partly justifies 
the influence of a competent minority. Here the argument refers primarily 
to moral competence (a concern for the general interest), though it also 
includes the ability to reason about the means and ends of broad courses of 
governmental action. Mill does not think that the instrumental competence 
that experts and administrators can ever be widely taught. Civic education 
does not occur spontaneously. Mill’s “school of public spirit” requires 
teachers as well as scholars (p. 79) 
Hence, these two principles are reconciled within Mill’s theory of representative 
government as well as within his theory of development: Thompson stresses Mill’s 
remarks made at the beginning of CRG regarding the naturalist and the a priori views of 
political models (they would only show half of the truth) and also the fact that a good 
government would promote virtue and intelligence of its citizens, not only their 
material welfare. Furthermore, understanding how political institutions affect the 
creation of active and progressive characters means being able to prevent the 
degeneration of democracy into stagnation and decay and making it a force of change in 
the future stages of humanity (see pp. 137-141).  
Going back to Mill’s work, another example of the mix of competence and popular power 
can be traced in the proposal of an unelected Senate. Indeed, chapter XIII ('Of a Second 
Chamber', whose topic is whether the parliament should be composed of two branches 
 
42  Thompson correctly points out that in CRG Mill considers bureaucracy as a form of 
government in itself, rather than a part of a state of any sort (democratic or not) – however, 
as we have already seen, Mill always associates it with the state, not with other forms of 
organization (i.e. private associations, companies etc.). See Thompson, pp. 66-68. 
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and what should be the nature of the hypothetical second chamber) shows again the 
dangers Mill sees in a representative democracy and of the solutions he seeks to devise. 
On the issue whether there should be a bicameral system, the relevant element which 
should be taken into account is competence (a force against class interests) along with 
the respect of popular will (which may pave the way for legislation favourable to the 
interests of the majority). Although Mill opposes, at least in principle, the need for what 
he defines “a wisely conservative body” (CRG, CW XIX, p. 516), since “(t)he really 
moderating power in a democratic constitution, must act in and through the democratic 
House” (p. 515), and states that the issue of the accordance between competence and 
popular will can be properly addressed and solved only thanks to the system of 
distribution of seats and the legislative process described beforehand in CRG43 , he 
concedes that it may still occur that, for some reason, a second chamber is maintained 
or believed to be a necessary body to exist and there may still be good reasons to 
establish a second chamber as a form of counterweight to the power of the 
democratically elected part of the legislative body, in particular of its majority, which 
may happen, under certain circumstances, to act despotically.  Mill outlines two 
different options: 
- the Roman Senate model, i.e. a non-elective house composed of people who 
have had a remarkable legal, military, naval, political, scientific or literary 
career; 
- a model which may be called the ‘American model’44, i.e. a Senate indirectly 
elected by the body expressing the popular will (in the British case, the House 
of Commons). 
 
43 See chapters VIII-X of CRG. 
44 It is an ‘American model’ as it possesses the same political advantages of the United States 
Senate in the XIX century as described by Alexis de Tocqueville: as an effect of the indirect 
elections by the States’ legislatures, it used to be composed of brilliant and eminent people, 
willing to contrast the particular interests without opposing popular influence and 
legitimacy in themselves. Even though any explicit reference to Tocqueville is missing in this 
short section of CRG, an analogy can be somehow traced as Mill’s argument in favour of an 
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Both these options would fit the purpose of conciliating competence and popular power. 
Traces of these counterbalancing, competing and perhaps contrasting forces are also 
present in Mill’s plan of electoral reform. In CRG Mill proposes a system of plural voting 
(each person is entitled to a number of votes according to his school, academic and 
professional qualification (too vague)), but this is the final outcome of a reflection which 
led Mill to endorse publicly different solutions between the late ‘50s and the publication 
of the CRG in 1861. In a pamphlet titled Thoughts on Parliamentary Reform and 
published in 1859 Mill sets out the principles of a complete reform of the voting system. 
The first one is universal suffrage, because those who have no voice in government (or 
in the choice of the representative) can hardly be heard and taken into account by those 
who, instead, would have the right to vote, and mainly because voting is “one of the 
means of national education” then someone who is deprived of his right to vote and 
participate in the political process “has not the feelings of a citizen” (Thoughts on 
Parliamentary Reform, CW XIX, p. 322). The educative element is fundamental here, as 
the possession of political rights allows the less educated to possess “one of the chief 
instruments both of moral and of intellectual training for the popular mind” (p. 323).  
Along with the universal suffrage, two more principles are required in order to 
constitute a good representative government: representation of the educated and 
representation of the minorities. Everyone should be given voice in political business, 
nonetheless not all the people are equal and, hence, not everyone should have an equal 
voice. The reason for breaking a principle of pure equality in voting is the difference in 
people’s mental, intellectual and moral qualifications, “one person is not as good as 
another; and it is reversing all the rules of rational conduct, to attempt to raise a political 
fabric on a supposition which is at variance with fact” (p. 323). The variance in 
competence and education within the population does not justify, anyway, a voting 
system in which some individuals are excluded from the suffrage, as it would make a 
class subject to the others’ will, as “the suffrage for a member of Parliament is power 
over the others, and that to power over others no right can possibly exist” (p. 326). 
Plural voting is the way to fulfil the need for the representation of the educated: an 
unskilled labourer would have one vote, a skilled labourer two, a superintendent of 
 
indirectly elected Senate substantially runs along the same lines of Tocqueville’s description 
of the Senate of the United States. 
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labour three and so on, up to those of highest intellectual rank such as clergymen, 
lawyers, artists, physicians, etc. who should be entitled, Mill writes, to cast five or six 
votes. In such a way the more educated cannot be easily outvoted and the labour class 
(or, at least, the least skilled citizens) can still affect politics and legislation by virtue of 
their number and receive the educative benefits provided by civic and political 
participation. Representation of the minorities is the other element aimed to be 
protected in Mill’s proposal for electoral reform; although rule by majority is a basically 
constitutive element of democracy, it should not be excluded or substantially reduced 
in representation, “(i)f the numbers are to be the rule” (p. 329). This is an argument in 
support of both an extension of suffrage and of a reform of the allocation of seats, 
granting three members for every constituency.  
However, just two months after the publication of his Thoughts on Parliamentary Reform, 
John Stuart Mill changes his mind and adopts Thomas Hare’s system of proportional 
representation in a short essay titled Recent Writers on Reform (CW XIX, pp. 341-370). 
Hare’s plan would have been able, according to Mill, to face the issues related to 
representation of minorities in Parliament, as “that minorities in the nation ought in 
principle, if it be possible, to be represented by corresponding minorities in the 
legislative assembly, is a necessary consequence from all premises on which any 
representation at all can be defended” (p. 358). Thomas Hare’s plan, as illustrated in his 
book The Election of Representatives, Parliamentary and Municipal (published in 1859), 
would consist in the creation of a single national constituency where a quota of votes is 
needed in order to be elected. Such quota is obtained by dividing the number of voters 
by the number of seats available in the House of Commons. Moreover, votes are 
transferable: that means that each voter ranks his favourite candidates. In this way 
further votes can be attributed until the amount needed for the quota is reached (Hare, 
1857, pp. 16-25; Hare, 1873) 45..  
In The Distribution of Seats in Parliament, a paper read at the Manchester Congress of 
the Social Science Association in 1879, Hare summarises the goal his proposal would 
seek to achieve: “real political power” would be handed to voters thanks to electoral 
 
45 On this specific point of moving to the second choices, Mill actually disagrees and thinks a 
better and less complicated solution should have been found (Recent Writers on Reform, CW 
XIX, p. 361).  
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reform, and this would increase the participation of “more thoughtful voters, and 
persons of public and philanthropic spirit” and “the sense that it is a personal duty not 
to stand aside in the business of selecting those by whom this great nation and so much 
of the world is to be governed” (Hare, 1879, p. 3). Many years before this, in another 
article, Hare already outlines the objectives his proposal of electoral reform is designed 
to pursue:  
“First, to give every elector the power of voting for any qualified candidate 
throughout the kingdom with whom his views are most in accordance; and, 
secondly, to enable every elector – with the exception of an ultimate 
fractional number – to participate in the choice of some representatives” 
(Hare, 1857, p. 16).  
Many years later Hare still thinks that, thanks to his system, these voters, even if they 
failed to form a majority, would still be able to associate their views with those of other 
voters in the country, and therefore be represented (p. 4).  
One of the elements of this voting system. working as an incentive to electoral 
participation, would consist in the fact that the share of MPs given to every city or 
borough or administrative subdivision would be in relation to the number of actual 
voters, and not on the numbers of merely registered voters (p. 4). Moreover, one of the 
consequences would be an increase of the independence of every MP (Hare, 1857, p. 31) 
and on a wider range of choices for every voter (p. 34). This would help in “bringing out 
every form and shadow of political opinion” (Hare, 1873, p. 127). 
As for the intellectual qualities of the electorate, Hare warns that “the greater number 
must not be the least instructed” (Hare, 1857, p. 44); from this, however, he does not 
conclude that the will of the majority should be disregarded or disrespected, au 
contraire, “it does follow that means should be provided for giving the minority its full 
weight” (p. 46). Indeed, in his The Election of Representatives, Parliamentary and 
Municipal, Hare provides for the illiterates to be assisted when voting (Hare, 1873, p. 
126). 
Hare envisaged the end of a system where the geographical location of a candidate was 
a substantially relevant element in a successful election of MPs. One of the virtues of his 
new system would consist, according to Hare, in the fact that the minority of every 
constituency would not be “as now extinguished”, but be granted at least some 
 97 
 
representation thanks to the association of their votes to those of other voters in the 
country (Hare, 1857, p. 8), and “the proportional system of election would bring the 
whole electoral body within reach of one another, and create a new and vigorous and 
healthy national life” (p. 9). This would also give an impulse for candidacies of people of 
high mental cultivation and education, who may otherwise feel that their possibility of 
being elected may be very low (Hare, 1879, pp. 9-10).  
As regards the reception of Thomas Hare’s voting system and of proportional 
representation in general, along with his commendation in Thoughts on Parliamentary 
Reform (1859), Mill also helps Henry Fawcett (his disciple and assistant during his term 
as MP) in the preparation of Mr Hare's Reform Bill, Simplified and Explained (1860), a 
pamphlet in which Fawcett presents Hare's scheme as a remedy against the danger of 
an oppression of minorities (see Packe, 1954, p. 418 and p. 457; Courtney and Lee, 
2004). With the aid of Mill, Fawcett, as well as of G. J. Holyoake, and Max Kyllmann, Hare 
succeeds in spreading his proposal of electoral reform among the working class, and he 
also founds the Representative Reform Association with George Howell and Edmond 
Beales (Courtney and Lee, 2004).  
Hare’s system gained success among thinkers and political theorists not only in Britain 
with Mill, but also abroad. In Australia, for instance, it started being publicly debated at 
least as early as 1860 and a voting law partially based on Hare’s proposal was approved 
in the late XIX century (Bennett, 2011). However, this success was mostly restricted to 
some intellectual circles. In the late 1880s, a few dozens of MPs showed some interest 
for his system, but Hare was anyway aware that support for his reform was not enough 
at a political and parliamentary level (Parsons, 2009, pp. 161-185). His proposal, indeed, 
faced the accusation of excessive mathematical complication46 and of putting too much 
faith in the public’s intellectual and civic qualities; moreover, some critics also argued 
that the mandate linking the representative and his voters would be broken under the 
provisions of Hare’s plan, the party system would have been heavily damaged or, vice 
versa, it would have turned the scheme to the existing parties' own advantage (Packe, 
1954, p. 416). In general, Hare’s proposal on electoral reform, along with Mill’s other 
proposal (extension of the franchise to the women, the creation of a London County 
 
46 “The complex nature of its machinery” was also admitted and pointed pointed out by Mill 
in his Autobiography, CW I, p. 262. 
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Council, were met by indifference (p. 457), in the sense that they had no immediate 
practical consequence. 
Rather than Hare’s proposed electoral mechanism, what raises interest here are the 
motives which led Mill, although temporarily, to converge on this specific form of 
proportional representation, because they differ in part from those of Thomas Hare. 
According to Parsons (2009), for instance, Hare’s voting system would seek to 
encourage the representation of the educated élite, of the clerisy described by Coleridge: 
the influence of this class would be threatened by the rise of democracy, and, therefore, 
an electoral reform protecting it should be carried out (Parsons, 2009, pp. 59-60). In his 
article investigating and comparing the theoretical foundation of Thomas Hare and John 
Stuart Mill’s advocacy for extension of suffrage and electoral reform overall, Paul Kern 
(1972) shows that they are both convinced of the need for the representation of 
minorities, but they have different reasons (or strategies). Hare considers his system of 
proportional representation47 as a means for the elevation of character of the legislative 
body as a whole, as no vote would have been wasted under the form of representation 
and ballot counting he devised, but “it was not just any minority which concerned Hare 
but rather the minority of the educated elite which he believed constituted the most 
valuable part of the nation” (Kern, 1972, p. 309). Under different, non-proportional, 
systems, these élites would have been underrepresented or, in any case, the pure 
numerical majority would have underwhelmed them, creating a sort of disincentive to 
the participation of (what he considers being) the best parts of society: why being 
involved in political business if they could not make their full weight be felt in society 
and in parliament? Not by the exclusion of the working class, but guaranteeing that the 
voice of the educated people is heard is the way, according to Hare, to prevent the 
apathy of the educated élites and let them influence the legislative process in parliament.  
Mill’s support for Hare’s plan seems to be more sincerely democratic than Hare’s 
support for his own plan actually is. According to Mill, Hare’s voting system would have 
 
47 The extension of suffrage does not seem to be a substantial issue, according to Hare. He 
thought that his system would have proven itself effective under any sort of wide (although 
not universal) suffrage –in general, he supported minimal educational and property 
requirements for men and exclusion for women (Kern, 1972, p. 311). 
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been useful in order to prevent excessive power by the working class, but, also, it would 
have replied to an objection brought forward by some members of the educated class: 
Why is nearly the whole educated class united in compromising hostility to 
a purely democratic suffrage? Not so much because it would make the most 
numerous class, that of manual labour, the strongest power; that many of 
the educated class would think only just. It is because it would make them 
the sole power (Recent Writers on Reform, CW XIX, p. 363).  
Both Mill and Hare aim to reduce the influence of the working class. However, Hare 
seems to think the problem is the mere fact that the working in class would be a majority, 
while Mill seeks to find a way to not silence the minorities, since if the smaller number 
could still be represented, there would no longer be objections to the participation of 
the working class and to the fact that it may be represented by a majority in parliament. 
Furthermore, Mill’s considerations appear even more inclusive towards the working 
class if we take the “moral efficacy of such a representation of minorities” (p. 364) into 
account: moral authority and ascendancy of the highest minded and experienced 
representatives would counterbalance the power of the number and positively 
influence the opinions of the majority, or at least leave room to advocate the ideas of the 
minorities. In other words, Hare wants to find a democratic way to keep some form of 
power in the hands of the educated class and his plan “looked backward, nostalgically 
trying to preserve a time when politics was an affair between gentlemen, unsullied by 
the hurly-burly of the hustings and the crass efforts of the have-nots to claim a larger 
share of the fruits of society” (Kern, 1972, p. 322), while Mill sees Hare’s proportional 
representation as a way to remove objections and barriers to the enfranchisement of 
the workers and their involvement in political business. 
In two years Mill harks back to this argument again: in CRG the proportional 
representation system devised by Thomas Hare plus plural voting accordingly to one's 
qualifications and even an exam (in order to acquire further votes) is what we may 
define Mill's final proposal in the field of voting systems. What really seems to care to 
Mill is the fact that every voice should be heard: “Is it necessary that the minority should 
not even be heard?” (CRG, CW XIX, p. 449), “it is a personal injustice to withhold from 
anyone, unless for the prevention of greater evils, the ordinary privilege of having his 
voice reckoned in the disposal of affairs in which he has the same interest as other 
people” (p. 469), “every one ought to have a voice” (p. 473), and a number of other 
passages suggest that this is probably what a legislative body is intended for, i.e. a place 
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where every voice is heard, properly considered and assessed with the least possible 
degree of bias. 
However, a problem arises when we consider that a section, although small, of the 
population is excluded from the franchise: Mill identifies conditions under which 
participation in the suffrage should not be admitted. At first, those who do not possess 
literacy and numeracy skills are excluded from voting. Secondly, an assembly – whether 
national or local – should be elected only by those who pay direct taxes decided and 
approved by that very assembly; this would be substantially a provision extending the 
suffrage to everyone, as Mill proposes, at the same time, to extend direct taxation to 
every grown person in the country. However, third, those who do not earn enough for 
their own subsistence and, therefore, receive forms of benefit or financial support, 
should be excluded too. Mill, however, does not regard these conditions as excluding 
some individuals from the franchise permanently, as he expects that in the long run 
everyone would meet the conditions granting the vote (except, perhaps, the class of the 
recipients of parish relief) and the suffrage would be, “with that slight abatement”, 
universal (p. 471-473). Some forms of criticism, maybe, could still be argued in respect 
of these criteria: even for a limited portion of time or limitedly to the current stage of 
civilisation, there is a section of society which would be excluded from the exercise of 
vote and, basically, from a relevant political participatory activity; quite a paradox is, or 
at lease slightly and prima facie contradictory, the fact that those who are excluded from 
such an activity and its beneficial educative effects on civic spirit are also those who 
very probably more need to be educated (in the broad sense) to the exercise of civic 
virtues – illiterates and people in financial struggle are probably on the edge of society 
and more likely, because of the starting conditions due to their cultural or financial 
disadvantages, to receive a form of ‘educative’ benefit from the educative element 
involved in (and caused by) democratic participation. Perhaps, this is because Mill 
regards voting not as right but as a form of power exercised over others (CRG, CW XIX, 
pp. 488-489). 
Claeys (2013) uses the restriction of the franchise as an example of Mill’s theory of state 
intervention, as Mill can hardly be considered – Claeys rightly writes – as an “unqualified 
advocate of laissez-faire” (p. 118). It is included in a list of other examples (Mill’s views 
on Ireland and India, poor relief, education, taxation, state intervention, foreign 
intervention and despotism) supporting the interpretation according to which “Mill 
believed that the very great good would be achieved by substantially rejecting the 
market” and the laissez-faire principles (p. 121). According to Claeys, whether Mill’s 
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proposal in CRG makes him “more of an ‘elitist’ than a ‘democrat’ depends on definitions” 
(p. 82). Surely, he is right to point out that such proposal was made before the adoption 
of universal suffrage in Britain, and that therefore it was meant as an extension of rights, 
rather than a limitation. However, there is also another way to see it, and there are a 
few other elements to be considered. 
First, CRG were a comprehensive collection or recollection of reflections of a whole life; 
in the preface, Mill points out that his work includes the principles on which he has been 
working up during the greater part of his life (CRG, CW XIX, p. 373). Hence, it may not 
be far from truth to affirm that in CRG Mill shows us a political and institutional model, 
a regulative idea, and that it probably is the final settlement of his political reflection, 
the final rendering of a set of political proposals that evolved and that he developed 
across several decades, and that as such it should also be considered; 
Second: apart from considerations on the estimated amount of people excluded from 
the electoral franchise (Claeys, 2013, n91), it may be of some help to remember again 
that Mill describes the conditions proposed in the eighth chapter of CRG as a “slight 
abatement”, not a substantial deviation from his main proposal. On the other side, it 
seems that Mill is aware (before he has seen of heard of Hare’s proposal) of the fact that 
“the largest, or a very large portion of the people, in this and other countries, are not fit 
for political influence; that they would make use of it” and also that “it is impossible to 
foresee a time when they could safely be trusted with” (Thoughts on Parliamentary 
Reform, CW XIX, p. 322). However, this indicates that he at least thinks that, in the future, 
the extension of the franchise could be universal, and that, therefore, its restriction is 
only a temporary measure. Indeed, he also writes that “everyone of the governed should 
have a voice in the government” and that participation in the political business “is still 
more important as one of the means of national education” (p. 322). 
As for education (in the sense of school education, or of an education providing 
knowledge in a number of subjects, such mathematics, literacy, geography etc.), it 
should aim to reduce the number of people to whom apply many of the voting 
limitations: it should not be forgotten the philosophy of history in which Mill includes 
his democratic theory, a philosophy where progress and the establishment of a 
representative democracy do not necessary take place, but that are likely to occur and 
that should be favoured. In other words, it is true that here Mill’s position is paternalistic, 
but, again, how much paternalistic is a matter of definition. More specifically, Mill writes 
that it is a duty of society to render instruction accessible to anyone and, as regards the 
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right of vote, “universal teaching must precede universal enfranchisement” (CRG, CW 
XIX, p. 470). 
If we want to answer the question of how far he intends to limit the franchise in CRG, we 
may answer that it was intended as a minor measure, a slight deviation from the main 
institutional model which, ideally, would instead include an almost universal franchise, 
restrictions on which as highlighted in CRG are a temporary paternalistic measure 
whose reason lies in the necessity for a society and for its members to reach an adequate 
level of education and of competence (the need for which is clearly evident in many 
parts of CRG), as well as a degree of cultivation of civilisation which would eliminate the 
extreme obedience and passiveness (in CRG, CW XIX, p. 416, Mill clarifies that this is one 
of the social conditions which make representative government unapplicable). Such 
temporary measure will be overcome by education, at first, and very probably will 
become obsolete when the progressive model of representative democracy as outlined 
in CRG will be established.  
As regards again education, how it is intended by Mill to eventually ensure its wider 
extensions, it stands as a matter of state intervention, although not limited to it: we have 
seen earlier in this thesis some aspects of Mill’s thought on a national endowment; 
moreover, in the Autobiography Mill recalls he “urged strenuously the importance of 
having a provision for education, not dependent on the mere demand of the market” 
(CW I, p. 191), despite not advocating a state monopoly48. Apart from this, it remains 
true what has been remarked earlier in this section, i.e. the at least apparent 
contradiction inherent the exclusion of some portions of society from electoral 
participation – portions that remain those the need the most political participation and 
its educative effects on civic spirit.  
More in general and apart from specific considerations regarding the electoral system, 
John Stuart Mill's ideas on the legislative body perhaps show plainly how far he goes 
 
48 "One thing must be strenuously insisted on; that the government must claim no monopoly 
for its education, either in the lower or in the higher branches; must exert neither authority 
nor influence to induce the people to resort to its teachers in preference to others, and must 
confer no peculiar advantages on those who have been instructed by them. Though the 
government teachers will probably be superior to the average of private instructors, they 
will not embody all the knowledge and sagacity to be found in all instructors taken together, 
and it is desirable to leave open as many roads as possible to the desired end” (Principles of 
Political Economy, CW III, p. 950). 
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from the typical utilitarian democratic theory: if we consider his father's Essay on 
Government, we will notice a different conception of the way different interests interact 
in a democratic society and a more purely theoretical approach to political science. In 
his essay, after having expounded the objections to monarchy and aristocracy, James 
Mill (1992 (1819-1823)), affirms that democracy remains the only valid alternative to 
any other form of government: a popular representative body can be adapted to 
perform checks on cabinet and administration activities to ensure that they, either ruled 
by a monarch or by an aristocracy, do not put the ruling class particular interest before 
the general interest. This chamber should also have a power that can never be topped 
by that of the members of the executive body.  
As for the choice of representative, according to James Mill there must be numerous and 
frequent elections: the representatives of the people must continuously be aware of the 
possibility of losing their parliamentary seat and to be part again of the social group 
they have originally come from; therefore, once elected they would probably keep 
serving and pursuing the interests of their group, and not their individual interest. 
Elections are essentially the means by which voters control their representatives: each 
of them may also be re-elected at the end of the term, as it makes no sense to get rid of 
a good ruler. The term in office, however, should not be too short: government activities 
require a certain amount of time to be implemented and tested, and too frequent 
elections would basically induce the candidates to use much of their time canvassing 
and campaigning instead of dealing with actual political business in parliament. James 
Mill also considers the use of recall elections, which would prevent bad representatives 
of the people to continue their work; however, he is also aware that here the same 
criticism as in the case of short terms in office applies: MPs would then constantly be in 
search of electoral support, hence moving away from their core business, which is the 
parliamentary work.   
As for representation and voting, James Mill states that the right to vote should be 
granted to all men older than forty years: the interests of women and people under forty 
may well be represented by their husbands and fathers. He also investigates voting 
rights’ limitations according to wealth, and he seems to reject the Benthamite proposal 
of universal suffrage, even though he does not appear to exclude such option explicitly. 
The problem, according to James Mill, is the threshold of wealth to choose, for, if it were 
too low, it would just be reintroducing the problems of an aristocratic government, 
while, if it were too high, it would mean, in effect, extending the suffrage to all, because 
it would not be easy for people who have a very small wealth to separate their interests 
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from those who have nothing. According to James Mill, it can, therefore, be said that 
although there is no harm in a low level of restrictions based on wealth, there might 
hardly be any good (James Mill, 1992 (1828), pp. 26-28). There is no danger, however, 
for the minority excluded from voting: as the number of those allowed to vote would be 
high, each member of the majority would rather be supportive of a government 
exercised in the interest of all (including, perhaps a bit optimistically, those who are not 
entitled to vote, I say), than of a government ignoring or even repressing small and 
unrepresented minorities, James Mill says. In other words, it is a democracy whose 
engine and heart seem to be the middle class. While considering the hypothesis of a 
democratic government based on the representation of professions and classes, James 
Mill opposes an outright refusal: as classes are driven by special interests, a 
representative body devised as voice of these social and economic groups, rather than 
of individuals, could not help but produce a bad government: the ésprit de corps guiding 
and inspiring these social groups shows the same problems occurring in an aristocratic 
government (see pp. 28-35).  
James Mill argues that we notice the advantages of a representative system in two 
activities: formation of laws and control of the government. He adds that the tasks of a 
representative body should not go beyond these two areas, and the executive functions 
should remain in the hands of the king—James Mill argues – and in the hands of a class 
of officials, including those who would inherit their office. Moreover, the House of Lords 
should control the laws. Monarch and nobles, on the other hand, would be strongly 
motivated to comply with the general interest by the fact that the MPs would be strong 
enough to protect and defend their positions and their powers. The evil of the possibility 
of bad government in a democracy (which is still possible, as we have seen, by mistake 
and incompetence, or if rulers pursue their own interest – a thing which in a democracy 
is just an accidental element, while, in other forms of government, it is a substantial 
element), in the long term, is prevented by education of the people in exercising 
democratic freedom and powers, James Mill writes. 
James Mill's essay is fundamental for the Radical philosophers, as it summarises the 
entire democratic radical proposal in a popular style, away from Jeremy Bentham's 
obscure Plan of Parliamentary Reform. This may be one of the reasons for which 
Government becomes the target of the critical attacks, for instance, by Thomas 
Babington Macaulay. He writes a reply thanks to which, perhaps, James Mill’s essay on 
government is still well remembered today (Ball, 2014), and which later becomes very 
relevant in the philosophical formation of the younger Mill: Macaulay, indeed, with his 
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reply contributes to somehow influence John Stuart Mill’s reformulation of his father's 
political proposal. Macaulay basically brings forward two arguments against James Mill: 
the first regards the method to be applied to the social and political sciences (Macaulay, 
1992 (1829), pp. 271-280); the second concerns the institutional form of representative 
government as designed by James Mill (pp. 280-303).  
As for the first argument, Macaulay substantially accuses James Mill of opting for an a 
priori method, ignoring evidence from experience, which would rather lead to different 
conclusions: for instance, Mill criticises monarchy and aristocracy without taking into 
account those countries well governed by a monarch (for example, Denmark); this 
would contradict his theory. In other words, Macaulay’s accusation is: James Mill adopts 
a general law of human behaviour and of the motives of human action (every individual 
tends to capture the maximum of pleasures and objects of desire, even at the expense of 
their fellows, without any limit), and, from this, he deductively derives the entire 
organisation of the polity and his negative opinions on monarchical, aristocratic and 
oligarchic governments. According to Macaulay, basing a political analysis on individual 
psychological theories is profoundly wrong, especially because the reasons for actions 
as well as the consequent behaviour, vary greatly from person to person, and, therefore, 
deducing political theories from the principles of human nature as James Mill and the 
utilitarians try to do is, actually, almost impossible. Moreover, the psychological 
principle of James Mill’s political theory is – according to Macaulay – either tautological 
or based on false assumptions. Arguing that the motive of the action of each is only self-
interest is nothing more than a truism, it does not allow us to know what each believes 
to be his own interest. The point Macaulay makes here is mostly methodological than 
based on specific political matters: he rejects James Mill’s deductive approach and 
rather defends his historical or inductive one, and, on the subject of self-interest, the 
accusation against James Mill is of circularity or of even supporting a false statement. 
According to Macaulay, If the meaning of self-interest is limited to the pursuit of 
pleasure and avoidance of pain through the exploitation and the oppression of other 
individuals, the starting point of the theory outlined in Government is simply not true:   
There is, we admit, no point of saturation with objects of desire which come 
under this head. And therefore the argument of Mr. Mill will be just, unless 
there be something in the nature of the objects of desire themselves which 
is inconsistent with it. Now, of these objects there is none which men in 
general seem to desire more than the good opinion of others. The hatred 
and contempt of the public are generally felt to be intolerable. It is probable 
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that our regard for the sentiments of our fellow-creatures springs, by 
association, from a sense of their ability to hurt or to serve us. But, be this 
as it may, it is notorious that, when the habit of mind of which we speak has 
once been formed, men feel extremely solicitous about these opinions of 
those by whom it is most improbable, nay absolutely impossible, that they 
should ever be in the slightest degree injured or benefited (p. 279).  
Moreover, James Mill neglects – Macaulay says – some parts of human nature, and takes 
into considerations only the reasons for which men oppress each other, as if they were 
the only ground on which the action of people is based and by which they can be affected, 
ignoring the fact that the behaviour of man in society may be due to several reasons. 
Macaulay, indeed, argues that men tend sometimes to take a hostile attitude towards 
the others, but also to show forms of kindness, courtesy, politeness, helpfulness, just 
because of things like, for instance, reputation or other social sentiments – and if we 
drop, as Macaulay does, the assumption according to which everyone pursues his self-
interest, the theoretical justification of the superiority of democracy as a system of 
government results flawed. As a result of these objections, the methodological proposal 
advanced by Macaulay in his reply to James Mill is that of induction: according to him, 
the only way in which the study of the principles of human nature can help political 
theory is to find out the reasons for which a particular form of government would push 
or influence the rulers to act from time to time for the better or the worse, to compare 
the effects of these reasons, and to understand which of these are the strongest: in a 
nutshell, politics is a sort of experimental science, and rather than referring to the 
mathematical sciences, it should use medicine as a methodological example. In 
summary, in his first argument Macaulay criticises Mill for having established an a priori 
theory and for failing to take into account experience, observation of the present state 
of things and history, and for having persevered in supporting a theory of organisation 
of the polity without a proper empirical foundation.   
The second point of divergence between Macaulay and Mill refers to the content of the 
proposals outlined in Government, and not just on methodological matters: even 
accepting the principles expressed in James Mill’s essay, according to Macaulay there 
still is a problem concerning the formation of the representative body, which should be 
able to prevent the dangers of a monarchic or aristocratic government. Such dangers, 
however, according to Macaulay still constitute a substantial element in a democracy as 
well, because, as soon as they are elected, the MPs become a temporary aristocracy, and, 
therefore, they no longer have the interests of their constituents in mind. Furthermore, 
 107 
 
what would prohibit the MPs to abolish the only limit placed on them, that of the length 
of their office, in order to keep it for and indeterminate time? In fact, they could change 
the law at any time, and even the establishment of special provisions and procedures to 
change fundamental laws such as those regulating the term of office, as is the case of the 
United States, would do nothing but work around the problem. It is true, Macaulay 
writes, that as long as candidates are running in an election, campaigning and looking 
for electoral support, they will keep seeing their interests as corresponding with those 
of the people; but, once the election has taken place, their interests will start to diverge. 
According to Macaulay, therefore, a further form of control upon this controlling body 
is to be found, and the real guarantee against a bad government is rather fear of bad 
reputation and resistance by the people, in the freest democracy as in the most despotic 
monarchy.  
Going into further detail of Macaulay’s second argument, he makes reference to James 
Mill’s criticism of the possibility of existence of a form of mixed government; Macaulay 
instead maintains that English history disproves this theory according to which, 
between two institutional political powers, one would turn out to be necessarily 
stronger than the other and then able to demolish it: the English crown, sometimes, has 
been able to impose decisions on the parliament and, conversely, in many other 
occasions, the parliament has been able to prevail over the will of the monarch, as well 
as in numerous moments in history aristocracies were defeated by alliances between 
the monarch and the people, and in other periods rulers found themselves in front of a 
union between the nobility and the popular forces – unlike what is envisaged by James 
Mill's essay, according to which the presence of a hybrid form of the three forms of 
government would always be detrimental in respect to the people, which would find 
themselves in a submissive position. The exclusion of women from voting is also 
another contradictory element of James Mill’s essay, according to Macaulay: the 
government of the minority cannot but be a bad government, but, at the same time, 
women should not enjoy the right to vote because, in any case, their interests would be 
taken care of by their husbands and their fathers. In this way, Macaulay explains, Mill 
betrays both the principle of majority by excluding half of the population, and that of 
the pursuit of pleasure and happiness by each individual, as a portion of the population 
would be excluded from having an effective say (by voting) in political matters. The 
theme of suffrage and wealth is, for Macaulay, the most substantial issue in Government: 
one has to consider the fact that in such a system the majority of voters choose their 
representatives, and the majority of the representatives who make the laws, and that 
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the rule of the majority could have an interest in oppressing the minority. Macaulay 
affirms that such a situation is prejudicial to the institution of property: the rich 
minority of the country would risk being oppressed and stripped of their assets by the 
majority. If in the short term – within a generation – the appropriation by the majority 
of the assets of the few can seem consistent with the interests of the people, it should be 
noted, however, that in the long term it would turn out to be harmful and would threaten 
the well-being of the future generations: Macaulay points out that, unlike the United 
States, England is a country where many barely live on their own work, and where few 
other people have accumulated a vast amount of wealth over time, and therefore, there 
is the risk of arriving at a point in which the destruction of such wealth occurs and, 
consequently, of the institution of private property, in a sequence of social and political 
upheavals and revolutions. Macaulay writes:   
It is scarcely necessary to discuss the effects which a general spoliation of 
the rich would produce. It may indeed happen that, where a legal and 
political system full of abuses is inseparably bound up with the institution 
of property, a nation may gain by a single convulsion, in which both perish 
together. The price is fearful. But, if, when the shock is over, a new order of 
things should arise under which property may enjoy security, the industry 
of individuals will soon repair the devastation. Thus was no doubt that the 
Revolution was, on the whole, a most salutary event for France. But would 
France have gained if, ever since the year 1793, she had been governed by 
a democratic convention? If Mr. Mill's principles be sound, we say that 
almost her whole capital would by this time have been annihilated. As soon 
as the first explosion was beginning to be forgotten, as soon as wealth again 
began to germinate, as soon as the poor again began to compare their 
cottages and salads with the hotels and banquets of the rich, there would 
have been another scramble for the property, another maximum, another 
general confiscation, another reign of terror (pp. 296-297)  
and so on, until the ruin of the richest and most thriving state in Europe follows.  
As I have already briefly mentioned earlier, Macaulay's final criticism of James Mill's 
essay is about the fact that the political system outlined in Government simply 
constitutes a new form of aristocracy based on wealth, it would fail to represent the 
interests of all voters, as it basically is a government of the bourgeoisie which, at the 
same time, would put at risk the nation’s wealth. James Mill replies to these criticisms; 
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this does not prevent his son John Stuart Mill to acknowledge that Macaulay's objections 
are well founded:  
I saw that Macaulay’s conception of political reasoning was wrong; that he 
stood up for the empirical mode of treating political phenomena against 
the philosophical. At the same time I could not help feeling that there was 
truth in several of his strictures on my father’s treatment of the subject; 
that my father’s premises were really too narrow and included but a small 
part of the general truths on which, in politics, the important consequences 
depend. Identity of interest, in any practical sense which can be attached 
to the term, between the governing body and the community at large, is not 
the only thing on which good government depends; neither can this 
identity of interest be secured by the mere conditions of election: I was not 
at all satisfied with the mode in which my father met the criticisms of 
Macaulay. He did not, as I thought he ought to have done, justify himself by 
saying “I was not writing a scientific treatise on politics. I was writing an 
argument for parliamentary reform.” He treated Macaulay’s argument as 
simply irrational; as an attack on the reasoning faculty; an example of the 
remark of Hobbes that when reason is against a man, a man will be against 
reason. This made me think that there was really something more 
fundamentally erroneous in my father’s conception of philosophical 
Method, as applicable to politics, than I had hitherto supposed there was. 
(Autobiography, CW I, pp. 165-167)  
However, the son could have been a bit more generous with his father, at least in this 
specific circumstance: as Ball (2014) remarks, “in the first place, James Mill did not, and 
given his own premises could not, distinguish between a “scientific treatise on politics” 
and a coherent and compelling argument for “parliamentary reform.” For he believed 
that any reforms that were workable and worth having could be based only on an 
adequately scientific theory of politics. The Essay on Government was intended to be 
both, if only in brief outline. Moreover, the younger Mill leaves the impression that his 
father, although angered by the attack, never replied to Macaulay”. In his reply to 
Macaulay, indeed, the elder Mill defended his position on men and their self-interest. 
However, this did not stop the shift in convictions in John Stuart Mill’s mind, not just in 
politics but also in matters related to education and cultivation of people in a democracy: 
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(T)hough I no longer accepted the doctrine of the Essay on Government as 
a scientific theory; though I ceased to consider representative democracy 
as an absolute principle and regarded it as a question of time, place, and 
circumstance; though I now looked on the choice of political institutions as 
a moral and educational question rather than a question of material 
interest, and thought it should be decided mainly by considering what 
great improvement in life and culture stood next in order for the people 
concerned, as the condition of their further progress, and what institutions 
were most likely to promote that; nevertheless this change in the premises 
of my political philosophy did not alter my practical political creed as to the 
requirements of my own time and country. I was as much as ever a radical 
and democrat for Europe and especially for England. I thought the 
predominance of the aristocracy and the rich in the English Constitution an 
evil worth any struggle to get rid of: not on account of taxes or any such 
comparatively trifling inconvenience but as the great demoralizing 
influence in the country. Demoralizing, first, because it made the conduct 
of the government an example of a gross public immorality—the 
predominance of private over public interest—the abuse of the powers of 
legislation for the advantage of separate classes. Secondly, and above all, 
because the respect of the multitude always attaches itself principally to 
that which is the principal passport to power; for which reason under the 
English institutions where riches, hereditary or acquired, were the almost 
exclusive source of political importance, riches and the signs of riches were 
almost the only things really respected, and to the pursuit of these the life 
of the people was mainly devoted. Further, I thought that while the higher 
and richer classes held the power of government, the instruction and 
improvement of the mass of the people was contrary to the self-interest of 
those classes, because necessarily tending to raise up dissatisfaction with 
their monopoly: but if the democracy obtained a share in the supreme 
power, and still more if they obtained the predominant share, it would 
become the interest of the opulent classes to promote their education, in 
order to guard them from really mischievous errors and especially to ward 
off unjust violations of property. For these reasons I was not only as ardent 
as ever for democratic institutions, but earnestly hoped that Owenite, St. 
Simonian, and all other anti-property opinions might spread widely among 
the poorer classes, not that I thought those doctrines true but in order that 
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the higher classes might be led to see that they had more to fear from the 
poor when uneducated, than from the poor when educated (Autobiography, 
CW I, p. 177). 
This section has, insofar, mostly outlined other authors’ views, without any direct 
critical appraisal. However, at this stage of this work, a short descriptive part is needed 
in order to show what a representative democracy should be in John Stuart Mill’s terms: 
its institutions, its justification, and the methodological tools for political enquiry. What 
is the subject of research here? Mill’s democratic proposal. And what is it? How does it 
work? An answer to this has been given in the current section (and more details will be 
given in the following ones), as for parliament procedures, form of government, suffrage, 
etc. Only after the object is clear, a more proper analysis of it can be carried out.  
From the political and constitutional view, Mill’s proposal differs from the form of 
representation today we are used to, mostly with reference to the work required by MPs: 
they have to contribute to the debate, but they cannot go into detail of legislation. 
Although today in most Western democracies it is customary that many pieces of 
legislation are drafted or corrected by experts outside politics, the politician still 
preserves his power to introduce any bill and to go into any sort of technicality. What 
we have seen is that John Stuart Mill strongly advises against this. Methodologically 
speaking, Mill recognises empirical limits to the establishment of a democracy (or, at 
least, of a Millian democracy), in terms of civilisation, of legislation in step with the 
national character or civilisation. What John Stuart Mill’s detachment from his father’s 
project suggests is that any form of organisation of polity has to adapt itself to matters 
of fact. Among the matters of fact, there are the dangers and the flaws that a form of 
government carries with itself. As regards democracy and as we are going to investigate, 
for John Stuart Mill one of the greatest dangers is the tyranny of the majority. 
IV.III. THE TYRANNY OF THE MAJORITY 
In On Liberty, Mill summarises the problem of the tyranny of the majority as follows: 
The notion, that the people have no need to limit their power over 
themselves, might seem axiomatic, when popular government was a thing 
only dreamed about, or read of as having existed at some distant period of 
the past (…). In time, however, a democratic republic came to occupy a large 
portion of the earth's surface and made itself felt as one of the most 
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powerful members of the community of nations: and elective and 
responsible government became subject to the observations and criticisms 
which wait upon a great existing fact. It was now perceived that such 
phrases as "self-government,'" and "the power of the people over 
themselves," do not express the true state of the case. The "people" who 
exercise the power are not always the same people with those over whom 
it is exercised: and the "self-government" spoken of is not the government 
of each by himself, but of each by all the rest. The will of the people, 
moreover, practically means the will of the most numerous or the most 
active part of the people: the majority, or those who succeed in making 
themselves accepted as the majority: the people, consequently, may desire 
to oppress a part of their number: and precautions are as much needed 
against this as against any other abuse of power (On Liberty, CW XVIII, p. 
219) 
Moreover, we have already seen the clear remarks on Tocqueville in Mill’s 
Autobiography. It may be worthwhile to point out, anyway, that in the early draft of Mill’s 
autobiography they do not appear and, actually, Tocqueville is considered only in 
relation to James Mill’s favourable review of Tocqueville’s work – a quite surprising fact, 
if one considers that, in the early draft version, John Stuart Mill writes that Democracy 
in America “was at any rate an example of a mode of treating the question of government 
almost the reverse of his – wholly inductive and analytical instead of purely ratiocinative” 
(Autobiography. Early Draft, CW I, p. 210). This may somehow be a kind of clue which 
may lead to further scholarly research on the real influence of Tocqueville on Mill’s 
political ideas. This influence has already been investigated by scholars such as Terence 
Qualter (1956) and Iris Wessel Mueller (1960), who both have emphasised the 
contributions of Tocqueville's thought in Mill’s political theory: the warning about the 
possibility of leaving government to mediocre rulers (whose hard work, trades and 
business prevent them from having time and opportunity to devote themselves to the 
study and to political activity in order to gain ‘democratic experience’), as it can be seen 
in Mill’s second review on Democracy in America; the tyranny of the majority, not only 
politically but also socially and intellectually; the role that bureaucracy must have 
within a democratic government and the need to decentralize political power. Qualter, 
in particular, decides to emphasise the Tocquevillian elements which are found in both 
On Liberty and CRG.  
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Other scholars (Pappé, 1964; Varouxakis, 1999) suggest that, actually, despite the praise 
that Mill gives to Tocqueville in his Autobiography, Democracy in America has brought 
little or nothing original to the democratic theory of the English thinker, perhaps 
providing a further confirmation of the vision of Western societies already emerged in 
the eyes of Mill after reading the works of the French historian François Guizot, even 
before the drafting of Democracy in America itself. Guizot, but also British Romanticism, 
and, in general, the process of detachment from Bentham’s radicalism, had already 
influenced Mill on democracy. In other words, the background, the filter through which 
Mill reads Tocqueville are Guizot’s lectures, his theories of conflict among powers in 
society (according to which, when one principle stands above the others, progress is 
paralysed and stops), the relationship between civilisation and democracy, and the 
sociological approach. An appropriate assessment of Mill’s intellectual obligations 
would help to better understand the theoretical framework and the larger philosophical 
and somehow historiographical implications of the concept of the tyranny of the 
majority, one of the most relevant political ideas Mill borrows  from Tocqueville. Hence, 
the first question is: what is the tyranny of the majority?  
A couple of chapters of Democracy in America¸ more precisely chapter VII and chapter 
VIII in the first volume (Tocqueville, 1986 (1835), pp. 369-410), are specifically 
dedicated to this issue. They do not deal just with the obvious fact that in a democratic 
republic the majority of the voters choose their representatives and, consequently, the 
executive body; indeed the tyranny of the majority also affects opinions and habits, 
based on the idea (a wrong idea, according to Tocqueville) that there is more wisdom in 
a large number of people than in a single person - “C’est la théorie de l’égalité appliquée 
aux intellegences” (p. 370). Such a thing somehow resembles what occurs in an absolute 
monarchy, where the king – or the queen – is considered infallible and the reasons for 
anything wrong has to be found in something else, in a different level of government. 
Since in a democracy the majority is the ruler, and any power or legislative or 
government office directly or indirectly stems from it, according to the Americans it is 
as infallible as the king is for the Europeans of the Ancien Régime. The majority employs 
power in two ways: over facts and over opinions (p. 372).  The power of the majority is 
still more effective as in America the institutional system allows “legislative instability” 
(p. 373) in the sense of the possibility for the majority to either vote for new 
representatives at regular intervals or exercise pressure on those in office, so that the 
legislative body is led to follow the fickle and variable opinions of the majority over any 
relevant political issue. According to Tocqueville, the Americans have chosen to accept 
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unstable and changing laws – of which they recognise the flaws, anyway - rather than a 
system being at risk of upheavals because of long intervals between an election and the 
following one (pp. 305-307). 
As for John Stuart Mill’s reviews on Tocqueville, he writes that the tyranny of the 
majority set out in Democracy in America is a “tyranny exercised over opinions, more 
than over persons” (De Tocqueville on Democracy in America (I), CW XVIII, p. 81), so 
individuality of character, ideas that are shared by small minorities in society and 
independence of thought are forced to be subdued by the yoke of the public opinion. 
However, American society, in Tocqueville’s opinion, is prepared to recognise and be 
guided by those who possess talents and by the ablest people on government business, 
but it is also a society in which there is no leisure class that can deal fully to acquire 
political and government skills during a spell of many years and - as it happens in 
aristocracies – accumulate them through generations. Mill affirms that when all the 
people are in similar economic conditions and when they are engaged in similar 
activities (industry and trade), and when they have received a similar education, then 
they get used to thinking in a uniform manner and become intolerant of the few 
discordant opinions as well as of the experts49. Because of this, Mill’s democracy is not 
merely a mechanism of choice and automatic control of the government: it needs, 
instead, to prepare the minds of the majority to the exercise of power, to educate 
citizens to democracy in order to limit its defects, to enjoy its advantages, and to ensure 
the rights of individuals and minorities (including intellectual élites). 
Democracy, in its inevitability - for Mill, inevitable in the sense that it is a result of the 
tendencies of progress and civilisation; when these do not occur, democracy is unlikely 
to follow - may also degenerate and decay in what in Democracy in America is called the 
"tyranny of the majority". Mill reports in his 1835 review excerpts from the work that 
he is commenting on, and historical inevitability of democracy (apart from great 
 
49  These are Mill’s own considerations (p. 85). As concerns uniformity and similarity of 
education among Americans, however, it must be emphasised that Mill also makes reference 
to and quotes Tocqueville's description of the various U.S. states: the French thinker 
distinguished the well-educated, prosperous and well governed New England from the 
Southwest, populated by rude people and, therefore, badly governed (p. 77). 
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historical or natural upheavals) is demonstrated by the gradual levelling of social 
classes within England and France: 
We do not maintain that the time is drawing near when there will be no 
distinction of classes; but we do contend that the power of the higher 
classes, both in government and in society, is diminishing; while that of the 
middle and even the lower classes is increasing, and likely to increase (De 
Tocqueville on Democracy in America (II), CW XVIII, p. 163) 
The passage is “from an aristocracy with a popular infusion, to the régime of the middle 
class” (p. 167), through a gradual democratic change that finally makes acceptable the 
universal suffrage. 
According to Tocqueville, democracy shows two advantages, John Stuart Mill writes: 
first, that democratic institutions and political freedom push people to take care of the 
society (thus assuming more skills and knowledge in the art of politics and government), 
and, second, the use of the majority principle in political decisions. The serious flaw 
inherent American society, as Mill already notes in the first review and as he remarks 
again in the second review, concerns the danger of the tyranny of the majority: the 
principle of equality applied to the public opinion does not recognise any other 
authority outside of the number, and then makes unthinkable the fact that a broad 
consensus can, nevertheless, be wrong (this is also due to the fact that every citizen has 
the same title to speak, argue and express a view on every subject and every issue as the 
expert does). Mill argues that in England as well as in the United States the power of 
public opinion has been taken by the middle class, and it has become a kind of 
“dogmatism of common sense” (p. 196) that affects aristocracy, the rulers and the 
populace. American society is nothing but a sort of exaggerated version of the 
government of the middle class. 
On Tocqueville it can be said, according to Mill, that: 
his fear, both in government and in intellect and morals, is not of too great 
liberty, but of too ready submission; not of anarchy, but of servility, not of 
too rapid change, but of Chinese stationariness. As democracy advances, the 
opinions of mankind on most subjects of general interest will become, he 
believes, as compared with any former period, more rooted and more 
difficult to change; and mankind are more and more in danger of losing the 
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moral courage and pride of independence, which make them deviate from 
the beaten path, either in speculation or in conduct (p. 188).  
Moreover, the fact that people do not recognise any special skill or quality to any other 
citizen, but they just accept and submit themselves and their opinions to the power of 
the number and to the authority of the majority, could lead to increasingly assure 
control and power to the central government, so that it would ultimately deal more and 
more with the business of society, putting under a sort of protection and tutelage 
individuals and their interests, ignoring or even trampling on the individual 
prerogatives and rights in the name of a supposed public interest. Tocqueville’s 
solutions and correctives to these problems are popular education and spirit of liberty 
fostered by the dissemination and extension of political rights, and democratic 
institutions are the remedy to stop and correct evils and mischiefs of the democratic 
society itself; “as for those to which democratic institutions are themselves liable, these, 
he holds, society must struggle with, and bear with so much of them as it cannot find the 
means of conquering” (p. 189). Mill’s criticism does not regard just democracy in se: he 
has also concerns regarding the possibility that the ruling majority is not subject to 
limits and control and does not either possess expertise to govern wisely, to ensure that 
it is not despotic towards minorities and individual prerogatives: 
the defects to which the government of numbers, whether in the pure 
American or in the mixed English form, is most liable, are precisely those of 
a public, as compared with an administration. Want of appreciation of 
distant objects and remote consequences; where an object is desired, want 
both of an adequate sense of practical difficulties, and of the sagacity 
necessary for eluding them; disregard of traditions, and of maxims 
sanctioned by experience; an undervaluing of the importance of fixed rules, 
when immediate purposes require a departure from them—these are 
among the acknowledged dangers of popular government: and there is the 
still greater, though less recognised, danger, of being ruled by a spirit of 
suspicious and intolerant mediocrity (p. 202).  
Democracy – Millian democracy, at least - requires, as a remedy for the problems 
described above, education and training to democratic citizenship. 
From a political and institutional point of view, Mill suggests a further solution and uses 
a historical example, that of the Roman Senate, composed of the wiser and more 
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experienced aristocracy, which excluded members who fell into disgrace and included 
those who had occupied the state highest offices. The English philosopher proposes a 
senate placed side by side the representative assembly: senators would be chosen by 
virtue of their career, their services and their achievements in the field of government 
and administration, and, therefore, the senate would be unquestionably authoritative 
and reasonably respectful of the traditions of government. As we have already seen, 
bicameralism is a solution that Mill proposes many years later in CRG, though in a more 
problematic way50: the equal democratic origin (which would make it redundant), or, 
alternatively, the lack of legitimacy of a second chamber of aristocratic kind are both 
arguments against the existence of a second legislative body. However, Mill states that 
setting up a parliamentary barrier to the power of the representative assembly could be 
helpful. In CRG Mill makes a proposal of a Senate composed of high skilled and 
experienced people: heads of government no longer in office, senior military officers, 
judges who have performed in the highest offices of the judiciary, former ministers 
would be part of this second parliamentary body, unable to stop the legislative decisions 
of the first chamber democratically legitimate to ultimately give precedence to their 
own will, but at the same time, because of the recognised authority and unquestioned 
expertise of its members, capable of positively influencing activity and proposals of the 
elected MPs (CRG, CW XIX, pp. 513-519). This bicameral system would not have 
conservative targets (because of the popular component), and while integrating and 
improving the experience and knowledge of state affairs of the lower house, it would be 
able to be respectful of the principle of competence. 
Instead, leaving aside the institutional and political proposal, and considering the 
philosophical topics and ideas shown in these reviews, it must be stated that some of 
them, however, were somehow already present in François Guizot’s lectures; as Mill 
writes in the second review, outlining the problem of the predominance of the middle 
class in the United States as well as in England: “the evil is not in the preponderance of 
a democratic class, but of any class” (De Tocqueville on Democracy in America (II)¸ CW 
XIX, p. 196) and the danger of a homogeneous community leading  to mediocrity and 
 
50 Qualter (1960, pp. 887-889) notices the revival of this institutional proposal in CRG, and, 
linked to the problems related to the extension of suffrage, considers it as a result of 
reflection on Tocqueville’s political tyranny of the majority. 
 118 
 
conformity does not exist only in despotic states, e. g. China. Moreover - here it is worth 
quoting Mill:  
It is profoundly remarked by M. Guizot, that the short duration or stunted 
growth of the earlier civilizations arose from this, that in each of them some 
one element of human improvement existed exclusively, or so 
preponderatingly as to overpower all the others; whereby the community, 
after accomplishing rapidly all which that one element could do, either 
perished for want of what it could not do, or came to a halt and became 
immoveable (p. 197) 
Mill recognises a direct connection between François Guizot’s historical thought and the 
problem of a democratic society under the control of a conformist commercial middle-
class, as it is set in Democracy in America. Mill, therefore, knows Guizot’s writings at the 
time of his second review on Tocqueville; in fact, Mill had known Guizot’s historical 
works for a longer time: although his essay on the French politician and historian dates 
back to 1845, nine years earlier he had already commissioned a review of Guizot's 
lectures for the London & Westminster Review. Written by Joseph Blanco White51, it 
already contained a synthesis of the themes later touched in 1845 and it was amended 
by Mill before its publication (Varouxakis, 1999, p. 295); in Mill’s other writings and 
letters there are several references to Guizot and his work since 183252. We can then 
read and analyse 1845 review, knowing that it contains ideas already in Mill’s mind for 
many years - even before the publication of Democracy in America. Here Mill shows his 
appreciation for Guizot’s work: comparing the method usually used by French 
historians with that of British historians, he concludes by recalling that in England the 
 
51 See Joseph Blanco White, Guizot’s Lectures on European Civilization, CW XX, pp. 367-393. 
52 As an example, see the letter to Joseph Blanco White, CW XII, p. 259: “I have begun to read 
Tocqueville. It seems an excellent book: uniting considerable graphic power, with the 
capacity of generalizing on the history of society, which distinguishes the best French 
philosophers of the present day, & above all, bringing out the peculiarities of American 
society, & making the whole stand before the reader as a powerful picture. - Did you ever 
read Guizot's Lectures? If not, pray do”. 
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historical research is not yet a science, or at least it is not used with a scientific approach 
and with the aim of finding general rules: 
In this particular, the difference between the English and the Continental 
mind forces itself upon us in every province of their respective literatures. 
Certain conceptions of history considered as a whole, some notions of a 
progressive unfolding of the capabilities of humanity - of a tendency of man 
and society towards some distant result - of a destination, as it were, of 
humanity - pervade, in its whole extent, the popular literature of France 
(Guizot’s Essays and Lectures on History, CW XX, p. 260). 
Mill then begins treating the Histoire de la Civilisation en France, a text in which Guizot 
describes the causes of the fall of the Western Roman Empire. Roman law, particularly 
on taxation and on curiae, had destroyed the middle class of the empire, which then, 
except for a few privileged classes, had gone to ruin. So, barbarians found uncultivated 
land, depopulated cities, widespread poverty, and no trace of resistance or aversion to 
invasion (instead, they found strong resistance by the Saxons, who were one of the 
people less influenced by Roman culture). Then, Mill starts to deal with another work 
written by Guizot, the Histoire de la Civilisation en Europe, briefly showing the definition 
given by the French historian of the word and concept of civilisation, and Guizot’s 
explanation of what can be called “principle of antagonism” (Varouxakis, 1999, p. 296). 
As concerns the relationship between antagonism and civilisation, Mill deals with states 
and societies dominated by one only strong principle, i.e. ancient Egypt, Greece and 
India. Western Europe, instead, has always had more different forces competing with 
each other. This condition has made European progress slower but more durable, 
stronger and more varied: 
No one of the ancient forms of society contained in itself that systematic 
antagonism, which we believe to be the only condition under which 
stability and progressiveness can be permanently reconciled to one 
another (Guizot’s Essays and Lectures on History, CW XX, p. 269). 
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It is also interesting to quote Mill’s words on the role of the élites and the well-educated 
classes in government of a country such as China53: 
Education, for example - mental culture - would seem to have a better title 
than could be derived from anything else, to rule the world with exclusive 
authority; yet if the lettered and cultivated class, embodied and disciplined 
under a central organ, could become in Europe, what it is in China, the 
Government - unchecked by any power residing in the mass of citizens, and 
permitted to assume a parental tutelage over all the operations of life - the 
result would probably be a darker despotism, one more opposed to 
improvement, than even the military monarchies and aristocracies have in 
fact proved (p. 270). 
So, these multiple and varied forces, fighting and competing during most of European 
history, found by Guizot and reported by Mill, consist in: 
- the legacy left by the Romans about the idea of a universal empire and a body 
of written law, and liberty of thought;  
- Christianity, with its hierarchy, organisation and separation of spiritual and 
temporal power;.  
- the barbarian attitude, which, instead, has brought the spirit of individual 
liberty and voluntary association, the institution of military patronage and bond 
between leaders and followers.  
So, a history of European nations can be outlined according to these principles, and 
according to Guizot they first led to a long period of confusion after the fall of the Roman 
empire, then to a new social organisation in the feudal period. 
Considering the Carolingian era, in Civilisation en France Guizot writes that the cause of 
the birth of a new empire is due to the power of a systematic and comprehensive body 
 
53 It must be noticed that China is not an example described in Guizot’s lectures. The French 
historian talks about ancient Egypt and India as samples of country dominated by a despotic 
power, and ancient Greece as a country where a sort of democratic hegemony stopped 
progress and civilisation. By the way, an interesting description of the different uses of the 
Chinese example in Mill and Tocqueville can be found in Varouxakis, 1999, pp. 302-303. 
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of written law, and to the natural ascendancy of Latin civilisation over barbarism. 
Moreover, Charlemagne’s wars are different in nature from those of his predecessors, 
because they are not caused by disagreements among tribes or by the pursuit of 
resources, but they are guided by the purpose to put an end to the barbaric invasions 
and to the instability caused by them. The consequences of the reign of Charlemagne 
according to Guizot – Mill reports – are thus the creation of stable states in place of 
unstable and insecure domains, an attempt - albeit partially failed – of creation of a 
central government based on the work of the missi dominici and on vassalage. 
On this point Mill and Guizot disagree: according to the French historian, the work of 
Charlemagne died with him, as proven by written records of many of his 
contemporaries, while Mill’s opinion is that the Frankish king, however, could just 
follow or to put up with the trends of the time, and at his death, even if his empire did 
not survive for long period, he left a system of decentralized feudal powers with stable 
and well-defined territories, as a consequence of the fact that in any case Charlemagne 
work was set on the only model of society he knew. So, in feudal society, the spirit of 
independence and autonomy and the importance of the lord (a figure anyway quite 
different from that of the Roman patrician) emerged. Mill points out that the work of 
Guizot reveals a new type of relationship between the masses and political and temporal 
powers, as well as the endemic conflict between central government and landowners, 
particularly due to the general weakness of the central authority: these set up a sort of 
right of resistance against the national authority, and even with all its great defects, 
feudal society had the advantage of introducing or at least strengthening the idea of 
personal and individual will.  
The other point on which Mill differs broadly from Guizot’s historical interpretation is 
the transition from the feudal age to the modern period. Mill is actually quite interested 
in giving a more detailed and deeper explanation of the phenomenon described by 
Guizot (1871, p. 94), with the intention to put light on historical events in relation to the 
development of civilisation; so, while the French historian focuses on the intrinsic 
weakness of the feudal system, the need of the weakest vassals to submit to the 
strongest, and the consequent increase of authority of the latter resulting in the 
establishment of central powers, the English philosopher wants to give a sort of 
scientific explanation for this phenomenon, and he thus argues that the change of 
authority is due to a change in attitude and mentality in every part, even the smaller, of 
feudal society. Not its imperfection, but the qualities of the feudal system caused its end, 
because, on the contrary, in a steady and static social and political situation, those 
 122 
 
defects would still have survived along with that social model as a whole, and not fallen 
with it below the attack of the commons and of the royal authorities. Mill gives a deeper 
explanation of this great political and social change: feudal institutions allowed a mix of 
authority and freedom to give enough protection to the development of intellectual 
faculties and to material and social progress, which led to a general improvement of 
society, to surpass those defects and, ipso facto, feudal society itself.  
At this point, Mill omits the rest of Guizot’s work, i.e. those parts regarding the relations 
between temporal and religious powers, the role of the Church in the Middle Ages, cities’ 
organisation and politics, and so on until the XVIII century in France. Mill notes that the 
analysis of this historical period is not as insightful as that of the first chapters, and 
focuses only on the history of England, in particular on its political institutions, as 
discussed in Civilisation en Europe (pp. 352-378). Mill seems interested in the following 
questions: What is the origin of the British representative institutions? Why is England an 
anomaly in Europe? 
Mill reviews the core elements of English history: the Saxon character little affected by 
the Latin one, the organisation of the Norman invaders who therefore needed a strong 
leadership, the division of lands among noblemen that prevented any of them to have 
more power than the crown or the other members of the nobility had, then the 
important role held by common, non-noble, people with reference to the monarchy-
barons dualism, which led continual concessions of collective freedom from the king. 
Unlike the French and continental history as a whole, English has never had dominant 
cultural, social, political power or principle: 
to a nation, as to an individual, the consequences of doing everything by 
halves, of adopting compromise as the universal rule, of never following 
out a general idea or principle to its utmost results, are by no means 
exclusively favourable (p. 294). 
This long description has been useful to see how, according to Mill, Guizot's theory 
stems from the analysis of historical facts and can be intended as a general law: where 
a single principle or a single dominant or hegemonic power exists, a rapid first phase of 
material, moral, intellectual progress, due to the lack of limits to the domain of that 
principle or power, can be experienced, but, eventually, such phase is doomed to 
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stagnation, to a steady state due to the lack of other principles bringing their further 
contribution – in an antagonistic way - to civilisation54. 
Mill considers the tyranny of the majority in a democracy as a particular case of Guizot’s 
systematic theory of antagonism of powers. So, as Guizot’s theory is a general one, and 
as Tocqueville’s interpretation is particularly related to democratic theory and a sort of 
subset, of particular application of Guizot’s view, it may appear - simply and clearly at 
the same time - that in Mill’s struggle for democracy, Alexis de Tocqueville's text 
 
54 An explanation of the concept of civilisation according to Guizot is due. It is expounded in 
the first lecture of his Histoire de la Civilisation en Europe, where Guizot, at first, makes a 
general analysis of the common use of the word civilisation, through the use of examples. 
This is his first conclusion: «Il me semble que le premier fait qui soit compris dans le mot 
civilisation (et cela résulte des diverse exemples que je viens de faire passer sous vos yeux), 
c’est le fait de progrès, de développement; il réveille aussitôt l’idée d’un peuple qui marche, 
non pur changer de place, mais pour changer d’état; d’un peuple dont la condition s’étend e 
s’améliore. L’idée du progrès, du développement, me paraît être l’idée fondamentale 
contenue sous le mot de civilisation. Quel est ce progrès? quel est ce développement? Ici 
réside la plus grande difficulté» (Guizot, 1871, p. 15). The analysis continues considering 
other different historical matters. Guizot wonders whether this concept of progress that 
underlies the word Civilisation is linked just to economic and social conditions, or rather to 
values and culture. The economic and material well-being of France during the XVII and 
XVIII centuries, for example, was lower than the English or Dutch one at that time; however, 
it is generally recognised that France was the most civilised country in Europe. On the other 
hand, according to Guizot we can see the great crises of history are linked not only to 
economic reasons, but also to cultural factors. A striking example of a ‘moral’ crisis can be 
found, he writes, during the early centuries of Christianity: this religious doctrine did not try 
to set an upheaval of the social and institutional status quo, however it deeply influenced 
Western civilisation because it changed beliefs, feelings, the inner side of men. Therefore, 
there are material development of society on the one hand, and moral progress of mankind 
on the other side, and, according to Guizot, every investigation on which of these two factors 
is a consequence of the other implies a question – which is left unresolved by Guizot - on the 
general purpose of men on earth, and on the general cause of all the historic events. The fact 
is that these two sides of the history of humanity, which achieve two different methods of 
treating history as a discipline, are each a reflection of the other, are closely related, and they 
can potentially be dealt with as separate subjects of study. 
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occupies an important position which stems from Guizot’s historical reflection, but at 
the same time it is central and relevant because it is more focused on problems and 
solutions of contemporary Western European democratic societies, dealing with the 
federal model of government and the role of education in a democracy mainly composed 
of middle-class citizens. 
The analysis of Mill’s reviews of Guizot’s historical work, moreover, points out that, 
perhaps, Hamburger interpretation of Mill’s hope for a new natural state of society 
(Hamburger, 1999, pp. 108-113) is perhaps slightly misleading: indeed, Mill’s praise of 
a new era of stability and harmony is not unequivocal, as we have just seen. Actually, 
the existence of antagonistic forces in society is under some aspects a positive thing, and 
the permanence of an established set of powers and beliefs has, at least in the long run, 
negative effects on society and on individuals. Guizot is cited in Hamburger’s John Stuart 
Mill on Liberty and Control just once (p. 67), with reference to Mill’s description of 
Guizot’s prudence in asserting his own opinions. (letter to Robert Barclay Fox, 23 
December 1840, CW XIII, pp. 454-455). As this interpretation of Mill on the dichotomy 
between natural and transitional states is one of the foundations of Hamburger’s 
argument supporting his views on Mill as a proponent of a religion of humanity and of 
a sort of moral regeneration led by the intellectuals, “responsible for originating and 
disseminating opinions and beliefs” (Hamburger, 1999, p. 109), it may not be excessive 
to conclude that, at least on this, Hamburger’s claims on Mill and his alleged plans for 
moral reform and control are perhaps to be somehow put into a different perspective. 
IV.IV. MILL AS POLITICAL PHILOSOPHER: WAS HE A DEMOCRAT? 
As Mill maintains in his theory that representative government both implies and 
provides a few corrections in the direction of competence and rational debate, one may 
wonder whether it is actually a democratic theory or rather a moderate form of elitist, 
although enlightened, government in which, apart from the moment of the general 
election, ruling a country is just a business for the cultivated few. 
Probably, the interpretation of Mill's philosophy provided by J. H. Burns (1968 (1957)) 
is the clearest, or at least rather exemplary, in criticising Mill’s democratic attitude and 
in claiming that it actually opposes popular power as much as it can. Burns argues, 
indeed, that political representation, the role of the intellectuals and the possibility of 
an effective participation of the masses in the public discourse in Mill's theory clearly 
lead to an undemocratic representative government: even though, according to Burns, 
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three different stages of Mill's political thought can be identified (1829-40, from the 
recovery from the 'mental crisis' to the year he gave up the ownership of the London 
and Westminster Review; 1840-49, when Mill's political writing are barely relevant; 
1849-1861, from the publication of his defence of the French Revolution of 1848 to that 
of CRG), throughout his life he has consistently had faith in a class of professional 
administrators and tried to fix the flaws of popular government and find 
countermeasures to the possible evils of a democratic rule. Basically, Mill’s caution 
towards democracy has led Burns to claim that Mill’s political thought is not, according 
to the very sense Mill himself gives of democracy, the viewpoint of a democrat (p. 328). 
Actually, Burns’ conclusions are quite too extreme. For instance, Burns takes into 
account (p. 286) the following words, which were written by Mill with reference to the 
British political situation in July 1833 and to the electoral reform: 
The cause of the evil is one which I foresaw and predicted long before—
the anomaly of a democratic constitution in a plutocratically constituted 
society. Till changes take place which can only be remotely promoted by 
any Reform Bill, the people will continue from necessity to select their 
representatives from the same class as before, avoiding only those who 
are committed to principles which the people abhor (letter to John Pringle 
Nichol¸ CW XII, p. 166). 
Here Mill says, in bullet points, that: 
- democracy is unfit for a plutocratic society (principle of adaption, as seen 
before); 
- a Reform Bill will have little effect (as a machinery without power). 
This is perfectly consistent with what Mill maintains in CRG¸ however Burns uses this 
and other quotations from Mill’s works to claim that “he is beginning to fear tendencies 
in the masses which must be offset by some other power in society” (p. 297). Burns 
affirms that the central section of CRG is nothing particularly new if compared to many 
of Mill’s previous political writings, but, as we have just noticed, in 1833 some of the 
ideas included in the first chapters were already present in nuce in Mill’s writings. 
However, Burns misses the progressive aspects of representation: even accepting his 
interpretation according to which Mill is afraid of the ignorant masses becoming a 
prevailing force, anyway the progressive influence of representative institutions over 
these masses will make them more cultivated and intellectually and politically fit to a 
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more participatory model of representative government – i.e., I dare to say, a democracy. 
Progress as intrinsic value and practical effect of representative government is a quite 
clear concept in the early chapters of CRG, from which “much of the book’s permanent 
value and interest” derives (p. 325) – Burns’ own words. 
When we look at Tocqueville and Guizot’s influence on Mill, this progressive aspect is 
included within an antagonistic framework (not just in terms of opposition of political 
parties, but rather of progressive or ‘stagnating’ forces), which makes clear that it is not 
the single constitutional provision (aimed to either increase and reduce the space for 
popular political participation) to give real value to democracy, but the process within 
the mechanism as a whole, a process involving the people and with an active popular 
element. 
Still, the role of the intellectuals stands and it may be argued that Mill’s political proposal 
deals with a minor form of elitism, as the role of the intellectuals acquires value within 
the system and can be effective only with the largest political participation (at least as 
large as possible). Competence and mental qualities of the rulers do matter, but they are 
a necessary and non-sufficient condition for individual improvement of the people, 
since the efficacy of the influence of the competent in society requires adequate political 
and social conditions and actions through political participation and debate. So, at least, 
elitist elements coexist with progressive elements.  
In general, Burns’ criticism of Mill – or, at least, his interpretation of Mill as a non-
democrat – depends on the claim that there is a difference between true democracy and 
representative government: the former would be the power of the majority (although 
still exercised through representation) and based on the assumptions that all the men 
are equal; the latter would be the institutional system devised in CRG and limiting the 
popular element. As regards equality, previously we have noticed that everyone is 
equally entitled to have his (or her) opinion taken into consideration, although not every 
voice is equal: dismissing forms of extreme egalitarianism does not imply that in Mill 
does not exist any form of soft egalitarianism. Secondly, Burns thinks that Mill 
progressively detaches from the pro-democratic utilitarian stance he holds in his early 
writings (true), that after his father death’s he starts embracing some critical, and even 
conservative, views (true), but he implies that CRG simply continues along this path of 
anti-democratic reaction or that at least it would not contain the democratic elements 
which, anyway, had been a feature of Mill’s political thought for many years; one of the 
issues regarding CRG Burns investigates is “whether the central chapters, which sum up 
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Mill’s conception of representative government, contain anything of significance which 
we have not seen emerging in his earlier writing”  and the answer is that “the 
Considerations embody elaboration and clarification rather than new departures” (p. 
326). Hence, for instance, elements of protection against the rule of the mob and the 
commercial spirit55 are substantial; however, it is in the central part of CRG that Mill 
outlines a system of government in which, ultimately, the powers of political decision 
lie, despite all the limitations Mill devises for them – in the hand of the representatives 
of the people and no one else. Intellectuals, men of competence and experience, 
enlightened minorities etc. have a right to be heard, have a sort of obligation in 
influencing the political debate, have the task (in the case of the Legislative Commission) 
to draft bills, but, at the very end of the political process, the predominant power still is 
the popular will. 
As I have mentioned earlier, it is worth to point out that it may well be said that the 
popular element in Mill’s proposal of representative government is at least as strong as 
what Burns maintains to be an elitist one. At this point, however, I may even moreover 
try and investigate how far elitist elements may go within Mill’s democratic theory. 
Finding an upper limit to Mill’s alleged elitism may help to further redirect and refocus 
investigation, in the attempt to understand and assess the role of competence in a 
representative democracy for Mill. So, we may see, at first, whether there is room for 
technocrats in this form of political organisation.  
Therefore, in the next section I use Platonic terms to describe what a technocrat is and 
argue that  
a) although Mill himself cites Plato as an example of intellectual for his project of 
cultural reform (see Hamburger, 1999), and   
b) even considering  politics as a technē in itself,  
in any case Millian democracy is much less elitist than a Platonic form of government 
(and here we have found our upper limit: we cannot go any further in describing Mill’s 
elitist elements). 
 
55 See Burns’s remarks on Mill and Tocqueville (Burns, 1968 (1957), pp. 306-307). 
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IV.V. DEMOCRATIC COMPETENCE 
Competence, education, democracy, prevention against the rule of the mob and the 
tyranny of the majority are the elements investigated in the previous sections of this 
chapter. Also, whether Mill is truly a democrat or not has constituted a subject of 
attention and investigation: doubt over Mill’s political status as a democrat arises due 
to his words stressing the importance of competence and his recurring doubts related 
to the majority rule and the dangers of mediocrity in democratic societies. Furthermore, 
the field of things included in the concepts of education and competence is quite wide 
and, perhaps, vague: non-elected members of a second chamber should be chosen 
accordingly to their experience in political or military office, while education of the 
people, in general, entails something more than simple school and academic education; 
there is, of course, the need for a sort of enlightened minority in parliament, whose main 
task would have to be fostering a rational discourse rather than merely stand for 
particular interests, no matter what others have reasonably to say or whatever the 
common good (accordingly to the utility principle) is, but meanwhile the legislation 
drafting process is delegated to a group of highly skilled people who possess the 
technical knowledge in economics, finance, law and in the various fields affected by the 
proposed legislation – and all these different forms of competence need still to find their 
place in democratic arena, they are politically and socially effective when included in 
the democratic process and strengthening its virtues. Perhaps, there may be a proper 
political skill, possessed by politicians, which enables them to act within the democratic 
arena and push through bills and political decisions. In order to describe this, I will use 
the notion of a technocrat. 
 
What is the definition of a technocrat?  A ‘technocrat’ may be defined in a generic way 
as an individual who assumes a position of power, a member of a technically skilled élite 
whose position of power draws legitimacy because of his specific technical and scientific 
knowledge and his recognised expertise in a specific field, totally unrelated, then, from 
any other kind of political legitimacy, for example election via a democratic process. 
Actually, the technocrat may also occupy other positions within a democratic society: 
that of political advisor, a bureaucratic position, or even a policy-making position 
without any political responsibility which still remains to democratically elected 
representatives and governments (Barnes, 1968, pp. 29-58). However, over the 
following pages the subject of analysis will be the technocrat as a ruler with powers of 
active intervention in matters of political choice. The purpose is, therefore, to deepen 
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the definition of technocrat in the context of modern representative democracies. 
Looking at the nature of representative democracy in contemporary Europe, some 
political events in 2011, brought to power a few governments which have commonly 
been defined as ‘technocratic’: both the Greek experience, which saw the appointment 
of an economist as prime minister, and even more the Italian one, where the whole 
cabinet has consisted for one and a half year of academics and high officials of the public 
administration, have seen the removal of professional politicians from key cabinet 
positions they had occupied by virtue of an electoral result. In this section, an 
examination of a definition of technocrat arising from Plato’s Republic will be carried on 
in order to identify one or more distinctive conceptual nodes of a technocratic system 
of government (particularly that of technē). Such examination, following the issues 
affecting the need for skilled rulers already arisen during the eighteenth century, brings 
to light the problem of competence. Two conclusions will be brought to light and used 
in our research on the role of competence in Millian democracy: aside from the fact that 
the technocratic principle in itself is inherently weak because of the epistemological 
status of social sciences, if we have in mind the character of philosopher-king applied to 
the twenty-first century (and considering bureaucracy as a special case), the criterion 
of Platonic technē favours professionalism in politics, instead of the need for experts in 
specific areas to cover key positions in a state’s cabinet. 
 
A preliminary question arises, anyway: why deal here with Plato? The definition of 
‘technocrat’ rests on that of technē, i.e. an art that covers a field of knowledge or a 
specific subject, and that produces an outcome, a product or consequence. It is 
reasonable, therefore, to start with a definition of technē; Plato’s political technē implies 
the idea of a science of sciences, an epistēmē epistēmōn (Sprague, 1976, pp. 29-42), and 
such an idea can be somehow associated with the skills which may be required to rulers 
in modern democracies, because government activities cover such a range of different 
areas they cannot be reduced to one or a few disciplines, scientific or unscientific as they 
might be. The work of R. S. Sprague (1976) on the theoretical background of the king 
philosophers gives us a description of this political technē, linked to the concepts of 
temperance, justice, and good and evil, but above all depicted as an ability to rule, as 
statecraft.  
 
Moreover, one of the first theoretical models - if not the first - of a technocratic state in 
the history of ideas could probably be considered the one outlined by Plato. His model 
is based on certain fundamental ideas, which are, in a very brief summary, justice as a 
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unity of an harmonious society and as a condition of the realization of the good of society; 
the analogy between individual soul and political community; the figure of the 
philosopher, devoted to true knowledge, reflection, research and pursuit of truth. The 
philosopher, therefore, appears as an individual who finds his political legitimacy to 
govern in his knowledge, within his competence, in his art (technē) - an art similar to 
the one that anyone possesses and puts into practice in carry out in his own activities 
(the carpenter, the sailor, the sculptor and so on).  
Rosamond Sprague, in her work on Plato’s philosopher-kings, interprets the concept of 
technē in the Platonic dialogues as follows: first, she considers Plato in the Ion on the 
necessary requirements of an art. Plato, analysing the figure of the rhapsode, concludes 
that every art has its special field, separated from the other fields of the other arts, and 
if any particular field of judgment - or knowledge – does not exist, then there is no 
specific art (Sprague, 1976, pp. 1-14); in the Protagoras and the Gorgias Plato operates 
a very similar argument, with Protagoras claiming that politics, politikē technē (pp. 18-
19 and p. 21) is not a form of knowledge for a sophist (of course), and therefore – 
according to Plato - it belongs, rather than to the sophist, to the statesman (pp. 15-22); 
in the Gorgias justice is excluded from the subjects of rhetoric. In other words, those of 
the rhapsode, the sophist and the rhetorician are not properly defined as art because 
they do not have a definite purpose (pp. 22-28). In the Republic and the Statesman, 
according to Sprague, Plato concludes that statecraft is a real and proper art, owned by 
the king-philosopher (pp. 57-117). The politician, therefore, is the one who knows the 
art of governing as an art of organising society according to justice.  
This technocratic (if we can define it so) model outlines the idea of a ruler who manages 
the state for the good of the community by virtue of his skills. It is more than obvious 
that the Greek polis that Plato had in front of him was largely different from the political 
entities existing today, in the twenty-first century; but this does not mean that we 
cannot try to see how the idea of the king-philosopher can be applied today. Clearly, in 
this particular Platonic theory – or in Sprague’s interpretation of it - the character of the 
ruler is greatly out of context when applied to democratic theory, not just because of its 
inherent anti-democratic spirit or simply for a temporal reason, having been drawn up 
many centuries before the development of representative democracy, but also for the 
fact that the institutions and principles of the Greek democratic poleis were quite 
different from those later developed over the last few centuries. The point, however, is 
that the very definition of technocrat in politics implies the existence of a concept of 
political technē, and Plato comes useful to give a first definition: the statesman has got 
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a technē – statecraft - which somehow specializes him makes him fit for his role, as it 
happens to anyone who has a practical activity of a certain kind. It is something to start 
working on. 
As in Plato’s dialogues the analogies between the art of statecraft and other arts56 are 
frequent, and so having the statesman a technē as a carpenter, a doctor, a fisher do, there 
is a correlation between technē, political role and social position. All this might 
somehow justify an application - or at least an attempt at application – of this definition 
to the thought of Benjamin Constant, according to whom only some citizens have an 
active role in government activities because of the intrinsic nature of modern societies. 
In Constant the liberty of the moderns and the need for political representation arise 
largely from social considerations: abolition of slavery has eliminated time to devote to 
politics, while commerce permeates the life of nations, therefore individuals prefer to 
focus on their own activities (in other words, exercise their own technē, use it to create 
products or results, and enjoy the outcome). The liberty of the moderns, then, is freedom 
of trade, production, employment or professional activity, in general, as they typically 
exist in a bourgeois society (Constant, 1980, p. 501). In other words, the political status 
of modern man is related, at least in part, to his social and economic role – as in Plato. 
Since according to Constant everybody dedicates his time to his own activity, and only 
a few are involved in particular to politics while most of the others do not, one may say 
that only some people – for any reason - have got a political technē, as described in the 
previous paragraph.  
Actually there may be a possible objection: in the Platonic model, statecraft is what gives 
legitimacy to the philosopher-king, whereas according to Constant, simply schematizing, 
we can say that everyone puts into practice his art (in trade, industry, etc.), while just a 
few citizens practise the art of politics (others do not because they are practising 
another activity and then do not have a practical and temporal possibility), but not in 
virtue of their supposed political technē, a superior wisdom as in Plato, but rather by 
the electoral vote; the fact remains that in a society everybody practises or develops his 
own technē, and the majority of people is employed in activities other than politics, 
which is delegated only to the few. There is, at least apparently, a reversal logic 
 
56  And sometimes Socrates’ interlocutors are annoyed by these references to common 
activities – e.g., see Callicles in Plato, 1979, p. 64. 
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(according to Plato, if you have got the political technē, you rule; in Constant, we might 
say that if you rule, you are practicing the political technē), but the relationship between 
the figure of the ruler and the political technē still remains. 
Such argument is valid if we consider a strict interpretation of political technē as mere 
statecraft: in its broadest sense it is inapplicable, since in Plato’s utopia philosopher-
kings only are involved in politics, while the participation of citizens in political life, even 
considering just the electoral vote, is a prerequisite for representative democracy. The 
focus of this argument is, in summary, the following: there is no contradiction in saying 
that even in representative democracy, as well as in the Platonic utopia, few possess this 
kind of political technē, as only few rule, while the rest of the citizens do not.  
Moreover, there are some examples showing that in the history of representative 
democracy and of democratic theory in general, the need for some expertise has often 
been taken into account. During the United States Constitutional Convention in 
Philadelphia, the Federalists (e.g. James Madison) had been trying to outline an electoral 
and institutional way to let the best citizens emerge, a representative system in which 
representatives would possess more virtue and talent than their voters, a sort of natural 
aristocracy, opposite to that of their former English homeland and to the French Ancien 
Régime; the legislative body did not have to simply be a mirror of the voters (Manin, 
1996, pp. 135-170).  
A few decades later, as we have seen, John Stuart Mill feels the need to introduce 
elements of competence and knowledge in the context of his democratic political 
proposal (Thompson, 1976, pp. 54-90), e.g. the need for competent people in the bill 
drafting process, or the creation of a Senate made up of civil servants who, thanks to 
their experience, could positively contribute to the political debate and to the 
parliamentary legislative process, overcoming the danger of mediocrity and lack of 
expertise. According to Mill, those élites who have the deepest knowledge, the best skills 
and the highest intellectual qualities must have as much space as possible in a 
democratic society. He points the finger to the dangers of incompetence, stressing the 
importance of minorities in the process of political education of the rest of population. 
Furthermore, bureaucratic competence can certainly be considered relevant because of 
the experience accumulated over the time, but it suffers from a serious defect: routine. 
It will become a rigid bureaucracy, inappropriate to any change or political reform: 
technical expertise, therefore, must necessarily stare after discretionary political 
choices still remaining in the hands of democratically elected representatives 
(Tocqueville on Democracy in America (I), CW XVIII, p. 72), reflecting the fact that any 
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political decision is discretionary, requiring a wider technē, a science of sciences, a 
general view of things that recognises the need for specific skills and is not limited to 
owning only one or few specific and well-known subjects. Technocrats of the twenty-
first century, or rather, the examples we have seen at work in Europe over the last few 
years (typically, economists at the head of governments in Greece and Italy) are not 
exempt from liability for their policies that lie outside their proper competence or field 
of study and work. And even as regards every other political issue, their liability is 
exactly the same as that of any professional politician: actually, therefore, there is not 
any possible separation between the character of the technocrat and political 
professionalism: if the legitimacy of power based on possession of a technē for a specific 
field of knowledge runs out – as we have supposed so far, trying to use a definition of 
political technē as statecraft – and a more general ability to rule a country as a necessary 
skill remains, the distinction between political professionalism and technocrat 
disappears, and the field that can be delegated to experts may be, rather, that of the 
bureaucracy and the supply of technical support to policies for which the rulers keep 
their full responsibility.   
Hence, once we include statecraft in the principle of competence and as long as we see 
it is not inconsistent with democracy (as in Benjamin Constant’s writings, for instance), 
then claims of anti-democratic elements in Mill appear less convincing. We establish a 
democracy, therefore we need competence - this is substantially the relationship 
between popular sovereignty and competence in Mill.  In this scenario, even allegations 
of Platonism, such as those brought forward by Joseph Hamburger (1999, pp. 36-37) 
appear in a different perspective. As we have seen earlier in this work, Hamburger’s 
criticism mainly focuses on the notion of Mill’s liberty and cultural reform; however, as 
for the subject of this specific chapter, it seems appearing that accusations of Platonism 
with reference to the principle of competence cannot be proved on the basis of alleged 
inconsistencies with the democratic principle. Statecraft as a technē in Platonic terms is 
compatible with a democratic framework. 
This chapter has presented the methodology through which investigation in political 
theory should be carried out according to Mill: political institutions are neither mere 
theoretical constitutional constructions nor the automatic product of social processes. 
They actually have to be devised in order to mix the two elements. Historical processes 
are relevant, indeed, and we must adapt our institutions to them; however, the fact that 
democracy may be the consequence of social, political and historical processes naturally 
occurring or that have occurred in society is not in itself the real justification for 
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establishing a representative government. Actually, what makes it a good choice is the 
educative element provided by political participation, and the role played by both the 
popular will57 and the action of competent people. The importance of the democratic 
elements is so significant that even including within a democratic context a Platonic 
notion such as the one of political expertise, we may find it not inconsistent with the 
establishment of a representative democracy. Expertise and competence are needed – 
technical expertise and moral expertise, but even a political expertise (which is not 
explicitly present in Mill’s system, and which I have just introduced in this section as a 
way to show what extent Mill’s elitism goes. and which revealed itself to be consistent 
with a democratic pattern), as we have seen in this section – exactly in order to make 
the democratic process virtuous and the popular element fruitful of good consequences 
in terms of liberty, of education and of the fight against the degenerations of democracy 
such as the tyranny of the masses and mediocrity. After this, I move on to a specific 
aspect of democratic government: political representation. 
IV.VI. POLITICAL ETHICS IN MILL’S THEORY OF REPRESENTATIVE 
GOVERNMENT 
The task of the previous chapters consisted in outlining the general features of the 
system of representative democracy devised by John Stuart Mill. In chapter II, for the 
purpose of the argument, I have given a general overview of the utilitarian doctrine 
which is the substantial ground (although not the only one) from which Mill derives his 
philosophical and political conclusions. Chapters III, IV and V, instead, have highlighted 
three aspects of the Millian form of government: education, what it is, what its 
multifaceted aspects are and in what its links with the individual as well as social 
development and with the polity in general would consist; democracy in itself, i.e. the 
particular form of representative government as designed by Mill in CRG and in other 
writings, how it works, its institutions and, mainly, the principles on which it is based 
and which it should be aimed to foster; political representation, analysed under the 
particular issue of the so-called mandate/independence controversy. This has been a 
 
57 As we have seen earlier in this chapter, this dismisses the view according to which Mill is 
not a real supporter of democracy. 
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process of gradual narrowing from a bigger picture regarding education, individuals 
and society to more specific political issues. 
Now, this section rather aims to determine what should be individuals’ obligations in 
such a kind of democracy: when it comes to voting or political participation, or other 
forms of public activities, some questions may arise in terms of effective decisiveness of 
an individual’s actions or of his moral duties towards society. The importance of the 
rational element will be stressed then: it gives reasons to participate, mostly to the 
competent and to the intellectual, and rational debate helps to overcome some 
problems related to the effective usefulness of participating in elections. 
There is a number of issues which can be addressed when dealing with the political 
participation of the citizens. For example, according to Beerbohm (2013) there are at 
least three groups of problem: 
The Ethics of Participation: Why should I participate in a democracy? What 
is the root moral idea behind our participatory responsibilities? How does 
the valence of participation change under unjust political institutions? Am 
I blameworthy for failing to participate? 
The Ethics of Belief: How should I manage my political beliefs? How can I 
guard against the well-known biases in reasoning – wishful thinking, self-
deception, and confirmation bias? When, in short, am I permitted to be 
ignorant about politics and policy? 
The Ethics of Delegation: When can I contract out my obligations to a trusted 
representative? Can I offload all or nearly all of my political reasoning to 
representative agents? What are the limits of political representation? (p. 
7) 
In this short section, I do not address all these issues. However, these are democratic 
issues, i.e. they affect the behaviour of citizens in a democracy and in relation to 
democratic institutions. Addressing these problems under a Millian perspective would 
perhaps be an interesting suggestion for further research. For instance, as the utilitarian 
political philosophy and Mill’s as well include a principle of accountability (of 
representatives), it may be interesting to look for an application of the same principle 
to the voter. In other words: at what extent should voters be held responsible for the 
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action of democratically elected MPs, of parliament as a whole and of government?58 
For instance, according to Mill, voting is a form of exercise of power over others 
(Thoughts on Parliamentary Reform, CW XIX, p. 326; CRG, CW XIX, p. 470 and p. 488), 
hence one should be held accountable for his or her electoral choice – therefore, the 
ballot should be cast in public, and not secretly (CRG, CW XIX, pp. 488-500). Mill’s theory 
of public voting may be tested in relation to two other elements: the efficacy of every 
single vote in modern nation states, large-scale complex pluralistic societies where 
millions of people vote, and whether the voter should somehow and to some extent bear 
the responsibility of his MP’s or his government’s choices. What I aim to do here is to 
focus just on another detailed aspect, i.e. political participation of the intellectuals with 
reference to the marginal value of the vote and to public and political life in general. In 
order to do this, I introduce the notion of rational debate as an influence multiplier. 
According to the Millian point of view held in this thesis, the issue of the minimal, almost 
null, influence of a single vote in modern representative democracies may be overcome 
if the role and characteristics of rational debate within John Stuart Mill’s political 
philosophy are taken into consideration:  acknowledgment of opponents’ good reasons, 
rational debate within the legislative assembly as well as in public and in society at large, 
the continuous challenge of given opinions and a rational attitude are what may provide 
the basis to make the single voter more influential than he would be if his only form of 
political participation were voting. The problem of the marginal vote is the one in which 
a citizen asks: “What reason do I have to participate in democratic decision making 
when the chance of making a difference is near zero?” (Beerbohm, 2013, p. 52). There 
are a number of reasons which have been given in order to argue in favour or against 
electoral participation: for example, one may argue in favour of electoral participation 
on the basis of fairness, as if everyone felt to do his part in the democratic play (pp. 55-
58); others may argue that, even if voting would seem almost ineffective in its direct 
consequences as regarded just as a single, individual vote, it still may be useful in order 
to express at least the convictions of a community with reference to decisions regarding 
 
58 In the case such government or at least its head is directly elected, as in the case of the 
United States and of France, for example; in other cases, the cabinet relies on a confidence 
vote granted by the parliament – as in Mill’s proposal in CRG.  
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the citizenry as a whole (pp. 58-60) – and so on59. I wish to appeal here, instead, to voting 
and elections in general as a process fostering rational debate.  
In the view I propose here, rational debate may be a sort of influence multiplier, and the 
rational and well-informed voter should be able to make his own influence greater and 
greater thanks to the effects of debate; in other words, on the one hand, ideas will be 
corroborated if they are object of discussion and investigation by other people, and, on 
the other side, if one is right and if he is able to convince other citizens, his opinions on 
a specific topic or on a particular politician may spread and become a wider opinion, 
influence electoral behaviour and, therefore, it would be as if he had voted multiple 
times, because other people’s votes will be somehow steered or influenced by his ideas 
and his ability to defend them rationally and find good arguments in their favour. Even 
dismissing Mill’s idea of plural voting, not everyone would cast the same number of 
votes, even if they would formally do: if the parliament really develops into a Socratic 
assembly, where political decisions are discussed and assessed in their very own 
founding principles, and if the same occurs in society at large, who would gain influence 
over the others? Those who advocate and support rational arguments – or at least the 
more rational ones – would. And gaining influence over the others – in the case of a 
parliamentary assembly, over other MPs, while, in the case of society, over other citizen-
voters – would not it mean to influence the way others take their decisions and, 
eventually, vote? It probably would. 
Surely, what has just been illustrated is an extremely simplifying model of the political 
interplay occurring in parliament, across party lines, across social classes and in society 
in general; however, it shows the multiplying effect of the use of reason on individual 
vote: the more rational an individual is and the more room for open, frank and 
intellectually honest debate there is, the more such rational individual (i.e. the 
intellectual, the philosopher, the person of long, proven and qualified experience, etc.) 
would be capable of making his opinions spread, accepted and finally effective as for 
political decisions at every level (although such effectiveness has to be scaled 
 
59 For an interesting collection and critical account of the several theories on participation 
to vote, see Beerbohm, 2013, pp. 51-81). 
 138 
 
accordingly to the number of people involved in the political process, the level of 
political and government hierarchy we are dealing with, etc.). 
An electoral process as illustrated in this section would provide a valid motive for 
political participation to those sectors of society who think they have good reasons, 
reasonable plans, well-designed political agendas and, however, feel there is no room 
for their contribution in the polis. I have used the words think and feel, as it makes a 
small difference if such groups actually have better proposals than other groups (or 
parties, or classes, or lobbies, or individuals, and so on) or not; what really makes a 
difference here is:  
 a larger participation, in general, which promotes, in a Millian democracy, both 
individual and social/collective education; 
 a larger participation, in particular, of competent people, of intellectuals, 
philosophers, highly skilled people, which would increase the quality of public 
debate and, expectedly, of its outcome (i.e. the quality of political decision, 
government policies, acts of parliament etc.); 
 a larger number of opinions, theories, plans, proposals, beliefs etc. at scrutiny: 
that means that a larger number of wrong opinions, theories, plans, proposals, 
beliefs, etc. would be dismissed and that those who are kept as valid would be 
highly corroborated – at least more highly than it would have been if most of 
those opinions etc. would not have entered the political arena.  
In a very brief summary: one of the models of democracy which would enable the 
citizens – in particular, the rational, well-informed ones – to be sufficiently influential in 
providing them with enough incentives for political and electoral participation, is, in the 
case made here, a form of rational democracy. As for a political obligation to follow the 
rules of Millian rational democracy, it may be found in the philosophical roots of Millian 
philosophy: among the reasons for which one should participate in political life (for a 
list of possible motives of political obligation, see Dagger and Lefkowitz, 2014), surely 
utilitarian pursuit of happiness is fundamental, and it is hard to see how the rational 
element of a representative government devised as in Mill’s proposal can work as a 
disincentive. The rational element just described can come in useful in the scenario 
which I am going to describe in the next chapter, where I mean to propose further stages 
of research on Mill’s political philosophy with reference to contemporary political, 
philosophical and sociological issues. The way the rational element can spread in society 
and the obstacles it can meet are to be considered while discussing how a Millian 
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democracy should be established. Indeed, Millian democracy is not a theoretical 
political and constitutional system, but, instead, a set of institutions adapting 
themselves to practical conditions in society (which, in turn, affect the efficacy of 
political institutions). Therefore, an examination of Mill’s political ideas in today’s world 
may help in strengthening their plausibility. 
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V. REPRESENTATION 
Political representation has been over the last decades a quite classical topic in political 
theory: what degree of independence a representative should keep from his voters’ 
wishes, what is to be represented (voters, interests, parties, opinions and so on) and 
related questions have been widely investigated by a number of political theorists. The 
purpose of this chapter is an investigation of John Stuart Mill's theory of representation 
in the light of some of the most common or well-known theories of representation. 
At first, a general theory of representation involving the so-called 
mandate/independence controversy is expounded: the aim is to provide a theoretical 
framework within which to include Mill's ideas on representation or, in other words, to 
have some ideal coordinates which may help us to assess Mill's views on representation.  
Second, I have a look at John Stuart Mill's ideas that are strictly related to this area of 
politics: in chapter XII of CRG he discusses whether an MP should make pledges or not; 
furthermore, I take into consideration Mill's Rationale of Representation and his political 
activity in order to understand what really his position on the subject is.  
A third section will involve two interpretations of Mill's theory of representation: 
Richard Krouse's one, which is a comparison of James and John Stuart Mill's views and 
which suggests a revision of the common critical interpretation according to which John 
Stuart Mill was less optimistic and supportive of democracy than the Philosophical 
Radicals; after expounding on Krouse, Nadia Urbinati’s account of Mill's political 
philosophy will be brought into this enquiry, as it interestingly implies the idea of 
representation as advocacy. Both these views will be investigated.  
The fourth and final section puts forward an interpretation of Mill's position in the light 
of a more general theory of representation. I try to show how, actually, in Mill’s political 
views we can find different applications of a theory of representation in relation and 
proportion to the degree of complexity and generality of the political issues involved. 
V.I. A GENERAL THEORY OF REPRESENTATION: THE 
MANDATE/INDEPENDENCE CONTROVERSY 
A quite classical but extensive theory of representation is the one provided by Hanna 
Pitkin (1972 (1967)). In her work, a landmark in political theory, she points out the 
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complexity of the concept of political representation in terms of its theoretical meaning 
and implications: beginning with an analysis of Thomas Hobbes' views and describing 
the multifaceted aspects of political representation, probably the core of Pitkin's theory 
(or at least the piece of her research more clearly showing or exemplifying the many 
different, and sometimes conflicting, features of political representation) is the so-called 
mandate/independence controversy (pp. 144-167).  
The main issue involved in this controversy is related to the dilemma about whether a 
representative should act as a mere delegate of the represented, strictly bound to his 
constituents' wishes, or as a trustee who can freely take his own decisions regarding 
legislative and political issues. Such controversy entails other questions, e.g. what is the 
meaning of political representation? Who or what is actually represented (interests, 
lobbies, parties and so on)? 
Pitkin acknowledges that these are two extreme poles of a range within which many 
theorists have found their own position and many different moderate or substantially 
intermediate interpretations of political representation still have room. In other words, 
each of the two “pure” positions (mandate or independence) involves such a high degree 
of complexity that neither of them is really tenable without any contradiction in regard 
to the very operating principles of a representative institution. Since representation is 
the operation which makes someone or something “present or manifest or present 
again” (p. 251), it may be argued – Pitkin says - that a representative body should 
somehow be the mirror or the mouthpiece of the voters, as if they were actually sitting 
in parliament and deliberating on every specific issue – as if they were present. However 
- she notes - this kind of view implies some counter-indications: at first, it does not see 
the difficulty and complexity of political questions, for which technical expertise of 
ordinary men may not be sufficient; secondly, activity in a legislative body often 
requires political compromise, which would be made impossible if the MPs were 
absolutely bound to their voters' will and wishes. Third, it would also be somehow 
offensive in terms of dignity for a representative to be prevented from any autonomous 
decision and to be substantially hetero-directed. 
Even if we consider the problem of representation in relation to political parties (pp. 
147-149) or with the concept of interest (pp. 155-166), it seems to be a sort of insoluble 
puzzle, according to Pitkin, as, indeed, it may be reasonably argued that the 
representative is morally bound to the party who supported and possibly funded his 
candidacy; therefore, as his parliamentary seat is mainly a consequence of his party's 
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campaign rather than his own, he should pursue his party's program and electoral 
manifesto60. Furthermore, even in a first-past-the-post system, most voters' choices 
may simply mean that they express a preference for a party's political proposals, rather 
than for a specific candidate. On the other side, political parties often back proposals 
differently affecting the parts of which a nation is composed (e.g. some geographic areas 
may be advantaged from such proposals, while others may be damaged by them) or 
particular social classes may be the object of specific support and advocacy (for instance, 
as in the case of a classical Socialist party who could just aim to improve working class' 
conditions, or of single-issue parties): in such cases, a free and independent61 candidate 
may offer a different point of view and somehow protect the general interest or at least 
the neglected parts of society negatively affected by his party's proposals. Even looking 
at empirical research (legislators' voting behaviour, public opinion polls, etc.) this 
ambiguity – Pitkin affirms - does not disappear. 
Pitkin goes on and shows that the same uncertainty is found in the representation of 
interests. At first, interest in itself, though linked to actual, real people (e.g. consumers) 
has a degree of abstraction. Furthermore, interest is semantically ambiguous, as it may 
regard something concretely affecting one person or a group of people (e.g., when a 
court mentions the “interested parties”), or, in the other case, attention and concern in 
a psychological (and for this reason subjective) sense. One can also find an unattached 
interest, i.e. something which may be reasonably understood or interpreted as 
objectively at stake, but it still involves a range of issues; for instance, Pitkin argues that 
interests are distributed on a scale where, at one end, there are objective interests, 
which are in turn unattached interests and therefore not particularly linked to any 
group of people (e.g. world peace: it is an objective interest to be pursued, it is not a 
psychological state or a wish limited to a specific number of people, but, still, it cannot 
 
60 Pitkin overlooks the fact that a representative – it may be argued – could be somehow 
morally or politically bound to his party as it may be seen as an association or even 
community whose members share  not just the same political beliefs, but also life experience 
and background. 
61 Independent in the sense that he is and feels himself to be politically allowed to act freely 
in a number of cases, not in terms of political affiliation – in this section I am considering 
parties’ candidates, indeed. 
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be measured in any particular person or group), and at the other end subjective and 
attached interests, which contain another element of ambiguity: there is no coincidence, 
Pitkin remarks, between someone’s interests and wishes, indeed a voter or a group of 
people or a social class (and so on) may desire something that, when looked more 
carefully, may be revealed to be wrong or harmful to their actual (social, economic, civil 
etc.) interests. It may also happen that, in pursuing his constituency’s interests, a 
representative may draw different conclusions from those of the large majority of his 
voters and a conflict arises. As Pitkin states (p. 165): “the basic question of the mandate-
independence controversy is wrongly put. It poses a logically insoluble puzzle, a choice 
between two elements that are both involved in the concept of representation. In that 
case, it is not enough to choose between representative’s judgement and the 
constituents’ wishes; and there is no rational basis for choosing between them tout 
court. Representation as an idea implies they normally will coincide, and that when they 
fail to coincide there is a reason”. As a consequence, such paradox is not to be solved, as 
it is inherent in the very nature of the concept of representation, and both the autonomy 
of voters and that of their representative is to be preserved in order to comply fully with 
all the different aspects that political representation actually involves. 
V.II. MILL ON POLITICAL REPRESENTATION 
In CRG there is a brief chapter in which Mill investigates whether pledges should be 
required from representatives. According to Mill, it is more a problem of morality rather 
than a legal or constitutional issue: indeed, even if a constitution allows an MP to act 
independently from his own pledges, there still could be a sort of moral obligation for 
any MP towards them - an obligation which could lead him to pursue and fulfil his 
electoral promises even though he is no longer sure they are the best decisions he could 
take. 
Earlier in his life Mill had already dealt with the problems concerning political 
representation. A clear example of him touching upon this topic can be found in his 1835 
review of Samuel Bailey's Rationale of Political Representation (CW XVIII, pp. 15-46). 
Here Mill seems to support a strong accountability view of the subject, as the rulers are 
supposed to be the best-cultivated people of the country, while the precise task of the 
voters would be judging of representatives’ political conduct every three years. Mill at 
that time was still a supporter of the Radicals’ reforms (such as the introduction of the 
secret ballot, the enlargement of the electoral franchises and the creation of a sort of 
class of professional politicians) and of their political philosophical assumptions 
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(mainly, that good government is possible whenever there is coincidence of interests 
between the rulers and the ruled). However, in this writing he displays his deep worry 
about the negative influence of an ignorant though publicly and politically engaged mass 
and he appears convinced that a representative government is, amongst the other 
things, a government of people’s trustees and that elections are a reward/punishment 
mechanism put in place mainly as an incentive or disincentive for the rulers. Coherently, 
Mill dismisses the idea of making pledges, as a representative may well be convinced by 
new facts, at one point, to change his own point of view on a particular subject, and also 
because government, at this stage of Mill's philosophical evolution, is still the 
government of the few, although selected through suffrage. This is interesting because, 
many years later, chapter XII of CRG is dedicated to the specific topic of political pledges. 
The question this chapter (CRG, CW XIX, pp. 504-519) addresses is made clear from the 
very beginning by his title: “Ought Pledges to be Required from Members of Parliament?”. 
As already remarked previously, according to Mill this is not a problem strictly involving 
the constitution of a state or legal provisions, because even in the case of a law 
protecting the independent conduct of representatives, voters may anyway require 
compliance with their wishes if they are asked to confirm their vote in the following 
election. It is, in fact, a problem of political ethics. As a general principle and in 
accordance with the principle of competence, Mill argues that pledges are not required 
from representatives: the voters, indeed, should rather commit themselves to non-
ordinary people, who, by virtue of their intellectual capacity and their previous 
experiences show a substantial degree of excellence and, therefore, are in a way better 
suited to take care of the interests of all public affairs. However, Mill introduces a couple 
of exceptions: first, this principle may perhaps be applied to an ideal system of 
representative government, but in an imperfect society (such as England in the XIX 
century, for example, where class interest and mass ignorance are still preponderant 
forces, according to Mill) voters would be morally entitled, for prudential reasons, to 
ask for guarantees from the candidates; secondly, at the elections there may be  
candidates with no previous experience in government or political representation, for 
which, in judging whether they are fit or not to have a seat in parliament, the only 
elements to be taken into consideration would be their previous activities (professional 
or generally non-political) and their words alone. In this case, a request of promises and 
pledges from these candidates may be acceptable. In any case, Mill remarks, voters may 
reasonably - from a political and moral point of view - choose between candidates closer 
to them in terms of fundamental firm beliefs; there are two reasons for this: the first 
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could be defined a realistic reason, i.e. it is very difficult to govern against the deepest 
beliefs of the electorate; the second reason concerns the fact that primary and essential 
political opinions are often complex, controversial and somewhat unsolvable. 
Furthermore, Mill reckons that a pure delegate view of representation implies a sort of 
self-annihilation of the voters (p. 510). This would be in contrast with the educative 
purposes of his democratic model and with his views on liberty. 
It is interesting to note, therefore, that even though the fundamental principle, as in the 
review of Bailey's Rationale of Political Representation, remains that of competence, Mill 
leaves room for moral and political obligations of the representatives towards the 
represented, other than the simple and straightforward commitment to good 
government. I aim to explain how this is relevant in the analysis of Mill’s political 
thought, through the screen of the dispute between the two views of political 
representation as a delegate or as trustee, and after discussing, in the next section, two 
interpretations of Mill on this subject: the first one standing within the theory of Pitkin, 
the second one going some way to overcome it by introducing the concept of advocacy. 
V.III. KROUSE AND URBINATI ON MILL AND POLITICAL 
REPRESENTATION 
In this section, I plan to give a critical account of two interpretations of Mill's theory. As 
already partially stated earlier, the first one, by Richard Krouse (1982) is relevant 
because it deals with Mill's detachment from the radical philosophers and considers 
Pitkin's theory expounded above. Urbinati's study on Mill, instead, tries to go somehow 
beyond the general theory of representation and the mandate/independence 
controversy and introduces the concept of representation as advocacy. 
Krouse highlights the process and the changes through which Mill goes during the 
evolution of his political thought. Indeed, in the ‘30s Mill is quite close to his father’s 
views on representative democracy, while later (namely in CRG) he shows an important 
difference with respect to the original Radical positions – and against his own earlier 
views. The core of Krouse’s arguments lies in a basic difference existing between the 
classical Radical democratic theory and the late John Stuart Mill’s position: while both 
stress the importance of the educated classes within a representative democracy, so 
that mass participation and extension of the electoral suffrage are subordinated to (and 
in a certain way protected by) a sort of intellectual leadership of the competent élite, in 
CRG John Stuart Mill introduces a further element, a main revision of his father’s 
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conception of democracy, i.e. the educative role of representative government. It is 
interesting to notice an argument reported by Krouse and the analogy he draws from it: 
according to James Mill, Krouse claims, an enlightened despotism would be acceptable 
because his aim is a good government; the very abstract case of an almost perfect 
monarch or ruling class who would ignore his or their particular interests in order to 
pursue the general welfare while preserving people’s liberty, instead, are refused by 
John Stuart Mill for the mere reason that such a political system would, anyway, totally 
neglect the educative and moral element of representative government, which, on the 
contrary, creates and fosters an active character. The analogy following from this 
argument directly regards Krouse’s interpretation of Mill’s ideas on political 
representation: indeed, a representative as a pure trustee may be seen as a benevolent 
dictator, who, still pursuing what he holds to be good for the society at large, does not 
involve the citizens within the political process, in this way preventing the development 
of people’s civic virtues; Krouse argues that “Mill apparently seeks to reconcile a strong 
trustee concept of (national) representation with maximum mass participation in both 
national elections and local government” (p. 531), but a tension still exists, and John 
Stuart Mill is perfectly aware of this (CRG, CW XIX, p. 508). In this view, CRG are an 
attempt or an exercise to reconcile a theory stressing the positive and beneficial 
consequences of mass participation with the potential abdication by the ordinary 
citizen to take any part in influencing the decisional process in the legislative body 
between one election and the other. 
The second view I am taking into consideration is Nadia Urbinati’s study on Mill and 
democracy (2002). Mill's democratic theory – she argues - is still relevant today because 
it involves several dynamic aspects of the political process, one of which is political 
representation. Mill's views on this topic cannot be framed within the classical 
distinction between the independence view and the mandate view in representation 
theory. Indeed, according to Urbinati's interpretation, Mill would go beyond such 
distinction and would be able to reconcile both general and particular interests in his 
description of how an MP should be morally and politically obligated to behave in 
parliament: he should be an intelligent and rational advocate of a cause, leaving aside 
the abstract general interest (still subject to forms of interpretation in any case) or 
partisanship. As a consequence, the deliberative process of the legislative body should 
be a rational and informed debate in which the advocates of each cause should be ready 
to change their mind if their cause is proven wrong, to be in a disposition of intellectual 
research of truths – truths which are absolute but still subject to different, and maybe 
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partial, interpretations, and object of investigation possibly leading to their recognition, 
classification and identification.  
Urbinati's interpretation of Mill, therefore, shows that representation seemingly is not 
a way to make present what is absent as in Pitkin's classical definition. Representation 
involves a call for any MP to defend a cause or a demand from citizens, and support it 
within the legislative body if he is convinced that such cause would promote general 
welfare throughout society. This means that Mill would not support a view of the 
representative as a delegate, because the support given by the MP to constituents' will 
is dependent on considerations regarding the general interest of society, reason and 
justice. However, although the representative is bound to the pursuit of the nation's 
welfare rather than of particular interests, the realistic acknowledgement of division of 
society in different social classes62 and of public opinion in different political, religious 
or philosophical groups means that the parliament should be similar to a democratic 
arena where different points of view are present, and they antagonistically, although 
rationally, challenge each other.  
V.IV. MILL'S THEORY OF POLITICAL REPRESENTATION IN THE 
LIGHT OF A GENERAL THEORY OF REPRESENTATION  
As this assessment of John Stuart Mill on representation stems from Pitkin’s description 
of the mandate/independence controversy, it may be interesting, at first, to remark 
what she affirms about Mill’s political theory. She includes Mill in a category of thinkers 
supporting what she calls descriptive representation, i.e. “the making present of 
something absent by resemblance of reflection, as in a mirror or in art” (Pitkin, 1971 
(1967), p. 11). Actually she points out that Mill does not use such metaphor, in fact 
making clear that Mill talks about the representative body as an arena (p. 63). As regards 
representatives’ role, she makes clear that, according to both Jeremy Bentham and John 
Stuart Mill, the legislator does not possess an obviously superior knowledge: the point 
is that the more the MP’s intellectual or moral superiority is doubtful, the more others’ 
opinions become valuable. Of course, educated and informed opinions still exist in 
 
62 Urbinati remarks that this does not imply a form of corporatism in Mill's philosophy. 
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society63, but Pitkin stresses the theoretical detachment from strong or extreme elitist 
theories according to which people’s opinions are misguided by their interests and 
representatives should ignore them. Furthermore, Mill thinks – Pitkin argues - that even 
if a majority of elected representatives would be steered by selfish or class interests 
(and these interests would conflict and, perhaps, somehow cancel each other in terms 
of their possible dominant or relevant influence on government decisions), there is a 
minority of people guided by the will to pursue general interests.  
Indeed, representation in Mill is linked to his defence of the deliberative function of 
parliament, a place of discussion among the various MPs (or groups of MPs) carrying 
and supporting different opinions. Representation of opinions is extremely important 
for Mill - and for Bentham as well - firstly because it may well be that the representatives 
know better what their voters’ interest is, and secondly because it may be that a voter 
or some voters may have a well-educated or informed opinion on one or more specific 
political issues. This follows from the fact that there is such thing as an objective 
interest64: every citizen can judge the consequences of government actively, precisely 
because these consequences fall on him, although his knowledge in advance of what his 
representative precisely ought to do is very doubtful. Representation makes possible 
for everyone to have his part in government to the extent he can judge government’s 
choices; furthermore it also pushes the MPs to look at their voters’ interests because of 
the need to seek election (or re-election).  
If compared to Edmund Burke – Pitkin affirms - in Mill the belief that any individual 
knows his own interest better than anyone seems to fade and vanish65, as it cannot be 
known with absolute certainty, hence the need for a debating parliament, for 
 
63 I.e. some people are more informed, more educated, more cultivated than others. 
64 See above in section V.I for a description of what Pitkin intends for objective interest. 
65 Yet this is what Mill appears to contend in On Liberty, even if, perhaps, with some caveats 
(see, for instance, the higher pleasures theory). At least – I would rather remark – in the 
political field Mill recognises the need for voters to choose candidates of some mental 
superiority. Furthermore, Mill is afraid that some portions of society may use their right to 
vote in order to pursue their class interest. 
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representation of different views and for the deliberative function of the legislature (pp. 
202-206). The importance of parliament, and, therefore, its activity lie in the discussion, 
in the comparison of opinions and in the control of the executive (pp. 63-64). 
As representation is the object of the investigation of this chapter, it should also be clear 
what the context is, i.e. what a representative body should be according to Mill. In his 
political model, the deliberative role of the parliament is mainly concerned with 
discussion of bills rather than their drafting, the representatives' task after their 
election is to join parliamentary as well as public discussion on the possible approval of 
bills written by bureaucrats and experts and on which the MPs could just vote for or 
against or give general instructions or guidelines to the legislative committees drafting 
the bills (CRG, CW XIX, pp. 422-434). So, the mandate/independence controversy in 
Mill’s political philosophy is somehow partially defused – not totally anyway, as there 
still are some aspects regarding the problem whether a representative should follow his 
voters’ wishes and indications or not. It is true and correct to remember that the specific 
role of a member of the legislative body is not to make decisions but rather to produce 
discussions and activities to some extent persuasive. The value of democratic decisions, 
i.e., is in the fact of being the outcome of an activity of persuasion and conciliation of 
different positions as a result of a discussion (Manin, 1996, pp. 234-245). As regards 
MPs' role in the assembly, it has been stated and assessed that Mill’s democracy is a 
form of deliberative democracy which tries to balance the ideas of representative both 
as a delegate and as a trustee: Urbinati’s interpretation of Mill’s democracy as a modern 
version of the Athenian agora makes clear the fact that Mill dismisses the idea of the 
parliament as a mirror of society (indeed, being a means towards progress, i.e. the 
future, cannot at the same time be a sort of certification of the current situation) and he 
tries to transcend the usual distinction made in the mandate/independence controversy; 
according to Urbinati, the role of advocacy, rhetoric and the necessity of a Socratic 
debate in the legislative assembly are clear and important features in Mill’s view of 
representation (Urbinati, 2008, pp. 76-122; Urbinati and Warren 2008, pp. 391-395). 
Urbinati is right when she points out Mill’s opposition to the MP as a delegate66, but it 
would maybe be worthwhile to stress the fact that her views of Mill as transcending the 
 
66 Mill is very clear on this: even under the most favourable voting system «the delegation 
theory of representation seems to me false, and its practical operation hurtful, though the 
mischief would in that case be confined within certain bounds» (CRG, CW XIX, 511). 
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classical opposition in political theory between mandate and independence may seem 
to be quite more similar to a balance of opposite views or, somehow, to placing John 
Stuart Mill in the middle of a scale, or a line, on whose top one finds independence and 
at the bottom a very simple and blunt view of political representation as deference. It is 
true that this is described as a sort of regulative view, therefore it is not realistically 
binding, but even in such ideal form of a political deliberative arena that the parliament 
should be – and in which representatives are the main characters acting according to 
the spirit of Socratic discussion and rational deliberation – there must be a time at which 
the MP must take a decision, raise his hand, push a button (in modern times) or state 
his agreement or disagreement over a bill and not just a cause he has been advocating – 
and disagreements after such a perfectly rational and intellectually honest discussion 
there will always be in such an agonistic model of deliberative democracy (Urbinati, 
2008, pp. 82-85). Since the moment of the political decision is the core of the 
mandate/independence controversy, and disagreement between the representatives 
and, plausibly, between them and their voters will always exist, transcending such 
controversy can hardly mean that it is put aside – it still arises. 
I would moreover not underestimate Mill’s philosophy of history, i.e. the claim that over 
the different stages of humanity there may be the need for a sort of political 
guardianship over the people. In other words, without any attempt to claim or assess 
whether Mill is historicist or not, it should be considered that while development and 
progress take place in mankind, their political institutions change and improve as well. 
In CRG Mill makes clear that, in some stages of their history, some countries may not 
meet the conditions for a civilised and representative government, because of the lack 
of individual emancipation and insufficient cultural and social progress (CRG, CW XIX, 
pp. 376-378). On the other side, Mill does not lack realism, indeed transcending (or 
balancing or re-elaborating, I would rather say) the political dispute I am talking about 
is just part of a regulative model: this means that, unless we live in a perfect society (and 
this is impossible for obvious reasons – this is not a perfect world), we are always one 
step behind Urbinati’s model in which the mandate/independence controversy is, 
although agonistically re-interpreted, solved and decided, i.e. one step behind a model 
assuming enough rationality, enough emancipation, enough individual liberty and 
enough education to give life to a legislative institution where each representative could 
easily act, at the same time, both as a delegate and a trustee.  
However, at this point one objection may reasonably arise: we could just need to fulfil 
sufficient conditions to set a functioning representative democracy, rather than a 
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perfect one. So it would be a matter of realism which should lead us to read Mill's 
philosophy as an attempt to conciliate the two different poles of the concept of 
representation, with a very slight shift towards independence. 
Although considerations on the opposite views on representation are “so intimately 
interwoven with one another” (CRG, CW XIX, p. 507), Mill stills supports the principle of 
competence as the main and basic criterion by which the whole process of 
representation should abide, but the different relevance of the political issues at stake 
can be traced during such process, as Mill acknowledges when he says: “There are some 
differences, however, which they (voters) cannot be expected to overlook” (CRG, CW 
XIX, p. 510). In other words, I would categorise these differences in three different 
groups, each of them influencing in its own way how representation should take place: 
 very general and fundamental political beliefs and ideas: these are convictions 
to which voters or a part of them attach a great importance, for which they 
think there is no room for compromise, or which are largely rooted in an 
appreciable portion of people; 
 ordinary political ideas or opinions; 
 specific or highly technical or very particular political issues. 
What does “ordinary” mean in this context? I would define it by exclusion: it may be 
everything not general/fundamental or technical enough to be included in any other 
category. So, an ordinary political belief is neither one of those of fundamental ideas 
characterizing the course of political life and a number of decisions, nor one of those 
issues requiring high expertise, but rather a range of issues situated, without surely any 
sharp distinction and with some grey areas, in the middle zone between the two groups 
I have described. A further hint on this is given by Mill himself, when, for example, he 
advocates not just international law as part of liberal and academic education, but also 
popular scrutiny on foreign policy (Inaugural Address Delivered to the University of St. 
Andrews, CW XXI¸ pp. 246-247). Indeed, Mill says: “He is not a good man who, without a 
protest, allows wrong to be committed in his name, and with the means which he helps 
to supply, because he will not trouble himself to use his mind on the subject. It depends 
on the habit of attending to and looking into public transactions, and on the degree of 
information and solid judgment respecting them that exists in the community, whether 
the conduct of the nation as a nation, both within itself and towards others, shall be 
selfish, corrupt, and tyrannical, or rational and enlightened, just and noble” (p. 247). As 
Varouxakis (2002, pp. 126-127) remarks, there is a demanding conception of citizens’ 
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obligations here, because “it is a gross dereliction of duty if citizens fail to scrutinize 
their country’s foreign policy and international comportment using as an excuse that 
international law is too complicated to understand” (p. 127). In this case, complexity is 
bypassed by the fact that we are dealing with a fundamental matter of politics and that 
there is a need for citizens to influence rulers because of the importance of their 
country’s standing in the world. In other cases, instead, the higher is the degree of 
complexity or need for expertise, the greater is the influence of the principle of 
competence (still the basic criterion on which Mill’s theory of representation is based) 
while assessing whether a representative should act as a trustee or as a delegate. It may 
well be – Mill affirms - that Liberal voters choose a very brilliant Tory candidate, or that 
Evangelicals may choose a Rationalist for his deep knowledge of Church questions (CRG, 
CW XIX, pp. 506-507)67, but the general and popular beliefs of society should always be 
taken into account. In no case, however, representatives should act to benefit only one 
class or there should be a sort of exclusive rule by a faction.  
In the third category of political issues, instead, Mill supports a sort of extreme 
independence view: actually, the representatives are not to draft bills in detail  - as, 
cultivated and highly competent as they may well be, an even more profound and 
professional knowledge of all the relevant issues and details regarding specific changes 
in legal provisions and their possible consequences is needed – but they must just 
discuss and sketch the principles and the main criteria new legal provisions should fulfil, 
amend the proposals of the legislative committees of experts, and, at the end of the 
process, reject or accept the bill. It is hard to see how – in Mill’s theory - at this level of 
complexity of political decisions there is room to act as a delegate. Yes, it may be argued 
that a representative may explain to his constituents all the details of a bill, what 
inspired it and ask for a public debate among his voters, but, still, how can all the small 
 
67 Perhaps, voters’ religion (in the sense of political and moral values implied by one’s creed, 
not in the sense of support to or from people of the same church) has to be included in the 
group of beliefs which do not allow a large degree of independence for MPs too, alongside 
foreign policy. 
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relevant details be consciously assessed? There is no way, and at least in Mill’s political 
philosophy such a public debate involving any single issue is not expected68. 
The first category, instead, may be the object of further investigation: the importance of 
popularity of basic political opinions and belief may lead us to consider how electoral 
approval may be relevant in assessing political representation in Mill’s philosophy. If 
we look at Mill’s political activity (1865-1868), he seems to point out that he somehow 
prefers to not feel himself necessarily bound to his voters' wishes. The episode of his 
meeting (Autobiography, CW I, pp. 274-275) attended by members of the working class 
and his defence of the opinions he stated in Thoughts on Parliamentary Reform – the 
working classes are “mostly habitual liars” even though generally ashamed of lying 
(Thoughts on Parliamentary Reform, CW XIX, p. 338) – gave him some praise from those 
very workers attending the event. Along with the unpopularity of his positions on 
Ireland and his method of proposing extreme solutions in order to achieve a moderate 
success (Autobiography, CW I, p. 280) – unless we want to scale this to mere political 
and parliamentary tactics, which could well be – and with his initial refusal to canvass 
during the 1865 electoral campaign, these are practical examples of his attitude towards 
his constituents. In other words, far from being paternalistic, we can accept a view of 
Mill's theory of representation as a whole as leaning, in a mitigated way, towards the 
pole of independence, as this seems to be fairly consistent with his activity in 
Westminster and during 1865 and 1868 electoral campaigns. 
There is still room for considerations on the importance of popular vote. Roughly, we 
may try and use it as the cornerstone of an attempt seeking to reconcile the two versions 
 
68 Of course, Mill would normally consider acceptable and beneficial for all a public debate 
(on every subject of knowledge, I would remark), but here I am assessing representation 
theory and the deliberative and decision process it involves, a particular field of political 
theory – or philosophy – to which Mill dedicates particular attention. “Ought Pledges to be 
Required from Members of Parliament?” – in principle and apart from exceptions, Mill’s 
answer to such question is: no. This does not cover all the issues related to the theories on 
representation theory but, as I am trying to show, it certainly means that there must be a 
distance, a beneficial detachment between an MP and his constituents which cannot simply 
be ‘transcended’ as in the advocacy interpretation of Mill. 
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of the MP as trustee and delegate. From Mill’s theory we may draw a justification for a 
system based on an inverse proportion between the election results and the level of 
deference towards his constituents that a representative is morally obliged to show and 
to put in practice: where there is an electoral win by a large margin or a vast popular 
consent, they are acquired along with a high degree of independence for the law-makers; 
instead, in the cases of an election victory by a very short margin or an unpopular, 
although reasonable, opinions, a representative morally needs a greater adherence to 
the will of his constituents – unless he has a high degree of confidence in his own opinion 
on a particular issue69.  
However – coming back to Mill's philosophy – such a solution would imply an excessive 
automatism and, furthermore, it requires a more elaborate version when applied to the 
voting system Mill has in mind. Indeed, Mill supports Thomas Hare's proportional 
system, a way to ensure parliamentary representation to minorities, to provide people 
with a seat in parliament because of their moral and intellectual merits (in a first-past-
the-post system they would unlikely be elected). I have already discussed in chapter IV 
the electoral reform proposed by Hare and adopted by Mill. The intentions and the 
effects of this proposal are what interest us. As I have already remarked earlier, Hare's 
point of view – misunderstood by Mill – is a conservative (in the general meaning of the 
word) one in some ways, since the purpose of the introduction of proportional 
allocation of seats is the reduction of the influence of the working class, while Mill wants, 
instead, to protect the representation of the minorities, including the working class 
itself, but also that of the élites, as a means for the development of democratic 
institutions (see Kern, 1972). In other words, the proportional system is a way to give 
to unpopular – but deserving – people a seat from a minority position. These are the 
same people who, in addition to exercising control activities and protecting the rights 
of minorities, would have a duty to act a non-partisan and open-minded role in fuelling 
the political debate; they have to transform the parliament into a Socratic arena. 
However, it may well be that a majority of voters would be less progressive than an 
educated minority. In such a case, the effects of democracy and of proportional 
representation would be conservative effects. However, other progressive effects would 
still be in place: the educative element of political participation would have an effect on 
 
69 See, as an example, Alexander Guerrero's manifest normative mandate, from which I took 
inspiration (Guerrero, 2010, pp. 275-277). 
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voters, according to Mill. Participation is good because people involved in political life 
along with an educated minority will, over time, receive beneficial effects in terms of 
civic spirit and active character. As remarked earlier, this is not one of the intentions 
that Hare has in his mind while designing his plan for electoral reform. 
One might object that it may not be the case to use Alexander Guerrero’s account on 
representation I have introduced earlier in order to assess Mill’ ideas: indeed, while 
Guerrero focuses on a first-past-the-post electoral system, Mill appreciates and 
supports a proportional electoral system, in particular, Thomas Hare’s seat allocation 
method. However, an elaborated and revised version of such account may still be of 
some use. Furthermore, I am using Guerrero’s perspective because it implies a relevant 
concept in my attempt to critically assess Mill’s political philosophy on representation, 
i.e. guardianship70, and also for some of its implications: when the idea of popularity is 
used in such field, it leads to some paradoxical consequences. When we introduce the 
element of popularity, we should carefully consider it in a double sense: popularity of 
beliefs and causes as well as popularity of representatives because of the manifold 
aspects of representation, which cannot be narrowed to just one of them. We have 
already seen, in the first case, that in Mill's CRG deference towards voters' wishes is to 
be relatively increased (as a general rule; exceptions are still allowed) in proportion to 
their popularity and universality. However, if, in order to consider all the features 
implied in representation, we may assume that an MP may be more morally justified in 
acting as a trustee if he is largely popular amongst the voters and, vice versa, he would 
feel bound to his voters' wishes if his popularity were low – but this is contrasting with 
Mill's theory, as it actually aims to accrue the political influence of an elevated minority. 
In other, words, I am trying to argue that there is a slight difference between the degree 
of deference Mill allows regarding general political beliefs and the one concerning the 
way a representative should act. The practical consequences are quite relevant: an MP 
should pay more attention to widespread opinions (even if those who voted for him or 
support him do not share them) than those of his actual voters. On the other side, a 
representative voted by a narrow majority or even by just a plurality or a minority (in 
proportional representation) would find himself facing a tension between general and 
his voters' opinions – he should choose whether to act against popular beliefs (unwise 
 
70 Or, in other words, paternalism. 
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and unrealistic according to Mill) or against the minority he should represent (in such 
case, the element of representation of intellectual élites would be lost). Though 
restricted to the field of general firm beliefs, this application of the principle of 
competence towards these aspects of representation may seem a bit inconsistent with 
Mill's declared purposes on the subject, unless we re-introduce a stronger version of the 
principle of competence, already present elsewhere in Mill's writings. 
As regards parties’ representation, one might question whether Mill is unrealistic on 
political parties’ involvement in the electoral campaign. Actually, he recognises that 
“(i)n general, half a dozen local leaders, who may be honest politicians, but who may be 
jobbing intriguers, select the candidate” (CW XXVIII, p. 178) according to his opinions 
(which should not diverge from his party’s views), his political career and his wealth. 
Furthermore, it seems that being a good representative of the party the citizens voted 
for (or of which, in any case, voters know the representative shares most of his ideas) 
does not mean ipso facto being a good representative, even for those MPs who are the 
expression of the majority will: “But the local majorities are they truly represented? In 
a certain rough way they are. They have a member or members who are on the same 
side with themselves in party politics; if they are Conservatives, they have a professed 
Conservative; if Liberals, a professed Liberal. This is something; it is a great deal, even; 
but is it everything? Is it of no consequence to an elector who it is that sits in Parliament 
as his representative, if only he does not sit on the wrong side of the House? Sir, we need 
more than this. We all desire not only that there should be a sufficient number of 
Conservatives or of Liberals in the House, but that these should, as far as possible, be 
the best men of their respective parties; and the elector, for himself, desires to be 
represented by the man who has most of his confidence in all things, and not merely on 
the single point of fidelity to a party” (CW XXVIII, p. 178). 
Obviously, these remarks are strongly connected to Mill’s opinion that the English 
voting system encouraged local representation at the expenses of expertise, knowledge 
and even a fair electoral competition based on these principles: indeed, a good 
candidate, highly regarded nationwide, would find it very difficult to seek election in a 
constituency where the main opponents are supposed to support the interests of local 
communities - actually they might not even have a chance to seek election, as the 
selection of candidates is carried on under different criteria than that of competence. 
Mill does not underestimate the value of local and party representation: he argues that 
good local candidates could easily win elections, and candidates strongly connected to 
the Tories or the Liberals as well. Indeed, he states that the effects of proportional 
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representation applied throughout the whole nation would increase the quality of such 
candidates, because voters would have a much wider choice, and he stresses the need 
for representation of minorities or of a third – different – position apart from the main 
political groups; this has to be secured via an electoral reform, of course, but also with 
a rational and critical attitude in parliament: there always is room for a further position 
needed to be represented in parliament apart from Conservatives, Liberals, Radicals or 
whatsoever. So, these remarks on the parliament as a whole may give a further clue 
about how every single MP should behave according to Mill. First, he should keep his 
intellectual and political independence from his party: even though one could rightfully 
and earnestly be a member of - say – the Conservative party, he should preserve his 
autonomy during his parliamentary activity – and this is even truer for those MPs 
elected by a minority of voters. Second: political credibility about local issues should not 
overcome general and national interests: again, Mill does not have a totally negative 
opinion about a locally-oriented vote, but we cannot ignore that his electoral proposal 
suggests the need for candidates able to keep their credibility high both locally and 
nationally. In other terms, representatives are not to have a strong deference towards 
their territorial community71.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
71  I have been tempted to use the word ‘constituency’ here. Actually, in some countries 
constituencies occupy a very large territory, and, in some cases, there is only one national 
constituency. I want to point out the fact that Mill wants an electoral system able to give 
some decent hope to win a seat also to candidates without any strong or relevant local 
connections or acquaintances, but widely recognised as eminent, skilled or honourable 
people able to pursue the nation’s interest. 
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VI. RELEVANCE OF MILL’S POLITICAL THOUGHT TODAY 
In this chapter I illustrate two lines (individuality and happiness; European federalism) 
along which some issues for further investigation on John Stuart Mill’s political 
philosophy may arise in today’s world. There are already examples of scholars, by the 
way, who have investigated further implications and development of Mill’s political 
ideas, or at least their relevance nowadays. For instance, whether Mill’s political thought 
may still be of our interest today or not has been analysed in a work already mentioned 
beforehand, John Skorupski’s Why read Mill today? (Skorupski, 2006), a book in which 
he addresses the question why we should read and take Mill into account in our own 
age. In this work, Skorupski points out that with the collapse of socialism in Eastern 
Europe, the convulsions of Islam, the emergence of questions about our post-modern 
age, methodological and disciplinary tools such as history in a Millian fashion (but more 
moderately, perhaps) may come useful again (pp. 74-75). Skorupski also stresses the 
relevance of the fact that Mill’s democratic proposals aim to create a representative 
individual, not a mere delegate of a particular social group, but rather an independent 
member of a democratic polis and a conscious part of the institutional structures that 
are specially designed for this type of exercise of political practice (p. 91). Furthermore, 
the rise of unbelief, i.e. the fact that belief in God is challenged and that every belief in 
general fell victim of scientific rationality and of technological advancements, and, at the 
same time, the theories regarding natural and internal pulses influencing our moral 
character (typically, in Romantic thought), are other characteristics which identified the 
context in which Mill elaborated his philosophical system and whose traces we may find 
even in his highly rational thought.  Most important, is the fact that  
Whereas much nineteenth-century liberalism linked political and civic 
freedom to an objective ideal of human self-realisation, much twentieth 
century liberalism sought to unlink it. (Skorupski, 2006, p. 103) 
So, coming to Skorupski’s conclusions, which – we should not forget – try to answer the 
question Why read Mill today? (as in his book’s title), and also “What works?” and “What 
inspires?” (p. 106), one may probably agree on the fact that “(t)he accent on responsible 
citizenship is vitally important” and that the political guidelines settled by Mill, although 
not safe from controversies and criticism, are “informed by intelligent and reliable 
supporting argument” (p. 106). When it comes to the ethical view concerning Mill’s 
version of liberalism, Skorupski maintains that there is a case for its defence, although 
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it may somehow be accused of: a) lack of realism with regard to human potential; b) of 
trust in an objective hierarchy of human values which actually is not there; c) of an ideal 
which, at the end of the day, just stresses self-assertion and being ‘different’ (pp. 106-
107), as 
Mill's focus on human goods - happiness, spontaneity, independence - is 
civilised and attainable in the world as it is. It does not sacralise suffering 
or treat enjoyment with suspicion. It is not posited on some wishful 
thinking that is impossible to discuss. Unlike unattainably over-blown self-
images, or still worse, the violent and totalitarian utopian visions that 
people so depressingly sell out to, it flows not from moral weakness but 
from moral strength. (p. 107) 
However, it might be that the world as it is presents different circumstances on things 
such as human nature, inter-individual relations and pleasure, what people maintain 
pleasures are, and the means – political, social, economic, professional means – they 
possess in order to achieve them. So what is the place for rational forces in this changed 
and changing world? 
Much has been said insofar about Mill’s democratic theory, and conclusions have been 
drawn in terms of political ethics, the role of the politician, of the citizen and of the 
intellectual, and their moral obligations in participating in a system which, at the very 
end, would promote general happiness. Of course, from a general Millian point of view, 
utilitarian moral rules apply to every citizen more or less in the same way; however, in 
section IV.VI. I tried to identify stricter and more precise rules to be followed: reason is 
seen as a sort of influence multiplier, therefore rational agents should feel the need, or 
at least a sort of obligation, for participation. However, there might be a major challenge 
for the theory72 I have expounded on: it is based on a constitutional system and on a 
 
72 Actually, I would not call it a theory, as it mostly relies on Millian elements and, then, tries 
to draw a few conclusions on what the correct political behaviour is for different categories 
of individuals – politicians and the most rational and well-educated among the voters. 
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view of social and inter-individual relations of a XIX century man – although a man of 
rare intellect such as John Stuart Mill.  
Mill’s work on representative government was already in theoretical contrast with 
other liberal views on democracy in the age of its rise (e.g. compared to Benjamin 
Constant). Moreover, there are points to be stressed if we have to challenge or 
strengthen73 the hypothesis of a Millian way to handle democracy in the XXI century. 
Even considering Mill as a late-modern thinker (Skorupski, 2006, p. 93), the social 
structures and technological innovations characterising his age constitute elements of 
substantial and radical difference in comparison to today’s society. Skorupski also 
compares Mill to Hegel and Marx: he is a much stronger supporter of individual liberty 
than the two German philosophers, and when Mill thinks of concrete forms of 
communism, he is worried about the troubles which may come for individual freedom. 
Some socialist solutions to capitalist contradictions are a non-liberal or anti-liberal 
alternative to Mill’s political proposal. However, Mill’s support for some forms of 
socialism is well known. For instance, in his Autobiography, he writes, with reference to 
himself and to Harriet Taylor as well: “I was a democrat, but not the least of a Socialist”, 
and then he adds that “our ideal of ultimate improvement went far beyond Democracy, 
and would class us decidedly under the general designation of Socialists” while 
repudiating, at the same time, «that tyranny of society over the individual which most 
Socialistic systems are supposed to involve» (Autobiography, CW I, p. 239). Indeed, as 
already cited earlier in this work, one of the two substantial changes of opinion to which 
Mill makes reference in the Autobiography regards a form of qualified Socialism as 
concerns the ultimate prospects of mankind, being the other the shift in his appreciation 
and formulation of a model of representative democracy. Depicting a non-socialist or 
anti-socialist Mill would just fly in the face of Mill’s assertions on himself, but also on a 
number of social and economic proposals he made during his lifetime. Indeed, qualified 
Socialist tendencies accompany a qualified and elaborated model of democracy in Mill.  
What has just been said about extreme socialist illiberal solutions, can be also affirmed 
about extreme majoritarian illiberal forms of democracy: Mill – the democratic John 
Stuart Mill – fears them as they may hinder and endanger individual freedom and 
development. Skorupski shows us a great philosopher who develops a civic ideal and 
 
73 Or challenge and strengthen. 
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answers basic moral and political philosophical questions, i.e. how to live and how to 
live together. In a comparison between Marx and Mill, for instance, we would be 
considering two different ways of analysing and interpreting society in an age in which 
– using a Marxist description – the capitalist bourgeoisie, which has been able to 
emancipate itself from the feudal yoke, immediately afterwards has halted the process 
of emancipation just before the final step, which is Socialism.  
One may wonder how, while appraising the importance of reading Mill today, we should 
focus on social and political philosophies ‘targeted’ for XIX century industrial societies, 
where classes and nations are at play, and the individual must defend himself from 
forms of aggregation. What if the individual – the Millian individual – has to defend 
himself from forces of social dissolution, disaggregation and isolation rather than from 
processes of forced illiberal oppression, be it in the form of hard socialism, mediocre 
majoritarian rule or of irrational nationalism?  
VI.I. SOCIAL, ECONOMIC AND TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE: WHEN 
HAPPINESS DEPARTS FROM FREEDOM 
As said earlier, this section focuses on whether and how Mill’s political philosophy could 
still be somehow used today in order to address contemporary political issues. Are we 
sure that Millian philosophy has still contemporary value? What if some of the 
foundations of Mill’s political thought have become deeply flawed after the social and 
economic transformations occurred during the last one hundred and fifty years? 
Secondly, I will address a specific issue, that is that of European federalism: would 
Millian philosophy support or oppose the existence of common European institutions 
and an European federal project? 
The first question arises if one considers the strong connection between liberty, 
happiness and political institutions in Mill’s philosophy. One of the aims of a democratic 
government is to preserve and to enhance liberty – in the previous pages we have seen 
how this works, and how this is linked with the utilitarian goal of the greatest happiness 
of the greatest number. However, what if, under different social and economic 
conditions, liberty is no longer the privileged means through which achieve happiness? 
Would a political system protecting liberty receive a blow from such a change in the 
structures of society?  
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The idea on which Mill’s thought lies is that happiness follows from liberty: individuals 
can freely express themselves in society and adopt different lifestyles, and this leads, 
eventually, to self-improvement, to achievements in the search for truth (or truths), and 
to the acknowledgement of higher pleasures – a progressive process of education in 
which political participation, as we have seen earlier in this thesis, has an important role.  
However, this philosophical and political construction may lose its validity if this 
connection between liberty and happiness would become invalid, in the sense that the 
latter would no longer be able to follow from freedom but, actually, be somehow in 
contrast with it. Social, economic, technological and political changes may have, indeed, 
somehow made freedom a condition for uncontrolled frenzy, social isolation, economic 
exploitation, rather than a means for personal satisfaction. In assessing Mill’s political 
theory in contemporary society or, at least, in a general and ideal type of what 
contemporary society in economically and technologically advanced countries may be 
or may turn out realistically to be, would Mill’s theory resist not only a reality check, but 
also the theoretical check of the main concepts from which his theories on politics and 
society stem?  
We may consider, for the sake of the argument, a contemporary theoretical and 
sociological elaboration (Zygmunt Bauman’s theory of ‘liquidity’) suggesting, amongst 
the other things, that, nowadays, the wide range of opportunities offered to each 
individual leads to the unintended consequence of a perennial state of lack of 
satisfaction, of substantial unhappiness74. Bauman 2000 (2012) provides a description 
 
74 What is liquidity? Liquidity is metaphorical liquefaction of what is solid; it is a typically 
modern concept, a typically modern activity of change and elimination of old social and 
political incrustations, of the old regime, of old solids, to replace them with new and better 
‘solids’ (Bauman, 2000 (2012), pp. 1-3). An example of this process is the abolition of the old 
feudal privileges in revolutionary France, and, later, the whole process of dissolution of the 
estates, of institutional and political systems, of moral chains, of established beliefs, etc. 
which could have potentially limited individual freedom (p. 5). What was, at least in the 
intentions of its supporters, a process of emancipation, revealed itself to be a reallocation of 
loose powers waiting for a new solid arrangement (pp. 6-7), and as individuals had pulled 
themselves out (or had been pulled out) by the order and by the conventions and rules of 
the estates, they found themselves in new social-political groups, for example in social 
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of the social transformation regarding emancipation, individuality, time and space, 
work, and community. In each of these fields of human existence, liquidity is manifested 
in many forms; in general, liquidity or fluidity are used as “fitting metaphors when we 
wish to grasp the nature of the present, in many ways novel, phase in the history of 
modernity” (p. 2). Bauman’s description of a socially disintegrating modern society 
entails a substantial dissolution of individual’s ability to affect economic, social and 
political structure; the subsequent damage to the ability to build and preserve a 
network of individual and social connections gives way to new tools of power and to 
new forms of fragility of the individual (p. 14). The place of each person in society 
becomes volatile, tasks are ever-changing and, possibly, increasingly demanding, 
capitals flow freely and power – including political power – is no longer bound to a 
single, territorial entity, and, finally, we are facing “melting powers” (p. 6). Although the 
claim that “power has become truly extraterritorial” (p. 11) might be open to debate, 
some events in recent years may surely lead to infer that power has somehow become, 
at least partly, supranational or international.  
John Stuart Mill’s world, instead, was a world of nation-states, of imperial powers and 
of colonies and possessions. The parliament in London had effective power over all 
Britain and all the British possessions. Political powers today are scattered across 
different political institutions, all interrelated with each other and binding other states, 
governments and parliaments settled in a different territory; this may lead us to 
question how effective Mill’s political proposal may be in today’s world. It is a problem 
of efficacy, at first, and, secondly, it is a problem of representation. More in general, it is 
about making political institutions serve their purpose: progress and improvement.  
Today, Bauman writes, the individual acts and lives in this global and liquid totality in 
which global codes, rules and patterns are dissolving into a whole with which to 
compare and to which possibly comply. What is lacking is the process of solidification, 
i.e., when these patterns and codes of conduct are in liquefaction, they do not re-convert 
 
classes, with all that this implies in terms of political significance, living conditions, social 
rules and choices, inter-individual relationships to which comply (or with respect to which 
to choose to comply or not) and so on. The liquidity of our era brings us, rather, to lose sight 
of these social as well as existential references, and puts us in the frame of a global totality 
that we face solely as individuals (p.7). 
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themselves in solid form as it was in intent and as it has happened in the past, and they 
rather keep the "fluid" form, which requires careful and constant vigilance. As for the 
human condition, the process of re-stabilization of the fluid is not taking place, and 
actually another, different process occurs, bringing about disintegration of social 
networks, and collective action becomes less and less powerful because the level of 
commitment to civic, social, political, public causes is reduced. The relations between 
the individual and the whole get very fluid from social, economic, political points of view. 
All this leads to social disintegration, which is not only a state, but it is also a new 
technique of power: escaping from the political arena and from engagement in tackling 
social problems is also a way to defend oneself.  
Such interpretation of the current world may be, of course, an object of discussion and 
criticism. It may even be discarded or deemed implausible. However, this description of 
modernity may come useful in assessing the possible relevance of Mill’s political ideas, 
or at least to suggest further areas of investigation, in order to provide a place of testing 
for some philosophical and political ideas. It is like having a stage on which our actors 
(i.e. the aforementioned philosophical and political ideas) try to find their place, have a 
casting and prove themselves worth for a specific play. So, as this section also aims to 
provide some suggestions for further research, I would say there are two ways to 
approach this attempt: a more critical way, in which we criticise a sociological 
description of reality which do not exactly fit our philosophical and political purposes, 
or another one, in which we assume the context and then exercise and corroborate our 
theories. In this context of ‘dissolving’ forms and of new social norms or standards, we 
can try to figure out how to adapt the tools of Millian democracy, because this kind of 
world (or at least: this kind of analysis of the world today) touches concepts such as 
emancipation and individual liberty, and we know that, for example, the development 
of the individual is an important element in Mill’s moral, social, and political thought, 
and that, for example, Mill advocates “emancipation” from unnecessary custom (On 
Liberty, CW XVIII, p. 272). Furthermore, supra in this thesis the importance of the 
intellectual as a catalyst of rational factors in a representative democracy is pointed out, 
but if we have a much more liquid society, in which social networks are getting shabby 
and irrational forces appear stronger, we must address the issue regarding how the 
intellectual in parliament, in politics, in society can intervene.  
Here the intention is to show possible open issues, and a reflection may stem from this, 
in terms of individuality and of its development in a possible contemporary form of 
Millian democracy, challenging the liquid status of modernity and contrasting non-
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liberal tendencies: while in Mill’s political and philosophical thought there is a sort of 
linear connection between liberty and happiness (thanks to liberty, we may reach 
pleasure, according to the utilitarian principles), in the world described by Bauman, 
instead, this connection fails to exist, and, actually, one can have either liberty or 
satisfaction of a specific pleasure. This is a world, Bauman writes, where the pursuit of 
pleasure and happiness is deeply endangered, both in his moral and individual aspects 
(which I consider here in the way they are described in Mill’s On Liberty), and at a social 
and political level: if the link between freedom and happiness is eliminated, we get rid 
of a constitutive element of the Millian political system as well as of the related set of 
moral values. This is problematic at the very least.  
In Mill’s political proposal there are (or there should be, at least) people that, thanks to 
reason and to rational and informed debate in society and parliament, elevate the level 
of discussion and have a role of catalysis of rational elements. Among the other things, 
Mill’s political system aims to multiply these people’s influence. A Millian intellectual 
living in a liquid society must act within social and political structures that have been 
put in danger by virtue of that pursuit of happiness whose unity, linearity and causality 
with respect to liberty might be missing in today’s context. If happiness no longer 
follows freedom, there certainly is a problem for any Millian intellectual. This is clear 
when we read Bauman on what he calls the “mixed blessings” of freedom 75 .: 
emancipation may be a good thing or a harm, a curse. Why does he say so? Are ordinary 
people prepared to operate with their own freedoom? Bauman states that relying on 
one’s own resources also means relying on one’s own decisions, and then indecision, 
 
75 From now on, some space will be dedicated to the description of Bauman’s concept of 
liquidity. The reader may interrogate himself on why such a long descriptive part has been 
included here, and this note tries to explain this, even if it may even sound as a sort of 
excusatio non petita. The point is that Bauman’s sociological work is so distant and different 
from the rest of the material used in this thesis (methodologically, by subject and, with 
respect to part of the bibliography, even chronologically) that I am under the feeling that the 
reader, perhaps, may not be entirely acquainted with it. As Bauman’s sociological views are 
useful, in relation to this thesis’ purposes, for a number of reasons (it provides a context, a 
stage, for testing Millian theory; it is relevant as it provides insightful reflections on the links 
between liberty and happiness), perhaps a short descriptive section may not totally be out 
of place. 
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the weight of making decisions, the following torment, the fear of risk and the possible 
following failure may come, without even the possibility of appeal in some cases - and 
this is a problematic aspect of freedom. On the other hand, routine tasks can be a force 
contrasting with the process of liberation – but, actually, they may also provide a 
protective sense or role if compared to the bewilderment that emancipation can bring 
about. If we imagine a life made of constant decisions without routine, Bauman says, we 
see that it is a life, a way of life that lacks the time to reflect on actions and decisions, 
and routine reveals itself to be a protective element with respect to sudden impulsive 
decisions and to the continuous rush in this kind of society. In other words, what occurs 
here is “the collapse of long-term thinking, planning and acting, and the disappearance 
or weakening of social structures” which “leads to a splicing of both political history and 
individual lives into a series of short-term projects and episodes which are in principle 
infinite, and do not combine into the kinds of sequences to which concepts like 
‘development’, ‘maturation’, ‘career’ or ‘progress’ (all suggesting a preordained order of 
succession) could be meaningfully applied” (Bauman, 2007, p. 3). Moreover, 
contemporary Western society has generally given hospitality to, and sometimes even 
promoted, criticism and freedom of expression, but it has also accommodated critical 
thinking and subsequent actions, immunizing potential consequences with respect to 
social and political decision-making processes and their effects (Bauman, 2000 (2012), 
p. 23).  
Modern world has no power centres that restrict individual freedom and exercise 
capillary control on social relations, Bauman affirms. What we have is a world without 
control towers, without centres of command, where there is no focal power to 
implement oppression on individual freedom, and it is a context in which, however, the 
freedom of individuals undergoes some other type of problems: a world like this is 
dangerous for the individual because it abundantly challenges the individual himself or 
herself.  The latest society developments have brought us into “light capitalism” (p. 59), 
a kind of economic and social organisation of work loosely comparable to a flying plane 
whose flight deck is empty, and there are an autopilot and no way to know precise 
information about the direction, while in previous stages of capitalism, such as Fordism, 
for instance, the organisation of society was based precisely on conceptions of heavy 
type, solid - solid in the human conception of the world order given by practice and in 
terms of visual and material experiences given by big factories, big machinery, big 
industries, huge labour forces, and above all a rather fixed and rigid life from a 
professional point of view and from that of the division of professions, in a sort of line 
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or chain between top managers, intermediate employees, the labour force, output 
consumers and so on.  
What has happened, according to Bauman, is that decision-making centres have 
undergone a process of dissolution and under these new circumstances it is no longer 
clear what the underlying processes in decision-making are, but also what the 
objectives, goals, targets to reach are, so now it is up to the individual “to find out what 
she or he is capable of doing, to stretch that capacity to the utmost, and to pick the ends 
to which that capacity could be applied best – that is, to the greatest conceivable 
satisfaction” (p. 63); it is up to the individual, then, to discover his ability, the kind if 
satisfaction he seeks to obtain, and the best and the more he can achieve in a context of 
almost endless possibilities, within a state of unfinished-ness associated with risk and 
anxiety, whose opposite, however, “(t)he state of unfinishedness, incompleteness and 
underdetermination is full of risk and anxiety; but its opposite brings no unadultered 
pleasure either, since it forecloses what freedom needs to stay open” (p. 62).  
In the midst of endless possibilities, one may have, on the one hand, the illusion and the 
pleasure of having the opportunity to potentially achieve anything or almost anything, 
but one may also feel, on the other hand, the bitterness of the fact that we find ourselves 
in an endless game, where achieving a goal means losing freedom, because by finally 
reaching a goal one leaves the the world of endless choices. This precludes the 
achievement of fully and completely satisfactory objectives; if a satisfactory choice is 
made, freedom is then barred (p. 63), and the existence of many authorities is 
tantamount to the existence of basically none (pp. 63-64), and what these social, 
economic, political, legal, commercial authorities try to do is seducing, convincing, but 
not commanding anymore. So, their leadership role fails and leaves room to those who 
tell us directly and trivially how to, how to be in a certain way or how to do something 
in the form of manuals or textbooks, and brings us back to understand what our role is 
in public sphere.  
On the one hand, these changes lead men to seek examples (not leaders stricto sensu) 
and opinion leaders, on the other hand looking for these examples become almost an 
addiction because  
a) what one does is only his or her own responsibility in a continuous and hectic 
run;  
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b) there is no more a stable, rigid chain of command and decision-making 
regarding the goals; 
c) there is no more leadership or point of reference for any specific social body. 
A relevant thing in our test of Mill’s democratic principles in today’s world is related to 
the possibility of a separation between freedom and happiness (or satisfaction) due to 
social and economic factors:  
 if one is satisfied and achieves pleasure, he loses his freedom because he 
has reached his goal and then stops 
 on the other hand, preserving freedom leads to a compulsive search as 
consumers and to further lack of satisfaction.  
Bauman emphasises the role of the consumer in a race where the finish line is 
increasingly remote or less delineated, in a sort of never-ending compulsive run (p. 72). 
The broader freedom is, the more powerful temptations are, the more we will have a 
sense of impoverishment of ourselves relatively to what is at our disposal, and thus 
desire, will and power of choice will increase. The more choices the rich will seem to 
have, the less sustainable a life without choices will be, and so on, and the kind of 
freedom that our society has elevated to the highest rank has a far more devastating 
effect on passers-by than on those for whom it apparently seems to be devised, i.e. those 
who have means and resources.  
So, if this is a strongly interconnected world, traditional political and economic centres 
of power have lost their authority; at the same time, ‘liquid’ supranational social 
dynamics have gained strength and influence over the individuals’ lives and national 
political institutions, and a Millian political theoretical construction may be argued 
against as happiness and liberty have started following two different paths. This may 
prove to be a problematic point for a Millian philosopher. 
VII.II. NATIONALISM, COSMOPOLITANISM, EUROPEAN 
FEDERALISM 
if we focus on political institutions in themselves, we may find useful Mill’s ideas in 
assessing today’s democracy in an international context. Previously in this work, while 
touching upon the notion of technocrat and introducing the idea of a political expertise 
within a democratic pattern, I have mentioned the formation in the recent years of 
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technocratic governments in Greece and in Italy: the boundaries between national 
competences and sovereignty, and supranational bodies have been waning in favour of 
the latter, as many non-national institutions have been involved in discussing, planning, 
implementing and checking specific social, economic, fiscal and monetary policies76. 
Hence, at which level democratic government should be established? Can there be 
supranational governments in a Millian world? Have democrats a sort of moral duty to 
act with a cosmopolitan outlook, in order to make democratic institutions more and 
more beneficial to mankind? Varouxakis’ research (Varouxakis, 2002; Urbinati and 
Zakaras (eds.), 2007, pp. 277-297) on John Stuart Mill’s take on nationality shines a light 
on some aspects of concepts such as nationhood, nationalism, patriotism, 
cosmopolitanism, self-determination, national character and race and might help in at 
least partially and initially answering these questions. 
As for the link between liberal tradition (to which Mill belongs), mainly with reference 
to XIX century thinkers, and nationalism, Varouxakis shows that an ‘historical’ 
justification of the interpretations according to which nationalism and liberalism are 
somehow interconnected – a justification which claims there has been a longstanding 
tradition of liberal thinkers supportive, in a way, of some versions of nationalism, or at 
least substantially sympathetic with the national causes of their time – is not 
maintainable (Varouxakis, 2002, pp. 26-37): most of these thinkers (Constant, Mill, 
Tocqueville, for instance) have “different attitudes towards nationalism or patriotism, 
could still be in fundamental disagreement about the ways in which it was permissible 
or advisable to pursue the aims they are supposed to have shared” (p. 37) and, therefore, 
cannot be included in the same category of what may be defined ‘liberal nationalism’.  
Conclusions may be drawn upon Mill’s writings as regards race too, Varouxakis’ study 
shows. In Victorian Britain discussion over national character is inextricably associated 
 
76 Out of topic, a note on these remarks: these examples are not meant to imply that non-
national powers are undemocratic and, rather, simply technocratic. Au contraire, probably 
the institution most resembling Mill’s project of legislative assembly is the European 
Parliament. The point is that different and farther and farther levels of decision overlap each 
other and they cannot be held accountable or, if they can, it is in a way we are not accustomed 
to, and decisions are more and more inextricably connected with other decisions taken 
somewhere else. 
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with the idea of race (sometimes even used to mean what we today call culture): in fact, 
the reason for which, according to Varouxakis, some have misinterpreted Mill’s views 
on the subject, is that in XIX century the term ‘race’ was used quite loosely with 
reference to both natural, social and cultural traits, while, as Varouxakis has stressed, 
Mill distinguishes race in the biological sense from the notion of national character. In 
his work, after discussing and criticising scholars who claim that Mill confuses these two 
concepts, Varouxakis turns his attention to Mill’s review of Jules Michelet’s Histoire de 
France (Michelet’s History of France, CW XX, pp. 217-256), in which the English 
philosopher argues that the French historian had gone too far in attributing to race the 
differences between the German and the Gauls as regards their personal devotedness 
to the others (Varouxakis, 2002, pp. 42-43). Indeed, “Mill was in the forefront of 
attempts to discredit the deterministic implications of social theories and assert the 
ascendancy of “mind over matter”“ (p. 53). Four years later (the review of the Histoire 
de France is published in 1844), Mill makes strong remarks on this topic in his Principles 
of Political Economy: 
Of all vulgar modes of escaping from the consideration of the effect of social 
and moral influences on the human mind, the most vulgar is that of 
attributing the diversities of conduct and character to inherent natural 
differences. (Principles of Political Economy, CW II, p. 319)  
In a letter to Charles Dupont-White (6 April 1860, CW XV, pp. 690-692), Mill just admits 
a vague influence of racial factors on the formation of the national character, adding, 
anyway, as he already said in the review of the Histoire de France, that racial 
predisposition could be modified through a number of circumstances. Another proof of 
this attitude is his attack against Carlyle for having maintained the negroes are servants 
and the whites born wiser (The Negro Question, CW XXI, pp. 85-96). In the same writing, 
Mill highlights that the civilised people of the ancient Egypt belonged to the “negro race” 
(p. 93) and that the reason for contemporary Irish failings was mostly due to English 
misgovernment. Inspired by these references, as regards Mill and his projects of 
political reform and his moral views, Varouxakis writes: 
His deliberate effort to concede as little importance to race and other 
physical factors, even at the risk of being – as he actually was – exposed to 
the criticism that he was not sufficiently scientific, was the result of a strong 
determination to stand by certain assumptions about rationality and 
capacity for improvement that were dear to him (Varouxakis, 2002, p. 52) 
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Having said this about Mill’s take on race, we should not forget that Mill wrote 
extensively on the matter of national character, as described earlier in this work. 
However, what about the nation-state in itself? What about democratic and liberal 
issues on the world political stage? Now, we should go back for a moment to Bauman in 
order to introduce an example of how the concepts just mentioned, along with others, 
may help us to reproduce and represent Millian liberalism in the face of current political 
issues.  
We have seen that the sense of disorder produced by our actions and by the new social 
and political order produce irrational reactions and feelings, namely fear (Bauman, 
2007, p. 9). State institutions have withdrawn with respect to the individual, who is, 
then, one more time deprived of a collective dimension; we should not either forget the 
other process of withdrawal, the one from political participation as a way to defend 
oneself in a disintegrating or liquefying world. In such an open – too open – society, 
everything has a global dimension, and everyone gets more and more vulnerable, and 
here fear arises (for instance, security and safety concerns), people change their 
attitudes and their activities in order to react to such fear, and then a further problem 
follows, i.e. “that these activities reaffirm and help produce the sense of disorder that 
our actions are aimed at preventing” (p. 9), as every pre-emptive or defensive action 
gives manifest visibility to the fear it intends to fight, and so fear becomes a daily routine. 
Furthermore, a gradual detachment between power and states, because, at first, from a 
social and economic point of view, flexibility and loosening of social protection 
networks have substituted the presence of the state occurs; secondly, because safety is 
no more an individual issue or an issue restricted to a small group, but a world issue 
(see the war on terrorism, for instance); third, more in general, every issue is now a 
global issue which cannot usually be, for a number of reasons, tackled by a single nation-
state. “Society is no longer protected by the state” (p. 25), and, moreover: 
On a negatively globalized planet, all the most fundamental problems – the 
metaproblems conditioning the tackling of all other problems – are global, 
and being global they admit of no local solutions (…). The reunion of power 
and politics may be achieved, if at all, at the planetary level (pp. 25-26).  
In this sense, the challenge for the re-constitution of a state form, probably in the 
supranational sense (since at the national level it has failed or, at least, is currently 
heavily challenged), might seemingly be the task for new attempts of political 
democratic representation. The other way could be the restoration of the old order; 
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however, the current order guarantees individual freedom. The main issue, as remarked 
earlier, is actually the decoupling of freedom and happiness – and how can we achieve 
happiness in its highest forms if it is not free activities which lead us to it? From a Millian 
point of view, freedom is structurally inherent to happiness; if social and political 
structures make us use our freedom in a sense which does not lead to happiness, there 
is a problem, and, perhaps, a solution (admitting there is one and not excluding other 
possibilities) should be reuniting freedom and happiness. If the nation-state has failed, 
if power has moved somewhere else – and in Bauman’s world, it has moved upwards 
and outwards and now exists at a supranational and non-national level – and if many 
social, political, economic activities are getting global, the challenge, at least partially, 
perhaps currently regards the construction of proper supranational institutions. With a 
closer look to current political problems, for example, one may also use Mill’s 
philosophy in an attempt to approach specifically these sorts of constitutional issues. 
For instance, let us consider the problems today affecting Europe, its common 
institutions and the case for or against European federalism77. 
It has been suggested that in Mill’s works Bentham, On Liberty and Utilitarianism there 
is a view according to which we are Europeans because we are not one and European 
greatness stems from cultural and national diversities across the continent and that the 
danger of stationariness (in Mill’s own words, see De Tocqueville on Democracy in 
America (II), CW XVIII, p. 188) comes from uniformity of thought (Glendenning, 2013). 
However, if we go and look at CRG, we may find further hints on why federalists (for 
instance, European federalists) should consider a plurality of nationalities as positive 
and how a proper federation should be built. 
As for the ideas of nation, patriotism, federalism, etc., a couple of chapters in CRG show 
Mill’s position. Chapter XVI deals with the topic of nationality in relation to the idea of a 
free and representative government. Mill states that the feeling of nationality may be 
caused by various elements. Factors such as “race and descent”, religion, language and 
geographical boundaries matter, but political identity and a common national history 
 
77  The considerations on John Stuart Mill’s take on nationality and federalism hereafter 
illustrated have already been published, in an earlier and slightly different version, on the 
London School of Economics’ website EUROPP – European Politics and Policy (see Morricone, 
2013). 
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often are far more relevant (CRG, CW XIX, pp. 546-547). However, none of these factors 
is either necessary or sufficient by itself. Indeed, as in the case of Belgium or Switzerland, 
different nationalities may seem to be under the same government, but are, in fact, a 
single nationality because of their shared political history. 
Although Mill thinks, as a general rule, that free institutions are only possible in a 
country constituted of a single nationality, he leaves room for the possibility of a sort of 
multinational state. The first reason he gives for this is merely practical and 
geographical, because, “there are parts even in Europe, in which different nationalities 
are so locally intermingled, that it is not practicable to be under separate government” 
(pp. 548-549). Contemporaneous examples would have been Hungary or Eastern 
Prussia. The second reason derives from the proposition that different populations live 
at different stages of evolution, so for some nationalities it may be beneficial to be 
absorbed by another, more advanced, nation (according to Mill, this was the case for the 
Bretons and the Basques under the French dominion and the assimilation of Scotland 
and Wales to a common British kingdom). 
Although the idea of different stages of civilisation may seem slightly anachronistic 
today, we can understand its meaning in the context of Mill’s entire philosophy, 
according to which free and rational debate and the liberty to experience and pursue 
different lifestyles are intellectually, morally and socially advantageous to individuals 
and to humanity as a whole. In this sense, Mill’s philosophy is progressive (Mill is liberal 
and utilitarian, and generally both liberalism and utilitarianism are forms of 
progressivism78), where progress is the beneficial social outcome of mutual discussion. 
In his own words: 
Whatever really tends to the admixture of nationalities, and the blending of 
their attributes and peculiarities in a common union, is a benefit to the 
human race. Not by extinguishing types, of which, in these cases, sufficient 
examples are sure to remain, but by softening their extreme forms, and 
filling up the intervals between them. (p. 549)  
 
78 See supra, pp. 17-27. 
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There are two ways to achieve this goal, according to Mill. One is the authoritarian rule 
by advanced nations over less civilised ones which, in the long run, would turn itself into 
a free government with all nations treated as equal, as they progressively become 
equally civilised, while the other is a federation of free states. As for this, Mill gives three 
conditions under which a federal government is possible: a mutual sympathy among the 
populations, as well as a community of interest; member states must not be so powerful 
as to rely solely on their individual strength; and there must not be a marked inequality 
among the member states. In chapter XVII of CRG, after having discussed the way the 
American institutional model works, Mill affirms: “When the conditions exist for the 
formation of efficient and durable Federal Unions, the multiplication of them is always 
a benefit to the world” (p. 559), because they make the weaker stronger, and they 
prevent aggressive and petty policies and wars, while fostering trade and mutual 
cooperation. 
He concludes stressing the fact that under a central government (that is, a closer union 
than a federal one) constitutional provisions have to be set in order to protect national 
differences. Put in context, this precise remark apparently seems to imply that excessive 
centralisation is a danger, as it may lead to involuntary assimilation, while a well-
functioning federal system would not really pose such a threat (p. 561). 
What might a ‘Millian’ European federalist conclude from this? Yes, it is true that 
national peculiarities, as well as individual ones, have to be preserved and protected. 
However, their blending is not necessarily an evil and, actually, it might prove itself 
beneficial for the peoples of Europe. The lack of language uniformity is very likely a 
hindrance for a common European sentiment. Study and work experiences abroad 
would very probably boost the sense of a sort of European common citizenship – in 
order to create, in the long run, something similar to an ‘admixture of nationalities’. 
However, something else is necessary for a European federation to be a success. In the 
first instance, it is not enough that nations be equal under the law and the treaties. 
Citizens too must feel that even small or less wealthy nations are treated equally under 
rules which are beneficial to every country. National governments would have to act in 
order to achieve mutual benefit in the spirit of cooperation – not just in order to pursue 
the national interest. A common political identity would also be required for such a 
federation. 
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When Mill stresses the importance of national history and identity of political 
antecedents, he talks of “collective pride and humiliation, pleasure and regret, 
connected with the same incidents in the past” (p. 546). From this perspective, 
European federalists would have to work hard in order to manage to build a common 
history and the feeling of a single polity – not to create a single European nationality, 
but a common identity. This would reduce the sense of internal competition among 
countries in the EU and the lack of more direct democratic accountability and increase 
the feeling of a common political enterprise. 
Stemming from this, when we deal with the concept of supranationalism or even 
cosmopolitanism, investigating the prima facie opposite notions of patriotism and 
nationalism may be relevant. If the national states’ power is for any reason declining, 
the relevance of foreign relations might somehow be affected by it. On the other side, 
cosmopolitan citizenship could still be a usable tool in a world where barriers fall and 
everything is fluid – and in a work as the present, where I am trying a sort of first, though 
partial, assessment of Millan democratic theories in a postmodern world, Varouxakis’s 
works are of great help. 
Varouxakis’ study shows that patriotism is, according to Mill, a proof of the possibility 
of training human beings in order to make them devote themselves to the cause of the 
good of a larger group – be it the fatherland or mankind as a whole (Varouxakis, 2002, 
pp. 111-115). However, cosmopolitanism and patriotism may often be seen as 
antagonistic. The point Varouxakis makes with reference to such apparent 
contradiction is that Mill has in mind an “enlightened patriotism”, i.e. “a strong sense of 
cohesion and solidarity among its members in order for it to be stable, but that it should 
by no means take the form of ‘nationality in the vulgar sense’” (Varouxakis, in Urbinati 
and Zarakas (eds.), p. 286). Mill’s conception of cosmopolitanism “tried to orientate the 
“national mind” itself to a cosmopolitan outlook, rather than to detach individuals from 
their nation-bound lives” (Varouxakis, 2002, p. 123). One may be induced to love 
mankind either directly or through the means and the incentives of the pursuit of the 
national good, a principle of nationality which is not 
a senseless antipathy to foreigners; indifference to the general welfare of 
the human race, or an unjust preference of the supposed interests of our 
own country; a cherishing of bad peculiarities because they are national, or 
a refusal to adopt what has been found good by other countries. We mean 
a principle of sympathy, not of hostility; of union, not of separation. We 
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mean a feeling of common interest among those who live under the same 
government, and are contained within the same natural or historical 
boundaries. We mean, that one part of the community do not consider 
themselves as foreigners with regard to another part; that they set a value 
on their connexion - feel that they are one people, that their lot is cast 
together, that evil to any of their fellow-countrymen is evil to themselves, 
and do not desire selfishly to free themselves from their share of any 
common inconvenience by severing the connexion. (System of Logic, CW 
VIII, 923; Coleridge, CW X, pp. 135-136) 
Varouxakis introduces, then, the notion of “cosmopolitan patriotism” (Varouxakis, in 
Urbinati and Zakaras (eds.), p. 286), compatible with both a sort of ‘principle of cohesion’ 
and a cosmopolitan commitment: 
It is ‘patriotism’ (as opposed to ‘nationalism’) to the extent that mill was 
very wary of the implications of nationalist sentiment and the tribalism that 
it could entail and preferred to promote ‘a strong and active principle of 
cohesion among the members of the same community or state’. Now, this 
patriotism is ‘cosmopolitan’ in that he consistently defined it in such a way 
as to equate it with an outward-looking noble emulation among different 
human communities (‘nations’ or other) of achievements that would 
promote the welfare and civilisation of the whole mankind. Moreover, the 
criteria through which such achievements would be judged, the language 
that would be used, the arguments that would be appealed to, would have 
to be impartial and, to that extent, cosmopolitan. (p. 295) 
What Mill tries to do, in other words, is to turn the course of the nation towards policies 
good for humanity at large, and not just for the national community, even using national 
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pride as leverage for accomplishing this cosmopolitan task (Varouxakis, 2002, pp. 123-
125; Varouxakis, in Urbinati and Zakaras (eds.), 2007, p. 296)79. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
79 We are still in a liberal pattern, however. What if we turn away from the Millian liberal 
option and try to opt for a communitarian one? Bauman may still provide us a useful 
sociological framework. In a communitarian case, and with respect to the notions of 
nationalism and patriotism, he says we may find small differences between the two: in a 
community imagined along ethnic lines, they are mainly rhetorical, at least conceptually, as 
“there are reasons to conclude that there is little else to distinguish between nationalism 
and patriotism, except our enthusiasm for their manifestations or its absence or the degree 
of shame-facedness or guilty conscience with which we admit or deny them” (Bauman, 2000 
(2012), pp. 174-175), but show differences in their concrete application in the form of policy, 
as patriotism is almost “anthropophagic” (p. 175) in his attempt to include people, while 
nationalism aims to split from us those who are unfit to be us (p. 176). So, a communitarian 
solution, with respect to the idea of nation or of patria, is a bit contradictory, as communities 
exist only because of their internal harmony and the exclusion of what is different; either 
one bows to the communal unity, or becomes an enemy to be expelled: “The inner harmony 
of the communal world shines and glitters against the background of the obscure and 
tangled jungle which starts on the other side of the turnpike (…) In Jock Young’s words, ‘The 
desire to demonize others is based on the ontological uncertainties’ of those inside. An 
‘inclusive community’ would be a contradiction in terms. Communal fraternity would be 
incomplete, perhaps unthinkable but certainly unviable, without inborn fratricidal 
inclination” (p. 172). Under some aspects, according to Bauman, it may be plausible to claim 
that nation-states have been a kind of success story in the history of political entities based 
on ethnic unity, but, however, comparisons between them and communitarian polities 
cannot be traced, as nation-states have been suppressing, in many occasions, their internal 
contradictions, i.e. “self-asserting communities”, and promoting a national Kulturkämpf (p. 
173), rather than assimilating or expelling them. Hence, even in an historically successful 
case – successful because it has been able to establish itself as a political entity in a solid 
form – the problem of the existence of differences and of alternative, non-standard, 
individualities and cultures still exists. 
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VII. CONCLUSIONS 
This work has tried to outline a model of democracy drawing upon John Stuart Mill’s 
CRG. After a brief introduction, this thesis has expounded some features of the utilitarian 
political thought, introducing the main arguments from Mill’s Utilitarianism and the 
importance of the ideas of progress and equality in the utilitarian moral and political 
thought: happiness is the end of moral decisions and political actions, and everyone’s 
happiness matters.  
Chapter II, indeed, has provided a description of the assumptions which lie under John 
Stuart Mill’s political philosophy and assessed the political-philosophical relevance of 
utilitarian ethics in relation to the concepts of progress and equality: in this chapter I 
argued that in order to reconcile these two concepts, which are not obviously consistent 
one with the other, within a sort of utilitarian pattern, a Millian political system would 
need to devise institutions promoting general happiness, protecting individual 
autonomy and different lifestyles, and safeguarding society from mediocrity. Here I 
rejected Semmel’s interpretation of Mill, which quite clearly overstates some sources of 
influence on Mill’s thought, but dismisses Mill’s own words in Utilitarianism and in his 
Autobiography as regards the link between the utilitarian principle and virtue. Romantic 
sources, such as Coleridge and Carlyle, have influenced Mill, but interpretations 
claiming he departed so much from his initial Benthamism that he became an advocate 
of the pursuit of an unattached virtue rather than of happiness, really miss some 
important points, specifically the fact that his acceptance of some Romantic or elitist 
ideas should not be overstated. 
In chapter III, education was the subject of study, specifically Mill’s idea of education, 
presented under two perspectives: the definition of education at large, “taken in its 
broadest sense – education in a cultural, intellectual, moral sense”80, and its political 
implications. In Mill, there is a very complex idea of what education is, and his main 
concerns are addressed towards the creation of rational spirits able to exercise proper 
and rational criticism. I have shown several authors’ accounts on Mill and liberty (Isaiah 
Berlin, J. C. Rees, Alan Ryan, Joseph Hamburger, etc.) and touched upon James Mill’s 
 
80 See supra, p. 30. 
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theory of education and Coleridge’s influence on John Stuart Mill in order to stress the 
importance of the rational discourse both in ethics and in politics, and the strong links 
between education, freedom, political institutions and society. I have concluded the 
chapter with a section criticising Richard Arneson’s interpretation according to which 
CRG and On Liberty are substantially inconsistent and a strong paternalistic element 
underlies in Mill’s philosophy.  
This final criticism connects, in part, the concept of education to that of liberty, which is 
the main means towards progress of both the individual and mankind: thanks to liberty, 
the men of genius – and, in general, the rational aspects of most of the mankind – are 
stimulated, and improvement in the achievement of social, civic and political truths is 
brought about or, at least, followed through and sustained. The strong connection 
between education, individual flourishing, liberty, social improvements and critical 
thought lead to a connection between education and the political system – and Mill 
thinks representative democracy is the proper way to defend and promote proper 
education. I have argued, analysing both On Liberty and CRG, that both works are part 
of the same plan of social, moral and political reform. I also expounded on Coleridge’s 
influence on Mill: it is in part substantial and decisive, as it introduces the idea of a 
national endowment for education, as well as the idea of the opposition of forces in 
society. Coleridge, actually, takes also into consideration the need for a special class of 
cultivated people, while Carlyle (another source influencing Mill during the age of his 
rejection of Benthamism) proposes a leading role for the literary classes; in Mill these 
ideas take a different form and are substantially rejected; moreover, problems arise 
when it comes to competence in government and in public administration. In view of 
these aspects I analysed remarks by scholars such as Thompson and Arneson81.  
I have concluded the chapter stressing the fact that the role of the intellectuals is a role 
of support and influence within society at large. Discussion and confrontation – i.e. the 
use of those critical skills acquired by free, rational and well-educated minds – are the 
way towards both individual and social improvement, i.e. towards the ability to enjoy 
higher pleasures and the possibility of establishing a good government, i.e. a 
government which does not promote private and sinister interests. I also criticised 
 
81 Specifically, as the reader has probably noticed, a bit in contrast with Arneson’s view on 
Mill and paternalism, see supra, section III.V. 
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some aspects of Gregory Claeys’ work on Mill and paternalism, which overemphasises 
the “guiding role” of the intellectual class. In this chapter I also pointed out the fact that 
Joseph Hamburger basically does not take into due account Mill’s review of Guizot’s 
work: a careful reading of it would give us a different impression on Mill’s view on the 
stationary and transitional states of society. Hamburger maintains that what Mill aims 
for is a new natural or stationary state in which his version of the religion of humanity 
is spread and accepted; actually, what Mill’s reviews on Guizot suggest is that Mill 
supports antagonism of forces and opinions in society, and that, therefore, he wants to 
avoid the dominance of a single belief, or of a set of beliefs or opinions. As a consequence, 
claims about Mill’s sympathetic opinions on the establishment of a stationary state of 
society are exaggerated. 
At this stage of the argument, the problem of government needed further investigation 
– indeed, chapter IV has dealt with Mill’s democratic theory proper. In detail, its first 
section has provided a description of the methodology of the social sciences and of the 
philosophy of history as found in Mill’s System of Logic and in CRG, while the following 
sections have compared John Stuart Mill’s thought to his father’s Radical proposal and 
the subsequent reply by Thomas Macaulay. I also expounded at length the idea of 
tyranny of the majority, ‘borrowed’ by Mill from Alexis de Tocqueville and François 
Guizot. Chapter VI has also included some issues in political ethics in relation with CRG: 
for example, the marginal utility of vote, whether there are moral obligations for citizens 
as members of a polity organised according to the principles of representative 
democracy, and the role of intellectuals in such political structure. Millian democracy is 
a model which can, in particular, allow rational and well-informed citizens to be 
sufficiently influential in society thanks to the use of rational means: I described rational 
debate as an influence multiplier and Millian democracy as a system which tries to 
provide enough incentives for political and electoral participation of the intellectuals 
and of those who mostly behave rationally and competently. 
After the examination of Mill’s democracy, I turned my attention to the problem of 
political representation, and how it can be described in the light of (or subsumed under) 
one of the major contemporary works on the subject, Hannah Pitkin’s The Concept of 
Representation. Chapter V considers the topic of political representation in CRG’s 
chapter XII and in Mill’s other minor writings. At first, I introduced a possible general 
theory of political representation, as described in Pitkin’s work. Second, I gave a critical 
account of Richard Krouse and Nadia Urbinati’s interpretations. I concluded showing a 
Millian theory of political representation and that, in general, the higher is the degree of 
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complexity or need for expertise, the greater should be the influence of the principle of 
competence in assessing whether a representative should act as a trustee or a delegate. 
In chapter VI, I tried to raise some further issues about the compatibility between 
Millian democracy and the contemporary world. In this task, I used Zygmunt Bauman’s 
theory of liquid modernity in order to test Mill’s political and social philosophy today. I 
also made to case for European federalism using Mill’s CRG. 
More in general, in this work I have not just tried to condense John Stuart Mill’s complete 
system of political philosophy; instead, I have focused on the three aspects summarized 
above – education, democracy, representation – in an attempt to draw conclusions in 
the fields of political ethics and democratic theory, as well as in the analysis of the 
developments occurred in Mill’s mind as regards political theory and democracy. Each 
of these three concepts is strictly related to the others, and they altogether also involve 
other aspects of Mill’s philosophy such as logic, philosophy of the social sciences, 
philosophy of history and the idea of progress, ethics, etc.  So, what are the conclusions? 
Or, at least, which are the basic and fundamental ideas we may point out? 
The deployment of all the issues linked to representative government seems 
continuously and persistently to show the concern for a model of society which would 
foster a process that would let the individual develop accordingly to the criteria Mill 
outlines, e.g., in Utilitarianism and in On Liberty.  The strong connection between CRG 
and Mill’s previous works, and between the theory of government, on the one hand, and 
moral and social philosophy, on the other hand, in Mill’s system of thought is distinctly 
clear already to his contemporary reviewers (and not just because of the introductory 
statement at the beginning of CRG): e.g. the anonymous author of the review published 
in The Athenæum (Anonymous, 1861a) introduces his remarks outlining the similarity 
of the ideas expounded in CRG with those present in the Principles of Political Economy, 
in On Liberty and in the writings on parliamentary reform, claiming that “(t)he volume 
presents us so abundantly with the peculiarities of the writer, not only in respect to his 
known opinions, but in the very spirit that pervades the work, that no suppression of 
the name upon the title-page could have afforded a chance  of maintaining a mystery 
about its authorship” (p. 521); the same can be found in the review appeared on The 
Critic in the same year (Anonymous, 1861b), which confirms that “(m)any of the 
opinions advocated here are suggested or embodied in his great work on Political 
Economy and his essays on “liberty” and Parliamentary Reform” (p. 537); moreover, 
The Athenæeum reviewer describes Mill’s political proposal as a “connected system” 
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(Anonymous, 1861a), implying manifold aspects, the existence of checks and balance 
and of different powers and forces which are to be somehow balanced; furthermore, he 
underlines the distance from the Benthamite political project, as, with Jeremy Bentham, 
“so fundamental was the principle that the greater number should prevail, that students 
of his writings generally acquire a habit of regarding the majority, not only as a rightful 
sovereign but as a sovereign who “can do no wrong”“ (p. 521), while, with Mill, the 
feeling the reader receives is quite the opposite, a fear of ignoring the interests – and 
the opinion and the expertise – of the small number. 
Indeed, investigating the idea of Millian democracy requires an investigation of its 
background (not just of the partial rejection of Mill’s Benthamite roots), of parts of all 
the other systems of thought it entails (be they logic, ethics, social philosophy, 
methodology of the social sciences) and of its aims: at first, such investigation shows a 
theory of society conceived in its progressive development, the principle of utility as 
presented in Utilitarianism, the use of a specific type of scientific method in the field of 
social sciences, and the philosophical influences from Bentham, Tocqueville, Coleridge, 
Carlyle, Comte etc. In some cases, one may even dare to say that Mill’s system of political 
thought almost completely lacks originality – and that may even be deemed true, under 
some aspects. Indeed, it may be hard to locate the original contributions by Mill and 
what he just borrows from other thinkers. However, it is not the complete originality 
what may be considered noteworthy in this system, but, rather, the different concepts 
which are at play in outlining democratic representative institutions. Such as progress, 
justice, utility, education, liberty, moral development, etc.; the intricate project laid out 
in CRG is an attempt to meet the conditions set accordingly to what these concepts are. 
Furthermore, it is an individual-oriented political system, as the progress Mill seeks is 
mainly the progress or development (in utilitarian terms) of the individual. 
Although the focus is on the individual, Mill’s conception of government is installed as 
part of a progressive development of both social dynamics and the constitutional 
structures of the different forms of government: in fact, just as Comte maintained, 
society has a tendency to move from transient phases to stationary phases, and the 
development of forms of government, such as described by Mill, is proposed as a 
rational, progressive and gradual, although sometimes not linear, process in the course 
of history. However, a distinction has to be done between improvement and progress in 
Mill’s thought: the progressiveness of mankind has been the basis of ‘ethology’ and 
psychology, and the idea of progress has been borrowed from Comte’s sociology, while 
Mill’s debt towards Bentham is rather related to the idea of improvement (see Rosen, 
 183 
 
2013, pp. 44-46). Improvement (in relation to the individual) is not necessarily implied 
by progress (in relation to society), although a ‘general tendency’ towards a better state 
thanks to improvement exists. In this sense, societies may still be capable of progress, 
in the sense of moving into an age in which “the principal phenomena of society are 
different from what they were in the age preceding, and still more different from any 
previous age” (A System of Logic, CW VIII, p. 914), and, at the same time, active 
characters may be rendered ineffective in such a way to hinder the development of a 
proper democracy (and this would, in turn, make the flourishing of active characters 
more problematic).   
Mill’s case for representative democracy – which is also, as we have seen, a rational 
democracy - might appear, under some aspects, a bit atypical, at least if we take into 
consideration one of the other classical liberal justifications of representative 
government, i.e. the fact that modern states are too extended and that industrial 
societies do not leave time for political engagement or to any form of popular, 
continuous debate and self-rule. An example of this different, alternative view is 
Benjamin Constant’s theory of ancient and modern freedom.  
There are a few relevant theoretical contrasts, indeed, related to these two views which, 
in the end, still support quite the same form of organisation of the polity. What we may 
notice and conclude here is that in Millian democracy an expansion of the political space 
is sought, while in other liberal defences of democracy there is an inverse process. 
Constant, indeed, stresses the need for less political participation than that guaranteed 
by ancient liberty: he states that freedom of the ancients – in Sparta, in Rome and even 
in Athens - was based on active participation and constant collective power, while 
freedom of the moderns is based on peaceful enjoyment of private independence. The 
part that each had in the polity, in the process of political decision and in the exercise of 
power was not an abstract assumption. The will of each had a real and effective 
influence: the exercise of it was almost a pleasure, Constant says. “Perdu dans la 
multitude”, lost in the crowd, instead, the modern individual does not feel his influence 
as really effective (Constant, 1980, p. 501). The individual will may very likely never 
bring about real consequences on the whole; there is no evidence, in the eyes of an 
individual subject, of the effects of cooperation. The exercise of political rights now only 
offers a part of the enjoyments that the ancients possessed and, at the same time, the 
progress of civilisation, the commercial trend of the time, communication between 
peoples have multiplied and varied the means of endlessly private happiness. Individual 
independence is the first and foremost of modern needs (p. 506) because of the 
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particular nature of modern society and states, therefore, according to Constant, 
individual liberty is the real modern liberty, and political freedom guarantees it (p. 509).  
There are four causes, according to the French thinker, which make ancient and modern 
liberties so different: territorial dimensions, as Greek state-cities, for example, were 
much smaller than any modern nation; abolition of slavery, as thanks to slavery 
thousands and thousands of Athenians could find time to discuss and deliberate in the 
agora; commerce, which has taken the place which was occupied by war; individual 
independence and increased interest for private life, caused by commerce and by 
decline of war activities (pp. 499-500). Commerce, in particular, makes arbitrary 
actions on our existence more oppressive than in the past, because our speculations are 
more varied so that any oppressive force has somehow to ‘multiply’ itself in order to hit 
them; but commerce also makes the action of arbitrary power easier to elude, because 
it changes the nature of property making it more difficult to be seized by any 
authoritarian power. Commerce gives property a new quality, circulation: property 
without circulation is just a usufruct, since authority could at any time affect usufruct 
and would have the power to remove or hinder its enjoyment; but circulation poses an 
invisible and invincible obstacle to the actions of power. Furthermore, credit makes the 
authority dependent. Individual existence is so less incorporated in the political sphere. 
Individuals transfer their treasures and carry with them all the enjoyments of private 
life; trade has brought harmony among nations and influenced and made more similar 
their habits (p. 501).  
Since modern liberty – Constant says – is different from that of the ancients, it needs a 
different organisation, one in which the more the exercise of our political rights will 
leave us time for our private interests, the more freedom will be invaluable. So, even if 
we are still within a liberal and democratic (in the sense of representative democracy) 
pattern, there is a totally different attitude towards political participation. Of course, 
Mill’s case for political participation does not aim to foster presence in public life exactly 
as it was in ancient Greece; actually, it wanted better participation, i.e. participation of 
higher quality, where competence, sensible arguments, openness and support for the 
general good would have been increasingly brought into the political arena by skilled, 
rational and well-educated people; furthermore participation increases the quality of 
government, and a good government, which is a democracy supporting active 
characters, would have improved and somehow educated (non-paternalistically, at 
least in the strong sense) its citizens, which, in turn, would have found a renovated 
interest in the res publica, and so would have found favourable terrain for further 
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political participation, and so on. In few words, Mill is pro-participation. According to 
Constant, political participation is not bad per se, but it is just a way, at best, to protect 
our private liberty, or, at worst, a danger to the most precious of liberties, the individual, 
personal, one: whereas for Mill participating in political life means (I put it simply here) 
both to educate and to be educated, and taking part in an activity which, in the long term, 
will have improved society and its individuals and their ability to enjoy pleasures 
(higher pleasures, accordingly to the utilitarian system), according to Constant’s view 
on the liberty of the ancients and of the moderns political participation is not even 
valuable as a means, except in the few moments we exercise it when we are requested 
to participate in those activities fundamental to the functioning of representative 
democratic institutions. Yes, political freedom is important, but only as far as it grants 
our other basic liberties. Mill’s democratic theory expands individuals’ political 
activities and participation, while Constant’s view curbs them within narrower limits. 
The account given in this thesis is also substantially based on some specific criticism 
regarding some interpretations of Mill’s political and moral philosophy, and on what 
Mill says about individuality. We have seen, for instance, several scholars’ theories 
regarding Mill in paternalism, virtue and coercion:  
 Semmel provides a strong view of Mill as an advocate of virtue as good desirable 
in itself: this is an interpretation, as we have seen, that is problematic at the very 
least, because it goes against what Mill himself asserts in some of his major 
writings as regards the relation between virtue and happiness and the role of 
habit, desire and will; 
 we have also seen that Hamburger overlooks Mill’s review on Guizot, and that, 
therefore, this leads him to overstress Comte’s influence on Mill (which remains 
substantial anyway): stationary states of society miss the antagonistic element 
of discussion and competition among different opinions which, according to 
Mill, are important for individual and collective progress;  
 as regards Claeys, I have focused only on some specific points: the limited 
extension of the franchise, for instance, maybe is just an example of an 
accidental and temporary provision due to current circumstances, and not 
substantial and inherent to the form of government and its institutional design.  
 Arneson has been criticised here for maintaining that On Liberty is not 
paternalistic, while CRG are; Mill’s political proposal, actually, is functional to 
the social and moral theory expounded in On Liberty. Mill’s democratic theory 
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aims to bring about functional relations among the various political institutions, 
the intellectual, the politicians, and the masses in general, thus creating a 
system fostering moral, civic and social development. 
In conclusion, in this chapter and in the previous one I examined the fact that the 
existence of irrational elements in society and the detachment of the duo freedom-
happiness are main dangers challenging the possibility of the construction of a sort of 
‘Millian democracy’. Most importantly, if freedom no longer serves utilitarian purposes 
in terms of education, cultivation and attainment of pleasures, Mill’s political system 
simply collapses. The role of economic forces cannot be underestimated: interestingly, 
according to Constant these forces are the reason for which private life gets more and 
more important, in place of public and political activities; in Bauman’s sociological 
analysis, we actually see an expansion of private life, which invades public spaces, and 
a retreat from political participation and activism, as a form of self-defence, guided by 
economic and social factors (light capitalism), However, two opportunities arise in this 
context. There seems to be a line from view in which private life is much bigger than the 
public (Constant), to one where public participation is fostered (Mill), to another one, 
Bauman’s theory, in which what is private disappears and we live in a context with no 
substantial landmark. In both Constant and Bauman, economic forces are somehow an 
obstacle to political participation. Apparently, this does not seem necessarily an evil 
from a Millian point of view: at least in Constant’s cases, staying away from political life 
is something that causes forms of pleasure and happiness, and minimal forms of 
political participation are a sort of necessary evil, in order to protect individual 
autonomy in his other activities. In Bauman as well political participation is irrelevant 
as regards the pursuit of happiness – actually, routine in life helps to achieve some sort 
of pleasure and satisfaction. This, however, contrasts with Mill’s views on routine (seen 
as a form of oppression) and on political participation (which provides at least part of 
the educative element which makes the representative government the best possible 
option in terms of organisation of the polity). Above all, the real danger for a possible 
utilitarian foundation of democratic politics is the fact that, in Bauman’s theory, 
happiness is no longer caused by liberty and, actually, incessant free activities make 
people more and more unsatisfied with their life.  
These last pages, however, have shown that we can still use Millian justifications and 
investigate Mill’s philosophy in order: 
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a) to build supranational institutions and overcome the liquefaction process: as 
nation-states are no longer the centre of powers, a new ‘solid’ form has to be 
found. The supranational state may be a possible solution, and in Mill’s political 
philosophy we find reasons and even some guidelines which may help in 
constructing such entities; 
b)  to review the role of the intellectual: where borders no longer exist, at least in 
terms of circulation of information and idea, there may be fertile ground for 
increasing the influence of the most rational people among us. If the 
construction of democratic supranational institutions in Millian spirit is really 
achievable, with the purpose of serving liberal and utilitarian ideals of 
individual freedom, use of reason, and of happiness as the greatest good, then 
within such institutions intellectuals may find easier to foster discussion, 
advocate good causes and let their influence be multiplied thanks to the current 
‘fluidity’ (a term which may even imply progressiveness as well as non-
stationariness in Mill’s terms) along with possibly strengthened democratic 
representative institutions. It is not a matter of hard, although democratically 
legitimated, leadership (as we have seen, it would not be consistent with Mill’s 
political theory, and it would not be feasible in Bauman’s world) but rather of 
soft and rational influence activated within and by the democratic 
infrastructure. Active participation in representative democratic institutions 
may provide the arena in which this influence can be multiplied and made more 
effective. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 188 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY & REFERENCES 
 References from John Stuart Mill’s writings: 
- The Collected Works of John Stuart Mill, ed. J.M. Robson. Toronto: University of 
Toronto Press, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1963-1991, 33 vols. 
The Collected Works are mentioned as CW (e.g.: a reference to Mill’s Utilitarianism, 
chapter I, will be expressed in the following form: Utilitarianism, CW X, pp. 205-208). 
The Considerations on Representative Government are mentioned as CRG.  
 
Bibliography and other references: 
- Anonymous, 1861a. “Considerations on Representative Government. By John 
Stuart Mill. (Parker, Son & Bourn.)”, The Athenæum, 1747 (April 20), pp. 521-
522 
- Anonymous, 1861b. “Considerations on Representative Government. By John 
Stuart Mill. London: Parker, Son, and Bourn. 1861. 8vo. pp. 340”, The Critic, 
22:564 (April 27), pp. 537-538 
- Anonymous, 1861c. “Representative Government”, The Spectator¸ 34:1713 
(April 27), pp. 446-447 
- Anonymous, 1861d. “Considerations on Representative Government. By John 
Stuart Mill. London: Parker, Son, and Bourn. 1861”, The British Quarterly Review, 
34:67 (July),pp. 256-259 
- Anonymous, 1861e. “Mr. Mill on Representative Government”, Westminster 
Review, 20:1 (July), pp. 91-114 
- Anonymous, 1861f. “1. Considerations on Representative Government. By John 
Stuart Mill. London: Parker, Son & Bourn. 1861. 2. Constitution of the United 
States of America, Framed by convention of Delegates from New Hampshire, &c. 
&c., at Philadelphia, September 17th, 1787, New York. 3. Constitution of 
Confederate States of America”, The Calcutta Review, 37:74 (December), pp. 161-
193 
- A Yankee, 1868. “Suffrage as an Educator”, The Spectator, 41:2063 (January 11), 
pp. 43-44 
 189 
 
- Arneson, Richard J., 1982. “Democracy and Liberty in Mill's Theory of 
Government”, Journal of the History of Philosophy, 20:1,pp. 43-63 
- Ball, Terence, 2014. "James Mill", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 
(Summer 2014 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = 
<http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2014/entries/james-mill/> 
- Bauman, Zygmunt, 2000. Liquid Modernity. Cambridge: Polity Press 
- Bauman, Zygmunt, 2007. Liquid Times: Living in an Age of Uncertainty. 
Cambridge: Polity Press 
- Beerbohm, Eric, 2012. In Our Name. The Ethics of Democracy. Princeton and 
Oxford: Princeton University Press 
- Bennett, Scott, 2011. Inglis Clark's other contribution: A critical analysis of the 
Hare-Clark voting system. In: The Samuel Griffith Society, Upholding the 
Australian Constitution Volume Twenty-three. Proceedings of the Twenty-second 
Conference of The Samuel Griffith Society. Hobart, August 2011, pp. 35-47 
- Berlin, Isaiah, 1969. John Stuart Mill and the Ends of Life, in Four Essays on 
Liberty. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 173-206  
- Berlin, Isaiah, 1998 (1962). Does Political Theory Still Exist?, in The Proper Study 
of Mankind. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, pp. 59-90 
- Brink, David O., 2013. Mill's Progressive Principles. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press 
- Brink, David O., 2014. "Mill's Moral and Political Philosophy", The Stanford 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2014 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = 
<http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2014/entries/mill-moral-political/> 
- Brogan, Hugh, 2009. Alexis de Tocqueville. Prophet of Democracy in the Age of 
Revolution. London: Profile Books 
- Brooks, Thom, 2006. “Knowledge and Power in Plato’s Political Thought”,  
International Journal of Philosophical Studies, 14:1, pp. 51-77 
- Brown, Donald G., 2010. “Mill on the Harm in Not Voting”, Utilitas, 22:2, pp. 126-
133 
- Bucchi, Sergio, 1986. “Il saggio sul «Governo» di James Mill e le origini del 
radicalismo filosofico”, Il Pensiero Politico. Rivista di Storia delle Idee Politiche e 
Sociali, 19:2, 182-196 
- Burns, James H., 1968 (1957). J. S. Mill and Democracy, 1829-61, in Schneewind, 
Jerome B. (ed.), 1968. Mill: A Collection of Critical Essays. London: University of 
Notre Dame Press, pp. 280-328 
 190 
 
- Burns, James H., 2005. “Happiness and Utility: Jeremy Bentham’s Equation”. 
Utilitas, 17:1, pp. 46-61 
- Capaldi, Nicholas, 2004. John Stuart Mill: A Biography. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press 
- Cavenagh, Francis Alexander (ed.), 1931. James and John Stuart Mill on 
Education Cambridge: Cambridge University Press  
- Claeys, Gregory, 2013. Mill and Paternalism. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press 
- Coleridge, Samuel Taylor, 1976 (1830). On the Constitution of the Church and 
State, in The Collected Works of Samuel Taylor Coleridge, Volume X. London: 
Routledge and Kegan Paul, Princeton: Princeton University Press 
- Constant, Benjamin, 1980 (1819). De la liberté des Anciens comparée à celle des 
Modernes, in De la liberté chez les modernes. Écrits politiques. Paris : Libraire 
Générale Française, pp. 491-515 
- Courtney, William Prideaux and Lee, Matthew (2004), ‘Hare, Thomas (1806–
1891)’, in: Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, Oxford University Press, 
2004; online edn, Jan 2012 [http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/12307, 
accessed 11 July 2016] 
- Cowling, Maurice, 1963. Mill and Liberalism. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press 
- Dagger, Richard and Lefkowitz, David, 2014. "Political Obligation", The Stanford 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2014 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = 
<http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2014/entries/political-obligation/>. 
- Donatelli, Piergiorgio, 2006. “Mill’s Perfectionism”, Prolegomena, 5:2, pp. 149-
164 
- Donatelli, Piergiorgio, 2007, Introduzione a Mill. Rome and Bari: Laterza 
- Dovi, Suzanne, 2011. “Political Representation”, in The Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy (Winter 2011 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = 
<http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2011/entries/political-
representation/> 
- Drescher, Seymour, 1964. “Tocqueville’s Two Démocraties”, Journal of the 
History of Ideas, 25:2,  pp. 201-216 
- Garforth, Francis William (ed.), 1971. John Stuart Mill on Education. New York: 
Teachers College Press 
- Garforth, Francis William, 1979. John Stuart Mill’s Theory of Education. Oxford: 
Martin Robertson 
 191 
 
- Garforth, Francis William, 1980. Educative Democracy: John Stuart Mill on 
Education in Society. Oxford: Oxford University Press for the University of Hull 
- Glendenning, Simon, 2013. The work of J.S. Mill shows the danger in eliminating 
the differences between European nations. (online) London School of Economics, 
EUROPP blog. Available at: 
<http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2013/09/30/the-work-of-j-s-mill-shows-
the-danger-in-eliminating-the-differences-between-european-nations/> 
(Accessed 6 July 2015) 
- Greco, Anna, 2009. “Natural Inclinations, Specialization, and the Philosopher-
Rulers in Plato’s Republic”, Ancient Philosophy, 29: pp. 17-43 
- Green, Thomas Hill, 1997 (1883). Prolegomena to Ethics, in Nicholson, Peter 
(ed.), 1997. Collected Works of T. H. Green, Bristol: Thoemmes Press, pp. i-427. 
- Guerrero, Alexander A., 2010. “The Paradox of Voting and the Ethics of Political 
Representation”, Philosophy & Public Affairs, 38:3,pp. 272-306 
- Guizot, François, 1871. Histoire de la Civilisation en Europe depuis la chute de 
l’Empire Romain jusqu’à la Révolution Française, Paris: Librairie Académique – 
Didier et Cie, Libraires-Éditeurs 
- Hamburger, Joseph, 1965. Intellectuals in Politics. John Stuart Mill and the 
Philosophic Radicals, New Haven and London: Yale University Press 
- Hamburger, Joseph, 1999. John Stuart Mill on Liberty and Control. Princeton: 
Princeton University Press 
- Hamilton, Andy, 2008. J.S. Mill's Elitism. A Classical Liberal's Response to the Rise 
of Democracy, in Kofmel, Erich (ed.), Anti-Democratic Thought. Exeter: Imprint 
Academic 
- Hare, Thomas, 1857. The Machinery of Representation. 2nd edition, London: W. 
Maxwell 
- Hare, Thomas, 1873. The Election of Representatives, Parliamentary and 
Municipal. A Treatise. London: Longmans, Green, Reader, and Dyer 
- Hare, Thomas, 1879. The Distribution of Seats in Parliament. London: E. J. 
Kibblewhite for the Political Tract Society 
- Henwood, Kenneth, 1979. “Of Philosophers, Kings and Technocrats”, Canadian 
Journal of Philosophy, 9:2, pp. 299-314 
- Hyde, Francis E., 1946. “Utility and Radicalism, 1825-1837. A note on the Mill-
Roebuck friendship”, The Economic History Review, 16:1, pp. 38-44 
- Itzkin, Elissa S., 1978. “Bentham's Chrestomathia: Utilitarian Legacy to English 
Education”, Journal of the History of Ideas, 39:2, pp. 303-316 
 192 
 
- Johnson, Douglas, 1963. Guizot. Aspects of French History 1787-1874. London: 
Routledge & Kegan Press and Toronto: University of Toronto Press 
- Kern, Paul B., 1972. “Universal Suffrage Without Democracy: Thomas Hare and 
John Stuart Mill”, Review of Politics, 34:3, pp. 306-322 
- Kinzer, Bruce L., 1984. Review of: Semmel, Bernard, John Stuart Mill and the 
Pursuit of Virtue, Albion, 16:4, pp. 438-440 
- Kinzer, Bruce L., 2007. J.S. Mill Revisited. Biographical and Political Explorations. 
New York : Palgrave Macmillan 
- Knights, Ben, 1978. The Idea of the Clerisy in the Nineteenth Century. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press 
- Knüfer, Aurélie, 2011. ““L’aptitude à la liberté” de John Stuart Mill à Michael 
Walzer”, Philosophie, 110:2,pp. 72-90 
- Krouse, Richard W., 1982. “Two Concepts of Democratic Representation: James 
and John Stuart Mill”, The Journal of Politics, 44:2, pp. 509-537 
- Kumar, Sujith, 2005. “After Hamburger: The Revisionary Debate in Light of John 
Stuart Mill on Liberty and Control”, Studies in Social and Political Thought, 11, 
pp. 25-39 
- Lever, Annabelle, 2007. “Mill and the Secret Ballot: Beyond Coercion and 
Corruption”, Utilitas, 20:3, pp. 354-378 
- Levin, Michael, 2004. J.S. Mill on Civilization and Barbarism. London-New York: 
Routledge 
- Lyons, David (ed.), 1997. Mill’s Utilitarianism. Critical Essays. Lanham, Maryland, 
and Oxford: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers 
- Macaulay, Thomas Babington, 1992 (1829), Mill on Government, in Mill, James, 
Political Writings, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1992, pp. 271-303 
- Mill, James, 1992 (1819-1823), Essay on Government, in Id., Political Writings, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992, pp. 1-42 
- Mill, James, 1992 (1828), Education, in Id., Political Writings, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1992, pp. 137-194 
- Mill, James, 1992 (1835), Reply to Macaulay From “A Fragment on Mackintosh”, 
in Id., Political Writings, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992, pp. 304-
314 
- Morricone, Corrado, 2014. The work of JS Mill shows the importance of a common 
identity to the principle of European federalism. (online) London School of 
Economics, EUROPP blog. Available at: 
<http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2014/02/13/the-work-of-js-mill-shows-
 193 
 
the-importance-of-a-common-identity-to-the-principle-of-european-
federalism/> (Accessed 6 July 2015) 
- Mueller, Iris Wessel, 1956. John Stuart Mill and French Thought. Urbana: 
University of Illinois Press 
- Mulgan, Tim, 2007. Understanding Utilitarianism. Stocksfield: Acumen 
- Nichols, Mary P., 1984. “The Republic’s Two Alternatives. Philosopher-Kings 
and Socrates”, Political Theory, 12:2, pp. 252-274 
- Packe, Michael St. John, 1954. The Life of John Stuart Mill. New York: Capricorn 
Books 
- Pappé, Helmut Otto, 1964. “Mill and Tocqueville”, Journal of the History of Ideas, 
25:2, pp. 217-234 
- Parsons, Floyd D. (2009). Thomas Hare and Political Representation in Victorian 
Britain. Basingstoke: Palgrave  
- Pentucci, Pier Paolo, 2010. Governo, rappresentanza, federalismo. Un 
attraversamento critico della filosofia politica di John Stuart Mill, Ph.D. thesis. 
Padua: Università di Padova 
- Pitkin, Hanna Fenichel, 1972 (1967). The Concept of Representation. Berkeley, 
Los Angeles and London: University of California Press 
- Plamenatz, John, 1958. The English Utilitarians, Oxford: Basil Blackwell 
- Plato, 1979. Gorgias, Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
- Plato, 1998. Republic, Oxford: Oxford University Press 
- Qualter, Terence H., 1960. “John Stuart Mill, Disciple of de Tocqueville”, The 
Western Political Quarterly, 13:4,pp. 880-889 
- Rees, John C., 1960. “A Re-reading of Mill on Liberty”, Political Studies, 8:2, pp. 
113-129 
- Rees, John C., 1966. “The Reaction to Cowling on Mill”, The Mill News Letter, 1:2, 
pp. 2-11 
- Robson, John M., 1968. The Improvement of Mankind. The Social and Political 
Thought of John Stuart Mill. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul and Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press 
- Rosen, Frederick, 1983. Jeremy Bentham and Representative Democracy: A Study 
of the Constitutional Code. Oxford: Clarendon Press  
- Rosen, Frederick, 2013. Mill. Oxford : Oxford University Press 
- Rummens, Stefan, 2011. “Staging Deliberation: The Role of Representative 
Institutions in the Deliberative Democratic Process”, The Journal of Political 
Philosophy, 20:1,pp. 23-44 
 194 
 
- Ryan, Alan. 1987 (1970). The Philosophy of John Stuart Mill. London: MacMillan 
Press 
- Ryan, Alan, 2012. The Making of Modern Liberalism. Princeton: Princeton 
University Press 
- Savidan, Patrick, 2010. “John Stuart Mill à l’épreuve de l’histoire”. The 
Tocqueville Review/La revue Tocqueville, 33:1, pp. 101-124 
- Scarre, Geoffrey, 1996. Utilitarianism. London and New York: Routledge 
- Scarre, Geoffrey, 2007. Mill’s On Liberty: A Reader’s Guide. London: Continuum 
- Semmel, Bernard, 1984. John Stuart Mill and the Pursuit of Virtue. New Haven: 
Yale University Press 
- Semmel, Bernard, 1998. John Stuart Mill’s Coleridgean Neoradicalism, in 
Eisenach, Eldon J. (ed.), Mill and the Moral Character of Liberalism. University 
Park, Pennsylvania: The Pennsylvania University Press 
- Sidgwick, Henry, 1981 (1874). The Methods of Ethics. Indianapolis: Hackett 
Publishing Company 
- Skorupski, John, 1989. John Stuart Mill. London and New York: Routledge 
- Skorupski, John (ed.), 1998. The Cambridge Companion to Mill. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press 
- Skorupski, John, 2006. Why Read Mill Today? London and New York: Routledge 
- Snyder, Laura J., 2006. Reforming philosophy: a Victorian debate on science and 
society. Chicago: University of Chicago Press 
- Sprague, Rosamond Kent, 1976. Plato’s Philosopher-King. A Study of the 
Theoretical Background, Columbia, South Carolina: University of South Carolina 
Press 
- Stafford, William, 1998. John Stuart Mill, London: Mac Millan Press 
- Steinberger, Peter J., 1989. “Ruling: Guardians and Philosopher-Kings”, The 
American Political Science Review, 83: 4, pp. 1207-1225 
- Stephen, James Fitzjames, 1991 (1873). Liberty, Equality, Fraternity. Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press 
- Taylor, Charles, 2003 (1989). Sources of the Self. The Making of the Modern 
Identity. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 
- Ten, Chin Liew, 1980. Mill on Liberty, Oxford: Clarendon Press 
- Thompson, Dennis Frank, 1976. John Stuart Mill and Representative Government. 
Princeton: Princeton University Press 
- Tocqueville, Alexis de, 1986 (1835). De la démocratie en Amérique I. Paris: 
Gallimard 
 195 
 
- Tocqueville, Alexis de, 1986 (1840). De la démocratie en Amérique II. Paris: 
Gallimard 
- Turk, Christopher, 1998. Coleridge and Mill: A Study of Influence. Aldershot: 
Avebury 
- Turner, Brandon P., 2010. “John Stuart Mill and the Antagonistic Foundation of 
Liberal Politics”, The Review of Politics, 72:1, pp. 25-53 
- Urbinati, Nadia, 2002. Mill on Democracy: from the Athenian Polis to 
Representative Government. Chicago; London: University of Chicago Press 
- Urbinati, Nadia, 2006. Representative Democracy. Principles & Genealogy. 
Chicago-London: The University of Chicago Press 
- Urbinati, Nadia and Warren, Mark E., 2008. “The Concept of Representation in 
Contemporary Democratic Theory”, The Annual Review of Political Science, 11, 
pp. 387-412 
- Urbinati, Nadia and Zakaras, Alex (eds.), 2007. J. S. Mill's political thought: a 
bicentennial reassessment. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 
- Varouxakis, Georgios, 1999. “Guizot’s Historical Works and J.S. Mill’s Reception 
of Tocqueville”, History of Political Thought, 20:2, pp. 292-312. 
- Varouxakis, Georgios, 2002. Mill on Nationality. London and New York: 
Routledge. 
- Vegetti, Mario, 1998. Techne, in Platone, La Repubblica, Vol. I, Libro I, edited by 
Mario Vegetti, Naples: Bibliopolis, pp. 193-207 
- Waldron, Jeremy, 2013. “Political Political Theory”, The Journal of Political 
Philosophy, 21:1, pp. 1-23 
- Warner, Beth E., 2001. “John Stuart Mill's Theory of Bureaucracy within 
Representative Government: Balancing Competence and Participation”, Public 
Administration Review, 61:4, pp. 403-413 
- Wollheim, Richard, 1973. “John Stuart Mill and the Limits of State Action”, Social 
Research, 40:1, pp. 1-30 
